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Introduction
In the late 1990s, a team of Princeton geneticists led by Joe Tsien 
succeeded in adding an extra copy of the NR2B gene to the genome of a 
mouse called Doogy.1 This choice of name was definitely not arbitrary, 
for just like the fictional television science prodigy Doogy Howser MD, 
the mouse was reported to acquire new knowledge at an unparalleled pace 
and retain it much longer than unmodified mice. Subsequent experiments 
with the NR2B gene yielded less convincing results, but the research team 
hopes that, once proved safe, this procedure could offer a revolutionary 
treatment for brain damage caused by Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s. Even 
more spectacularly, they also speculate about what might be achieved by 
inserting additional copies of the NR2B gene in humans with normally 
functioning brains. Because if the treatment could restore damaged brains 
to health, then it could perhaps also be used to boost the capacities of the 
brain beyond its normal functioning.
In a recent article, the German behavioral geneticist Klaus-Peter Lesch 
claims to have identified a sequence of DNA on chromosome 5-HTTLPR 
that, in his view, has an important influence on our state of wellbeing.2 
His study shows that people who are born with a shorter version of this 
sequence are more susceptible to negative feelings and emotions such as 
depression, anxiety, and frustration. Those born with a longer version of 
the sequence, on the other hand, are reported to be more temperamentally 
upbeat and optimistic than the average person. Lesch still has no defini-
tive explanation why this is the case, but there is good evidence that it has 
something to do with the fact that this sequence of DNA is responsible 
for regulating the reuptake of serotonin, the monoamine neurotransmitter 
also targeted by the antidepressant Prozac. But if his thesis proves to be 
correct, then it would be theoretically possible for parents to give their 
prospective children a guaranteed happy life by having only the longer 
version of this sequence engineered into their genome.
A number of recent announcements of progress and innovations in ge-
netic science indicate that we are on the verge of entering a whole new era 
1 Tang, Y., Shimzu, E., Dube, G. R., et al. (1999), ‘Genetic enhancement of learning and 
memory in mice,’ Nature 401: 63-69.
2 Lesch, K., Greenberg, B. D., Higley, J. D., et al., ‘Serotonin transporter, personality, 
and behavior,’ in Molecular Genetics and the Human Personality, eds. J. Benjamin, R. 
Ebstein and R. Belmaker (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2002).
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in human evolution. Rapid advancements in genomics, most notably the 
completion of the Human Genome Project in 2000, have opened up the 
way for the manipulation of the human genetic heritage by technological 
means. In Jürgen Habermas’s words, “what hitherto was ‘given’ as organ-
ic nature, and could at most be ‘bred,’ now shifts to the realm of artifacts 
and their production.”3 Although there are still a lot of practical barriers 
that have to be overcome before it will be possible to modify human DNA 
in the same way as DNA in plants and non-human animals can be modi-
fied, “the question is no longer whether we will manipulate embryos, but 
when, where, and how.”4 The most obvious application of human genetic 
technologies is in the prevention and healing of disease. It would, for ex-
ample, become possible to insert healthy copies of a gene into cells that 
contain a defective gene so that the cells start to make the correct protein. 
However, as innovative as gene therapy may be, its sole aim is to restore 
diseased bodies to health, and as such it is still largely continuous with es-
tablished medical practices. But this is far less clear, though, in the case of 
what is called “genetic enhancement,” for here genetic knowledge about 
the genetic underpinnings of the phenotype is not used for treating dis-
ease, but to design human beings according to human will. It remains to be 
seen how radical these developments will prove to be, but, as biophysicist 
Gregory Stock maintains, it is already certain that “the enormous collec-
tive project of conscious human evolution has begun.”5
While the technologies for genetic modification are quite recent, 
the attempt to enhance the biological characteristics of human beings 
is hardly unique to the “age of genomics,” for clear parallels could be 
drawn with the ideals of eugenics.6 Formulated in the late 19th century 
by Francis Galton, the term eugenics refers to both a branch of science 
and a popular movement that sought to improve human hereditary traits 
through a variety of social policies and practices. Although the content 
of the eugenic project varied considerably from country to country, it is 
best known for its support for policies of racial segregation and enforced 
sterilization in the United States and Nazi Germany. Although very little 
of the scientific basis on which these 20th century eugenic practices were 
premised withstands critical scrutiny, they do provide an important back-
ground to the contemporary politico-philosophical debate over the moral 
acceptability or otherwise of human genetic modification. The central 
3 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 12.
4 Gregory Stock, Redesigning Humans: Choosing our Genes, Changing our Future 
(Boston/New York: Mariner Books, 2003), 2. 
5 Ibid., 184.
6 See for example George J. Annas and Sherman Elias, Gene Mapping: Using Law and 
Ethics as Guides (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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Introduction
assumption guiding much of the literature on the socio-ethical implica-
tions of new genetic technologies is that if they have eugenic effects, then 
they are also morally unacceptable. Recently, however, some commenta-
tors have taken a different approach to this issue, arguing that there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with the goals of eugenics as such, and that 
its moral acceptability depends on the values and principles of the politi-
cal ideology that regulates its implementation in society.7 They reject as 
unjustified any comparison that might be drawn between the contempo-
rary idea of human genetic modification and the Nazi eugenics program 
by indicating that the “new eugenics” will be firmly rooted in the liberal 
principles of individual autonomy and value plurality. Their central claim 
is that if the state remains neutral in this matter and does not intervene to 
enforce a particular conception of the good to be sought through genetic 
modification, then a “liberal eugenics” will greatly reinforce the freedoms 
associated with reproduction. Critics, on the other hand, claim that any 
attempt to integrate the eugenic ideal into a liberal framework is bound to 
fail and that it will corrupt the central tenets of liberalism to the point of 
turning it into its opposite.8 Although this argument takes many different 
forms, the basic assumption is that human genetic enhancement should 
be rejected because it poses a potential threat to human nature. Moreover, 
since the idea of an immutable human nature is intrinsic to the notion of 
human dignity, this threat extends to the whole meaning of what it is to 
be human.
Although it is not our intention to intervene directly into this contem-
porary debate over human genetic enhancement by taking position, it 
nonetheless constitutes the starting point and focus of the present book. 
7 See for example Agar, Liberal Eugenics; John Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethi-
cal Case for Making Better People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); 
Lee M. Silver, Remaking Eden: How Genetic Engineering and Cloning Will Transform 
the American Family (New York: Avon Books, 1998); Ronald Dworkin, ‘Playing God: 
Genes, clones and luck,’ in Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Jonathan Glover, What Sort of 
People Should There Be? (New York: Penguin Books, 1984); Philip Kitcher, The Lives 
to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities (London: Penguin, 1996); 
Nick Bostrom (2003), ‘Human genetic Enhancements: A Transhumanist Perspective,’ 
Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (4): 493-506. 
8 See for example Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future. Consequences of the Bio-
technological Revolution (London: Profile Books, 2002); Habermas, The Future of 
Human Nature; Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection. Ethics in the Age of 
Genetic Engineering (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2008), George J. Annas, American Bioethics. Crossing Human Rights and Health Law 
Boundaries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Leon Kass (2003), ‘Ageless 




The question of human genetic modification currently remains just that – 
a question. The ultimate threshold has still not yet been crossed. Should 
humanity go beyond this point of no return? Both advocates and oppo-
nents of human genetic modification seem to be narrowing the scope of 
the debate to this mode of questioning, without realizing that they thereby 
base their position on a similar set of assumptions about the nature of and 
relation between the concepts of “life” and “technology” that prevents 
them from reflecting on the question of human genetic modification in a 
sufficiently radical way. Regardless of whether the question is answered 
in the negative or in the positive, in both lines of reasoning the underlying 
assumption is that the question of human genetic modification essentially 
concerns the implications of an epochal confrontation between two radi-
cally heterogeneous forces: human life on the one side and technology on 
the other. In what follows, we will argue that this bespeaks a thoroughly 
inadequate conception of the human-technology relation, one that obfus-
cates more than it clarifies. Yet, the disturbing fact that many still uncriti-
cally rely on such an instrumental conception of technology – even at the 
very moment that its impotency stands exposed – indicates that it is very 
hard when not even impossible to extricate oneself completely from its 
hold. Be that as it may, we will take a completely different approach to 
this issue, and will seek to argue in what follows that the very fact that it 
is possible to modify the human genome retroactively reveals that there 
never was anything like a human nature in the first place. Is the human 
being’s proper dwelling place the realm of physis or the realm of tekhnē? 
Such a question might at first sight seem strange or even nonsensical, but 
it surely can no longer be left in abeyance if we want to stand up to the 
demands of our age.
The first chapter (Enhanced Life) will critically discuss the current 
politico-philosophical debate concerning the permissibility of a liberal 
eugenics and argue that none of the dominant positions on human genetic 
enhancement is entirely satisfactory due to the limited, monadic concep-
tion of the human that is adopted in these models. It will be argued that 
the positions of both advocates and opponents of a liberal eugenics are 
inconsistent on a conceptual level as, ultimately, both end up violating 
the very central liberal principle of individual autonomy that they each 
nonetheless pretend to defend. In particular, it will be shown that while 
the argument against a new eugenics necessarily entails a preemptive de-
humanization of any potential enhanced form of life, the argument for it 
threatens to reduce any non-enhanced form of life to the status of “wrong-
ful life” or a life not worth living.
In the second chapter (Bare Life), it will be argued that the contradic-
tion that any attempt to either improve or protect human nature produces 
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a form of life devoid of intrinsic value can only be properly understood 
when it is transcribed in terms of what Michel Foucault called biopoli-
tics. Foucault’s thesis holds that modernity saw the gradual substitution 
of the sovereign model of power by a regime of biopower, in the sense 
that the deployment, strengthening and improvement of the biological 
dimension of human existence became the principal object and target of 
modern political strategies. Both Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito 
have, however, recently pointed out that Foucault left us with a paradox 
which he was never able to resolve. For how is it possible that the ris-
ing to dominance of a form of power that precisely seeks to protect and 
strengthen life also generated a political regime – Nazism – whose eugen-
ic practices aimed at the suppression of life? After discussing Agamben’s 
and Esposito’s responses to this question, it will be argued that the future 
emergence of a responsible eugenics is predicated on a critical under-
standing of the conceptions of life that they have developed: on the one 
hand, the human being exposed to the violence of a politics over life 
(“bare” or “sacred” life) and, on the other hand, the human being who will 
become the subject of a politics of life to come (“form-of-life”).
The third chapter (Enframed Life) starts from the still widely neglected 
fact that Heidegger’s writings contain several critical remarks on what he 
considered to be the ultimate aim of “technological enframing,” namely 
the “the artificial breeding of human material.”9 It will be argued that, 
contrary to what has been generally assumed, Heidegger didn’t refer to 
these developments as a mere illustration of his theory of technology but 
that genetic intervention figured as the negative paradigm on the basis of 
which he developed this theory in the first place. For Heidegger, the dan-
ger of biotechnology does not consist in concrete empirical threats posed 
by technical interventions in the human genome but in the threat that man 
will completely forget his ecstatic belonging to Being. The question will 
be raised, however, how Heidegger can substantiate the claim that genetic 
modification puts man’s essence at risk, given his well-known criticism 
of attempts to ground man’s essence in a biological dimension. It will be 
argued that this suggests that Heidegger’s philosophy is not completely 
anti-naturalistic, as has been generally believed, but that he was only criti-
cal of the “zoological” conceptions of man of the metaphysical humanist 
tradition, because it is on the basis of these conceptions that man currently 
understands himself solely in biogenetic terms.
The fourth chapter (Natal Life) will use Hannah Arendt’s brief but 
poignant remarks in the prologue to The Human Condition about the 
9 Martin Heidegger, Four Seminars, trans. A. Mitchell and F. Raffoul (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), 106.
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advent of a biotechnological revolution as a starting point for a renewed 
reflection on her concept of natality. Arendt calls natality, the fact that 
human beings enter the world through birth, the central category of politi-
cal thought. But how can she assert that being born conditions one to act 
freely if she also seems to maintain that it is through labor, not action, 
that human beings deal with their biologically conditioned processes? 
Expanding on Arendt’s largely neglected references to the work of the 
German anthropologist Arnold Gehlen, it will be argued that the concept 
of natality precisely undoes any strict division between zoē and bios, the 
conditioned and spontaneous, because it names the radical co-implication 
of biological birth and politico-linguistic birth. On the basis of this new 
understanding of natality, it will be argued that technological intervention 
in human reproduction will not irrevocably infringe on the human capac-
ity to make radical new beginnings.
The fifth chapter (Prosthetic Life) will draw on Bernard Stiegler’s 
theory of originary technicity to argue that human life is phylogenetically 
as well as ontogenetically radically bound up with technical prostheses 
and thus that, in a sense, the human is always already technologically 
“enhanced.” According to Stiegler, the human can be defined as neither 
a biological state nor a philosophical condition (mind, consciousness, 
etc.) because it comes into being through technics. To substantiate this 
claim, we will focus on Stiegler’s reading of the French paleontologist 
André Leroi-Gourhan who has argued that the stone flint and the cerebral 
cortex co-evolved in a process of reflexive development, and thus that 
the appearance of homo sapiens is in the most literal sense an effect of 
the pre-hominid’s tool-use. This will allow us to conclude that biogenetic 
intervention is neither unprecedented, nor “anti-natural,” but that it has 
made the process of humanization possible in the first place. One of the 
most important consequences of seeing technology as the intrinsic con-
dition of humanity will be that simply being “for” or “against” genetic 





At the beginning of the 1970s, less than two decades after James 
Watson and Francis Crick had first described the basic structure of the 
DNA molecule and famously claimed to have unraveled “the secret of 
life,” microbiologists Kathleen Dana and Daniel Nathans made a lesser- 
known yet equally groundbreaking discovery. They showed that the 
restriction enzyme endonuclease R, found in Haemophilus influenzae 
bacteria, can be used to cut DNA at specifically targeted locations.1 This 
discovery, for which Nathans – together with Hamilton Smith and Werner 
Arber – received the 1978 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, was 
so remarkable that it would come to be regarded as the first major break-
through on the path to the deliberate modification of the genome of a 
living being. A decisive step was taken approximately two years later by 
Dana and Nathans’ colleagues, Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen,2 who 
became the first scientists to succeed in using Nathans’ cutting technique 
to isolate a DNA molecule and attach it to a plasmid, a piece of extrachro-
mosomal DNA found in E. coli bacteria, using DNA ligases. Proceeding 
in this way, they were able to create what is known as a recombinant DNA 
molecule. The special characteristic of such an artificial DNA molecule 
is that it can be transferred to any other living organism, where – if all 
goes well – it will be transcribed, translated, and, ultimately, caused to 
produce a particular protein. Boyer later founded the biotech company 
Genentech and used recombinant DNA technology to produce synthetic 
human insulin. The possibilities inherent to deliberately altering an or-
ganism’s genome will obviously allow for many more promising medical 
applications in the near future, however.
Yet, there is little doubt that the domain which will be most radically 
affected by these developments in genetics is that of human reproduction. 
1 Kathleen Dana and Daniel Nathans (1971), ‘Specific cleavage of simian virus 40 DNA 
by restriction endonuclease of Hemophilus influenzae,’ Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 68: 
2913-2917.
2 Stanley N. Cohen, Annie C. Y. Chang, Herbert W. Boyer and Robert B. Helling (1973), 
‘Construction of Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro,’ Proc. Natl. 
Acad. Sci. USA 70: 3240-3244.
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It is true that over the last few decades, this domain has already under-
gone a number of major changes as a result of the introduction of new 
technologies such as artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization 
(IVF). But there are good reasons to assume that genetic modification 
technologies will bring about even more radical transformations. After 
all, unlike assisted reproduction technologies, human genetic modifica-
tion technologies are not intended to improve the chances of new human 
beings’ coming into being, but to allow us to make decisions about what 
kind of human beings come into being. That is to say, these technologies 
will give us the power to endow human beings with specific genetic traits 
and characteristics. Although these technologies are still very much in 
their infancy, speculation about their future applications has encompassed 
significant improvements in the therapies currently available for known 
genetic disorders and engineered immunity to serious diseases such as 
cancer and HIV as well as the creation of entirely new biological func-
tions, such as flight and the breeding of a superior race of transhuman 
beings.3 Whether some, all, or none of these predictions are actually real-
ized remains to be seen. Perhaps scientists are simply too optimistic about 
where the current revolution in molecular genetics is headed. Nicolas 
Agar, for example, reminds us that at the beginning of the 20th century, 
many believed we would be using nuclear-powered vacuum cleaners and 
growing ready-to-serve portions of chicken by the end of the century.4 
Some of the predictions surrounding genetic technologies may also turn 
out to be products of overactive imaginations, but it could be argued that 
this is no reason to postpone critical reflection until there is more cer-
tainty about what is realistically possible. After all, as has been shown on 
many occasions, there is always the risk that scientific and technological 
developments occur so unexpectedly that any thorough discussion about 
their possible impact is rendered impossible. As Hans Jonas pointed out 
in the 1970s with regard to genetic engineering, “[s]ince no less than the 
very nature and image of man are at issue, prudence becomes our first 
ethical duty, and hypothetical reasoning our first responsibility.”5
Yet, if the main question is not if but when these technologies will 
be available, it would probably be no exaggeration to say that we are on 
the threshold of a post-Darwinian era in evolution. The central assump-
tion of (Neo-)Darwinism holds that selection only occurs at the genetic 
3 See for example Andy Miah (2008), ‘Engineering Greater Resilience or Radical Trans-
human Enhancement?’ Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2 (1): 1-18.
4 Nicolas Agar, Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (Malden, MA/
Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 23.
5 Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays. From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Chi-
cago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 141.
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Enhanced Life
level, in the sense that variations acquired at the somatic level are not 
passed from one generation to the next. This idea was first formalized in 
the 19th century by the German biologist August Weismann, who argued 
that an impermeable barrier exists between the germ cell line and the line 
of somatic cells. According to Weismann, evolution is a one-way street: 
germ cells produce somatic cells and are heritable, but somatic cells exert 
no influence on germ cells and are therefore evolutionary inert. What 
counts in evolution is the genotype, not the phenotype. In modern biol-
ogy, a revised version of Weismann’s germplasm theory was formulated 
by Francis Crick, who called it the Central Dogma of Molecular Biology.6 
The Central Dogma describes the normal flow of biological information 
in an organism and states that the flow proceeds from DNA to RNA and 
then to proteins, but not in the reverse order. As there is no back-flow of 
information from the body to the genome, the only changes that can occur 
in the genome are random mutations and rearrangements. In other words, 
any changes that may occur in the body of an individual organism and any 
knowledge or skills it might acquire during its lifetime are inevitably and 
irrevocably lost to the species as a whole when the individual organism 
dies. However, if it is true that Neo-Darwinism is constructed entirely 
upon the premise that “the genetic program does not take lessons from 
experience,”7 then it seems that the emergence of genetic technologies 
will cause the human species to enter a new phase in evolution. After all, 
if it is possible to introduce changes in the genome deliberately, then it 
appears that the genetic program can indeed “take lessons” from experi-
ence. Ultimately, as these technologies come to be applied more widely, 
evolution will no longer occur through natural selection, but through ar-
tificial selection.
However, some argue that while it may be true that these technolo-
gies are completely new, the goal of deliberate selection is not in fact as 
revolutionary as it first appears. Clearly, deciding whom we want to have 
children with already provides us with some measure of control over the 
genetic characteristics of our children. Moreover, the assisted reproduc-
tive technologies that are currently available can also be used for this pur-
pose. A paradigmatic example of an attempt to use assisted reproduction 
technology for the singular purpose of wielding greater influence over the 
future of one’s prospective child is the famous Repository for Germinal 
Choice. Founded in 1978 by the American millionaire Robert K. Graham, 
the Repository offered access to sperm samples from men who had 
6 Francis Crick (1970), ‘The Central Dogma of Molecular Biology,’ Nature 227: 
561-563.




excelled in their fields to women who hoped that inseminating them-
selves with the sperm cells of a gifted scientist or successful athlete would 
give their children a good chance of developing the same traits as their 
donor-father. However, although it has been reported that at least some 
of the Repository children came to be about as successful as their donors 
in later life, many attempts to select specific characteristics have failed 
because they were not based on scientific knowledge of the genetic foun-
dations underpinning the traits and characteristics the researchers aimed 
to produce in a child. Unless such procedures are combined with a certain 
amount of genetic technology, it is highly unlikely that they will yield the 
desired result. For this reason, but possibly also because the prices were 
simply too high, the Repository failed to attract enough customers to be 
profitable and eventually went out of business in 1999.
Perhaps the most fine-tuned procedure currently available for selec-
tive reproduction is preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).8 The gen-
eral idea behind PGD is that a number of embryos are first created using 
IVF and subsequently tested genetically. On the basis of these test results, 
the prospective parents can choose which of the embryos will be retained 
for implantation. Of course, this technique presupposes that sufficient in-
formation is available about the genetic basis of the condition the parents 
are interested in. Assuming this is the case, though, PGD is clearly a much 
more refined technique for selecting a particular type of child than paying 
a visit to Graham’s Repository. Inevitably, however, there are also some 
serious disadvantages to PDG. Any procedure that involves the selection 
of embryos for implantation will also entail a decision about what will 
happen to the embryos that are not selected. These may be stored and 
implanted at a later date; used for research purposes; or, given that they 
possess certain undesired characteristics, simply discarded. This issue 
raises a number of legal and ethical questions which we shall not explore 
here.9 It should be clear, though, that PGD requires that parents make a 
selection not among different versions of one possible future child, but 
among different possible children who already exist in a premature state. 
Moreover, PDG restricts prospective parents’ choices to the types of pos-
sible future children that would normally be provided by nature; it does 
not allow them to design a child entirely according to their own wishes. 
If this were ever to be possible, human genetic modification technologies 
would be required.
8 See for example Anne McLaren, ‘Prospects for pre-implantation diagnosis of genetic 
disease,’ in B. Holland and C. Kyriacou (eds.), Genetics and Society (Wokingham: 
Addison-Wesley, 1993): 67-85. 
9 See for example Günter Rager (2008), ‘Is preimplantation genetic diagnosis ethically 
acceptable?’ Bioethica Forum 1 (2): 81-88. 
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The Return of Eugenics
What Graham attempted to do with his Repository, what PDG – with-
in certain limits – can accomplish with more precision, and what genetic 
modification promises to do much more effectively in the near future, 
is seize control of the genetic endowment of our descendants. It aims to 
change them for the better. Some political philosophers and bioethicists 
have argued that we should embrace this new control wholeheartedly and 
prepare for the advent of a new eugenic era. There is still much discussion 
among the advocates of a new eugenics regarding the precise meaning 
and scope of this term, but broadly speaking it can be said to promote 
the idea that prospective parents be given as much freedom as possible 
to decide which genetic traits their children will or will not possess upon 
birth. Such extensive reproductive freedom would allow parents not only 
to intervene in the genetic make-up of their future children for therapeutic 
purposes, but also to choose traits according to their personal preferences. 
Thus, in addition to the medical goals of preventing disease and restoring 
health, it would also allow for the enhancement of phenotypic character-
istics such as intelligence, strength, height, and memory.
It is notable, however, that few advocates of a new eugenics are will-
ing to call the practice they support by that name. John Harris, for exam-
ple, prefers to speak of “deliberate selection”10 and Gregory Stock favors 
the term “human self-design.”11 These authors’ reluctance to use the term 
“eugenics” obviously has much to do with the shadow that still hangs 
over earlier attempts to make improvements to the biological foundations 
of human life. Many critics are indeed afraid that the emergence of a new 
eugenics will also prompt the return of some of the horrific acts committed 
in the field’s name, such as the atrocities committed by Nazi eugenicists. 
This association is so strong that occasionally, when a practice is referred 
to as eugenic, it is in fact being described as morally reproachable.12 The 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, for example, out-
lines the “prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at 
the selection of persons,”13 without explaining what such practices are and 
why they would pose a threat to human dignity. Apparently, the mere use 
of the label is enough to indicate that the laws relate to a field of practices 
10 Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 4.
11 Stock, Redesigning Humans, 3.
12 See for example Stephen Wilkinson (2008), ‘“Eugenics talk” and the language of bio-
ethics,’ Journal of Medical Ethics 34: 467-471; Diane B. Paul (1992), ‘Eugenic Anxi-
eties, Social Realities, and Political Choices,’ Social Research 59 (3): 663-683.
13 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/1), Chapter 1, 
Article 3 (Right to the integrity of the person).
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that any reasonable person would find morally objectionable. Conversely, 
those who argue in favor of a new eugenics are almost invariably accused 
of offering a thinly veiled justification of Nazism. Clearly, much of this 
argument is largely rhetorical. Even the most radical opponents of a new 
eugenics are aware that eugenics cannot be reduced wholly to its Nazi 
variant. Nevertheless, even a brief look at the history of eugenics reveals 
that there are good reasons to be wary of the call for a new eugenics.14
The term eugenics (from the Greek “good birth”) first emerged at the 
end of the 19th century in the work of Francis Galton – a cousin of Charles 
Darwin – who defined it as follows:
The science of improving stock, which is by no means confined to questions 
of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case of man, takes cogni-
zance of all influences that tend in however remote a degree to give the more 
suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over 
the less suitable than they otherwise would have.15
Galton’s original intuition was that the unequal distribution of intel-
ligence among family pedigrees could be entirely explained by heritable 
factors. He therefore proposed that it should be possible to improve the 
overall level of intelligence in a population by encouraging members of 
favored families to have more children and discouraging members of less 
favored families from doing so. Galton’s influence was almost immediate 
and within the next few decades, eugenics societies were established all 
across Europe and the Americas. Eugenics was both a respectable aca-
demic discipline and a popular movement. While many universities were 
beginning to offer courses on eugenic science and collect data on family 
pedigrees, eugenicists were also organizing popular fairs and exhibitions 
and even holding “fitter families” and “best baby” competitions. Galton 
himself was only interested in the hereditary factors that might influence 
intellectual virtue, but an enormous number of similar studies carried out 
in his wake subsequently claimed to have found the hereditary basis of 
many other characteristics and behaviors. Thus, as the movement grew 
and also began to attract attention in political circles, eugenics swiftly 
14 For an excellent and extensive historical account of the eugenics movement, see Dan-
iel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics. Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). The following overview largely 
draws on the useful summary contained in Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman 
Daniels and Daniel Wikler, From Chance to Choice. Genetics & Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 30-40.
15 Francis Galton, Inquiries Into Human Faculty and its Development (London: 
J. M. Dent & Company, 1883), 17.
23
Enhanced Life
became a catch-all term that could refer to all kinds of practices and meas-
ures for improving the biological characteristics of a population.
Yet, despite the wide variety of meanings attributed to the term, it 
could be said that all eugenicists accepted three basic assumptions. First, 
they believed that populations were being threatened by a growing pro-
cess of degeneration. It was thought that welfare programs, improved 
medicine, and better living conditions in general gave those who would 
normally be on the losing side of the Darwinian fight for survival an “un-
naturally” high chance of persevering in existence. In addition, as these 
“deficient” persons tended to reproduce in larger numbers, the net result 
for the population would be a steady decline of those endowed with “fa-
vorable” characteristics. Second, it was assumed that behavioral charac-
teristics were heritable. This was the case not only in France, where most 
eugenicists still accepted the Lamarckian theory of the heritability of ac-
quired characteristics, but also in countries where eugenicists adhered to 
a more standard version of Darwinism. Finally, eugenicists also agreed 
on the overall aim of eugenics. They believed that a better understand-
ing of the mechanisms of human heredity would enable scientists and 
politicians to take measures towards improving the overall quality of the 
population’s gene pool.
There was less agreement amongst eugenicists, however, about how 
this goal was to be achieved. Galton himself would not go further than the 
idea of encouraging the fittest to have large families but there were many 
other eugenicists who believed that more drastic measures were neces-
sary to put a stop to the creeping process of degeneration. In the United 
States and elsewhere, laws were being passed to legalize the involuntary 
sterilization of the “feeble-minded.” In the famous Buck v. Bell case, for 
example, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected an ap-
peal made by 18-year-old psychiatric patient Carrie Buck who claimed 
that, by ordering her sterilization, the state of Virginia had violated her 
constitutional rights. In his ruling, Holmes defended his decision by argu-
ing that:
It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate off-
spring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can pre-
vent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle 
that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the 
Fallopian tubes. […] Three generations of imbeciles are enough.16
In the light of such cases, it is unsurprising that Nazi eugenicists 
were quick to point out that the United States served as a model for their 
16 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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own sterilization program. Of course, Nazi Germany’s program of racial 
hygiene surpassed all other eugenic policies in both scale and cruelty; 
no other regime has ever concluded that the only means of achieving 
its eugenic goals was to eliminate the “unfit elements” of its population. 
However, it is certainly not the case that authoritarian regimes are the 
only ones to have supported coercive measures. As mentioned above, 
similar sterilization laws were adopted in the United States but also in 
countries where the social democrats were in power, such as Sweden and 
Denmark. Moreover, the 1935 Nuremberg Laws on Citizenship and Race 
were not the first government regulations enacted on the basis of eugenic 
concerns. By the beginning of the 20th century, most states of the USA had 
already adopted miscegenation laws. Later, following World War One, the 
United States would drastically restrict immigration from Southern and 
Eastern European countries out of the fear that the mass arrival of new-
comers with inferior genes would negatively affect the American gene 
pool. Furthermore, much of the research carried out on “bad genes” relied 
on poor science and were often nothing more than simple reflections of 
race and class biases. Deficient traits and behaviors which were thought 
to have a hereditary basis included not only immorality, criminality and 
even poverty, but also character and talent. It is unlikely that more thor-
ough scientific research into the hereditary foundations of certain traits 
and behaviors would have made a decisive difference, since the science of 
genetics was still very much in its infancy. Moreover, many of the leading 
academics in the eugenics movement were actually social scientists, who 
were looking for statistical correlations between social position and what 
they perceived to be inherited capabilities.
In view of these disconcerting historical facts, it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that eugenics is so often depicted in negative terms. Yet despite its in-
glorious history, the concept of eugenics continues to attract enthusiastic 
supporters. There appears to be something undeniably appealing in the 
essential idea of eugenics, something that prevents us from rejecting it in 
its entirety. Who, after all, would not want to give his or her child the best 
possible genetic endowment? Convinced that the potential benefits of ge-
netic technologies in human reproduction are too valuable to renounce 
on the basis of past abuses, advocates of a new eugenics argue that the 
main question is not whether the Nazi eugenics program was abhorrent 
– a question to which no sane person could respond in the negative – but 
whether the atrocities committed in the name of eugenics were not in fact 
the result of the underlying Nazi ideology rather than something intrinsic 
to the field of eugenics itself. Provided that the eugenic goal of improving 
human beings still enjoys universal support and approval, and that the 
moral acceptability of eugenics depends on the values and principles of 
the political ideology regulating its implementation in society, then, they 
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suggest, it might still be possible to devise a form of eugenics that is com-
patible with the fundamental tenets of contemporary liberal democracy.
The Liberal Eugenics
Nicholas Agar, one of today’s most vocal advocates of a new eugenics, 
has recently argued that the central principles of liberalism provide am-
ple guidance for avoiding the moral pitfalls of earlier forms of eugenics: 
“[T]he addition of the word ‘liberal’ to ‘eugenics’ transforms an evil doc-
trine into a morally acceptable one.”17 In his view, the most important 
difference between the authoritarian eugenics of the past and the liberal 
eugenics he envisages is simply the degree of control that the state has 
over the reproductive choices of its citizens: “While old fashioned au-
thoritarian eugenicists sought to produce citizens out of a centrally de-
signed mould, the distinguishing mark of the new liberal eugenics is state 
neutrality.”18 Robert Nozick was perhaps the first liberal philosopher to 
argue for a decentralized eugenic policy. In Anarchy, State and Utopia 
he suggests that in the coming age of genetic engineering, reproduction 
could best be regulated by creating a genetic supermarket: “This super-
market system has the great virtue that it involves no centralized decision 
fixing the future human type(s).”19 State neutrality is, of course, central to 
any liberal democratic system which aims to protect the principle of value 
pluralism. Liberal democratic societies are founded on the beliefs that, 
firstly, individuals may have radically different ideas about what makes 
a good life, and secondly, a government should not interfere with the 
choices made by its citizens in pursuing these ideas. In its original for-
mulation, the principle of value pluralism was primarily intended to safe-
guard freedom of religion and expression, but liberal eugenicists believe 
that it is broad enough to cover the freedom to use genetic technologies 
in the field of reproduction.20 This means that governments must refrain 
from interfering not only with the more ordinary reproductive choices of 
its citizens – as whom they want to have children with, how many chil-
dren they want to have, and indeed whether they want to have children 
at all – but also with new reproductive choices made possible by genetic 
technologies – such as what kind of children they want to have. In its 
negative form, this principle ought to prevent a government imposing 
specific reproductive goals on its citizens, including the shaping of future 
17 Agar, Liberal Eugenics, 135.
18 Nicholas Agar (1998), ‘Liberal eugenics,’ Public Affairs Quarterly 12 (2): 137. 
19 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 315.
20 See John A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Tech-
nologies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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human beings according to an “ideal type.” In its positive form, it gives 
prospective parents the freedom to consult their own values in deciding 
which genetic traits they want to pass on to their children. As Agar sums it 
up, “[a]uthoritarian eugenicists would do away with ordinary procreative 
freedoms. Liberals instead propose radical extensions of them.”21
One of the most important reasons why liberal eugenicists are con-
vinced that there is no need for moral panic in the face of a new eugenic 
era is that genetic interventions are not radically different from other 
types of interventions made in human beings. That is to say, they see no 
morally relevant difference between shaping humans by making modifi-
cations to their environment and shaping humans by making modifica-
tions to their genes. There are two aspects to this claim. First, it allows 
liberal eugenicists to refute the common argument that genetic interven-
tion is substantially more intrusive than any other influence we may have 
over the development of another human being. Agar calls this the nurture 
principle: “If we are permitted to produce certain traits by modifying our 
children’s environments, then we are also permitted to produce them by 
modifying their genomes.”22 Note that this principle does not serve as 
a justification for unlimited genetic modification but only suggests that 
such modifications do not pose radically different problems from those 
pertaining to other influences parents already have over their children’s 
development. Consider the example of improved intelligence. If parents 
are allowed and even encouraged to increase their children’s intelligence 
by providing them with the best possible education, why, then, should 
they not be allowed to pursue the same goal by means of genetic tech-
nologies? Second, if there is no substantial difference between genetic 
intervention and other influences that parents have over the development 
of their children, then there is also no need to develop new ethical guide-
lines and legal regulations for genetic technologies, because the freedom 
to use such technologies is already protected by the existing right to re-
productive freedom. Moreover, as John Harris has argued, this right does 
not merely involve “the exercise of bare preference, like drinking cof-
fee or playing tennis,” but could be compared to “a fundamental human 
right.”23 Positioning reproductive freedom alongside other fundamental 
rights, such as freedom of religion, Harris concludes that parents should 
enjoy a maximum of freedom in the domain of reproduction and thus that 
any arguments proposed against genetic enhancement would need to be 
of a very high order to overrule this right.
21 Agar, Liberal Eugenics, 137.
22 Ibid., 113.
23 Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 75.
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Liberal eugenicists also argue that the nurture principle is supported by 
genetic research, in the sense that it has been convincingly shown that any 
strong notion of genetic determinism is unfounded. Fears about genetic 
modification having the power to fully dictate a person’s characteristics 
and behaviors largely spring from the mistaken view that genes are exclu-
sively responsible for the shaping of a person. Critics of human genetic 
modification sometimes presume that, for example, simply inserting an 
extra gene for athletic ability will produce an individual fated to become 
a successful athlete in later life. Leaving aside for a moment the question 
of whether such a gene really exists, it is important to note that this view 
of genes’ influence on a person’s development is not supported by scien-
tific evidence. Cases of monozygotic twins have amply shown that two 
human beings with identical genomes do not grow to become identical 
persons. The explanation for any physical and psychological differences 
between them must therefore be sought in the environmental conditions 
to which they have been exposed. This implies that neither genetic factors 
nor environmental factors are entirely responsible for a person’s traits, but 
that these result from complex interaction between the two. Thus, unless 
a person endowed with a gene for athletic ability is also encouraged to 
engage in sporting activities, given access to adequate sporting facilities 
and subjected to a strict training schedule, she will not have significantly 
higher chances of becoming a successful athlete than a random person 
who has not been genetically engineered for athletic ability.
However, even if we provisionally grant that genetic modification is 
no more morally problematic than any other kind of attempt to influence 
the development of a human being, does this mean that there should be no 
specific limitations whatsoever in the use of genetic technologies? Would 
it not be morally wrong, for example, to use these technologies to deliber-
ately produce a child with a severe physical or psychological disorder? If 
we are spontaneously inclined to say that this would indeed be wrong, we 
must keep in mind that some would argue that even deliberately selecting 
for a disability is no straightforward case of an immoral act. Consider the 
example of the American deaf lesbian couple Candace McCullough and 
Sharon Duchesneau, who hoped to get pregnant using the sperm of a deaf 
donor in order to increase the chances that their child would also be born 
deaf.24 After having had their request rejected by several sperm banks, 
they approached a deaf friend who agreed to donate his sperm. Following 
several unsuccessful attempts, Duchesneau gave birth to a daughter who 
is reported to have slight hearing in one ear. Would a liberal eugenics 




allow this couple to use genetic modification technologies to deliberately 
create a deaf child? It seems that even a liberal eugenicist could only 
answer this question in the negative, because the parents would appar-
ently be causing harm to their child. According to Agar, however, it is not 
quite that simple. Suppose that Duchesneau was not a lesbian and that she 
was in a relationship with the deaf sperm donor. If they decided to have 
a child, then there would be an equally high chance that this child would 
be born deaf. If that were to happen, Agar asks, would we then also say 
that this couple has intentionally harmed their child?25 There is another 
issue to be considered here, however. The deaf couple themselves are not 
of the opinion that they have created a disabled child. They argue that, 
from their point of view, hearing people can also be considered disabled 
because they are unable to participate fully in the rich culture of the deaf. 
In other words, where some would consider this to be a straightforward 
case of a harmed or disabled condition, others would view it as a diver-
gent yet equally valuable way of life. Perhaps the liberal commitment to 
state neutrality should also apply to this case.
It has often been argued that some of these borderline issues could 
be avoided by drawing a line between therapy and enhancement.26 There 
are two assumptions inherent to this argument. The first is that there is an 
objective difference between genetic interventions that aim at restoring 
the capacities of the body to their “normal” state and interventions that 
aim at raising them above this state. The second assumption is that this 
distinction corresponds to the moral boundary between permissible and 
impermissible uses of genetic technologies. In other words, this argument 
holds that there is nothing morally wrong with using genetic technologies 
to heal people, but that it is impermissible to use them to boost human 
capacities above what is normal, or for that matter, below what is nor-
mal, as in the case of deafness mentioned above.27 While this argument 
appears to possesses the merits of simplicity and fitness for practical ap-
plication, both of its assumptions have met with severe criticism from 
liberal eugenicists. First, while the difference between a diseased state 
and non-diseased state enjoys great intuitive plausibility, this distinction 
may prove harder to sustain conceptually. At the risk of gross simplifi-
cation, it could be said that there are two approaches to the definition 
25 Agar, Liberal Eugenics, 13-14.
26 See for example LeRoy Walters and Julie Gage Palmer, The ethics of Human Gene 
Therapy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), xviii and Alastair Campbell, 
Grant Gillett and David Gareth Jones, Medical Ethics, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 76.
27 Jackie Leach Scully (2001), ‘Drawing a Line: Situating Moral Boundaries in Genetic 
Medicine,’ Bioethics 15 (3): 189-204.
29
Enhanced Life
of disease. There is the social constructivist approach, which essentially 
defines diseases as states which the majority of society considers harmful. 
However, it is clear that decisions about what constitutes a disease will in 
some cases simply reflect social prejudice. The objectivist approach, on 
the other hand, defines disease as any departure from normal biological 
function. This definition is advantageous in that it makes popular atti-
tudes irrelevant but it could also result in the banning of a number of ap-
plications of genetic technology which nonetheless promise to yield great 
health benefits. For example, if it were possible to genetically engineer 
immunity to cancer, then a ban on using genetic technologies to enhance 
humans beyond their normal state would also include this kind of genetic 
intervention.
Others have argued that while it may be true that the boundary be-
tween therapy and enhancement is too unstable to serve as an absolute 
criterion for moral judgment, there are still good reasons not to abandon 
it altogether. Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler agree that this distinc-
tion is indeed not entirely satisfactory, epistemologically speaking, but 
they suggest that any commitment to a Rawlsian liberal notion of justice 
as fairness requires that we nonetheless retain some limited version of 
it. Their basic assumption is that if a just liberal society rightly seeks to 
establish equal opportunities by compensating those whose initial, disad-
vantaged position in society is due to social factors over which they have 
no control, then it should do likewise for those whose opportunities are 
limited by genetics. In other words, according to these authors, the liberal 
principle of fairness should be applied not only to inequalities of oppor-
tunity that result from the “social lottery,” but also to inequalities that 
result from the “natural lottery:” “As our powers increase, the territory 
of the natural is annexed to the social realm, and the new-won territory is 
colonized by ideas of justice.”28 Specifically, this would mean that a just 
society is obliged to provide genetic technologies to those suffering from 
a genetically induced condition that will prevent them from participat-
ing fully in society. Following this argument, the therapy/enhancement 
distinction will not correspond entirely to the permissible/impermissible 
boundary, but given resource constraints, it does serve as a key rationale 
for the fair distribution of the benefits of genetic technologies.
Central to the model devised by Buchanan and his co-authors is 
Christopher Boorse’s notion of “normal species functioning.” Boorse 
claims to be able to distinguish objectively between a state of health and 
a state of disease by defining the former as “statistical normality of func-
tion, i.e., the ability to perform all typical physiological functions with at 
28 Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice, 84.
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least typical efficiency.”29 Normal functioning is thus understood as the 
ability to execute biological functions which, from a statistical point of 
view, are typical of a particular species. Accordingly, diseases are “inter-
nal states that depress a functional ability below species-typical levels.”30 
Since the notion of normal functioning merely refers to a statistically ideal 
state, every individual will deviate from it to a certain degree. Not all de-
viations from the norm will necessarily be defined as diseases: only those 
that fall outside of the range of what is statistically considered normal will 
count. However, Buchanan and his co-authors are not primarily interested 
in whether the notion of normal species functioning allows for a non- 
normative definition of disease. Instead, they assert that it provides us 
with a fair criterion for deciding whether or not a particular genetic condi-
tion requires technological intervention. After all, they explain, what mat-
ters “from the standpoint of a general account of equal opportunity, is not 
whether they are diseases but whether they limit opportunity.”31 That is to 
say, a just society should not restrict the application of genetic technolo-
gies to the treatment of disease, but allow it for all departures from normal 
functioning that deprive people of “the ability to participate in political, 
social, and economic life.”32 The normal function model of health care 
that they propose is therefore both more restrictive and more extensive 
than models that rely on the treatment/enhancement distinction alone: 
more restrictive because it forbids interventions in departures from nor-
mal functioning that do not impact on participation, and more extensive 
because it allows for interventions in genetic conditions that fall within 
the range of normal functioning if these conditions prevent the individual 
from participating “as normal competitors in all spheres of social life.”33
John Harris, one of the most fervent advocates of a new eugenics, has 
fiercely criticized the appeal to equality of opportunity in justifying the 
use of genetic technologies for enhancement purposes. Surely, since we 
would also wish to use these technologies to address conditions which do 
not affect participation, the moral reasons we have for using them are not 
that they reestablish equality of opportunity – although this may constitute 
an additional reason – but that they change us for the better. Moreover, in 
his view, “enhancements are not plausibly defined relative to normalcy, to 
29 Christopher Boorse (1977), ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept,’ Philosophy of Science 
44 (4): 543.
30 Ibid.





normal species functioning, nor to species-typical functioning.”34 These 
notions “play no part in the definition of harm and therefore no part in 
the way the distinction between therapy and enhancement is drawn.”35 
He gives a striking example to illustrate this. Suppose it was possible to 
use genetic technologies to slow down or even halt the ageing process. If 
we followed Boorse’s conception of normal functioning, then we would 
have to forsake this clearly benevolent use of genetic technology because 
it would not simply restore our body to normal functioning but actually 
enhance it beyond its normal state. In other words, since it is perfectly 
normal for us to die of the diseases of old age, this intervention would go 
beyond the therapeutic use of genetic technologies and would therefore 
be morally unacceptable. As a libertarian consequentialist, Harris believes 
that it would be better to do away with the therapy/enhancement boundary 
altogether. In his view, the moral imperatives either to provide therapy 
or enhancement derive from the fact that we value minimizing harm and 
maximizing benefits. What counts in deciding if it would be permissible 
to use genetic technologies is not the fact of whether an individual’s cur-
rent state deviates from normal functioning, but the cost/benefit calcula-
tion regarding the body’s “possible functioning.”36 That is to say, the only 
pertinent questions are whether the harm the technologies aim to prevent 
is serious enough and whether the benefits they aim to produce are valu-
able enough to take the risks.
Life needs to be Protected
Some critical commentators have argued, however, that the proposed 
marriage between eugenics and liberalism will not so much redeem the 
former of its authoritarian drift as corrupt the central principles of the lat-
ter to the point of its becoming something different altogether. According 
to these critics, genetic enhancement is morally wrong not only because 
it is still unsafe or because it goes beyond the medical goal of restoring 
the body to its normal biological functioning, but also, and more grandly, 
because it threatens to change human nature.37 This argument can take a 
variety of different forms, but the basic assumption is that modifications 
to the human genome threaten to disrupt something that is valuable in 
itself. Consequently, since our very understanding of human dignity and 
its legal reflection in human rights is founded upon the notion of human 
34 Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 36.
35 Ibid., 46.
36 Ibid., 53.
37 See Kass, Ageless Bodies, 14-18.
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nature, then genetic modification could ultimately signal the end of some 
of the central principles of liberal democracy.
George Annas is perhaps the most outspoken adherent of this ap-
proach. Arguing that genetic modification will create a species of crea-
tures which we will no longer be able to recognize as fellow human 
beings, he predicts that “either the normal human beings will view the 
‘better’ humans as the other and seek to control or destroy them, or vice-
versa.”38 This prospect makes the project of a new eugenics seem not 
merely morally problematic, but actually repulsive: “It is this genocidal 
potential that makes some species-altering genetic engineering projects 
potential species-endangering weapons of mass destruction and the unac-
countable genetic engineer a potential bioterrorist.”39 Eugenic programs 
working in this direction could, as a consequence, “fit into a new category 
of ‘crimes against humanity’ in the strict sense, actions that threaten the 
integrity of the human species itself.”40 While Annas is well aware that we 
are still a long way from realizing such sweeping genetic interventions, he 
argues that we should already be deciding upon the measures necessary 
for preventing any further steps being taken toward that goal, in the form 
of an international, legally binding “human species protection treaty.”41
Yet, it is one thing to say that we are on the verge of losing something 
essential to being human and quite another to specify what it is that that 
essence consists of, precisely. Throughout the ages, philosophy and theol-
ogy have provided numerous definitions of human nature by identifying 
it with soul, ratio, language, moral freedom, or some other distinctive 
quality. The question is, however, whether the notions traditionally used 
to delineate human beings from other living beings are still meaningful 
in the present context. Take, for example, the Christian belief that human 
beings enjoy a superior status among the Earth’s creatures because they 
alone were created in the image of God and endowed with an immor-
tal soul. Clearly, this idea of human nature is central to many Christian 
thinkers’ conservative reaction to a number of contentious bioethical is-
sues such as cloning, stem-cell research and genetic modification. This 
is precisely where things become particularly confusing, though, since 
if the soul is truly the essence of the human being, then why should we 
be afraid that interventions in the mortal body will wreak havoc on hu-
man nature? In Slavoj Žižek’s words, “if the church effectively believes 
in the immortality of the human soul, in the uniqueness of the human 






personality, in how I am not just the result of the interaction between 
my genetic code and my environs, then why oppose cloning and genetic 
manipulations?”42 Arguably, this question can also be posed to Kantian-
inspired thinkers who are critical of genetic modification on the grounds 
that it would amount to treating human beings merely as means and not as 
ends in themselves. If it is true that human beings possess dignity because 
only they have the ability to transcend the causal realm of nature and act 
according to moral law, then why oppose attempts to bring the natural 
foundations of human life under the control of the free subject?
Francis Fukuyama has argued, however, that while science has made 
it abundantly clear that what were previously thought to be unique, mark-
edly human qualities – such as language and reason – are in fact merely 
the contingent results of long evolutionary processes and also that these 
are, at least to some degree, also present in other living beings, there are 
nonetheless convincing reasons not to reject the notion of human nature 
altogether. The most important of these is that the belief that there is 
something that unites all human beings is fundamental to the central lib-
eral principle of universal human equality. This principle states that while 
individual persons may differ from each other in many different ways, in 
their languages, professions, talents, religions, degrees of wealth, genders 
and so on, there is something that nevertheless makes them equal and that 
is more important than these individual characteristics. This “something” 
is what Fukuyama calls “Factor X,” the most basic element of what it 
means to be human. All human beings are equal because each of them 
possesses Factor X. The use of new genetic technologies could change 
this, however. In liberal democracies we tend to accept some of the so-
cial inequalities that might result from the uneven distribution of genetic 
dispositions because we know that initially, we all had an equal chance of 
“winning” or “losing” the genetic lottery. In fact, one of the reasons why 
social redistribution mechanisms have been created is that we acknowl-
edge that social success is partly due to influences beyond the control 
of the individual. Moreover, the genetic lottery also has a redistributing 
function of its own: children of successful individuals will not necessarily 
inherit the gene-based talents of their parents, and the children of under-
privileged individuals may inherit talents that will allow them to climb 
further up the social ladder. But, Fukuyama predicts, “when the lottery 
is replaced by choice, we open up a new avenue along which human be-
ings can compete, one that threatens to increase the disparity between the 
42 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Of Cells and Selves,’ in The Žižek reader, eds. Elizabeth Wright and 
Edmond Wright (Malden Mass.: Blackwell, 2004), 306.
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top and bottom of the social hierarchy.”43 When the socially privileged 
no longer pass on just social advantages to their children but also endow 
them with genetic dispositions that give them an unfairly high chance of 
securing an advantageous position in the social competition, these en-
hanced individuals “may come in time to think of themselves as differ-
ent kind of creatures” and “feel themselves to be aristocrats, and unlike 
aristocrats of old, their claim to better birth will be rooted in nature and 
not convention.”44
What, then, is this Factor X which all human beings are supposed to 
have in common and which entitles them to equal dignity and rights? 
Fukuyama agrees that our claim to equality can no longer be grounded in 
a transcendent understanding of Factor X, but neither does he think that 
we can ground universal human equality in positive law, for it is unlikely 
ever to be possible to reach cross-cultural agreement on the definition 
of Factor X. Thus, in his view, “there is desperate need for philosophy 
to return to the pre-Kantian tradition that grounds rights and morality in 
nature.”45 Accordingly, Fukuyama defines human nature as “the sum of 
the behavior and characteristics that are typical of the human species, 
arising from genetic rather than environmental factors.”46 Notice that this 
definition does not require all individuals to have an equal share in these 
characteristics, nor does it exclude the possibility that some will lack one 
or more of them without necessarily being denied the status of human be-
ing. This is so because, firstly, typicality is a statistical concept that refers 
to a median of a normal distribution of characteristics and traits (with its 
limits set by nature) and, secondly, because this definition also applies 
to human beings who might lack one or more of these characteristics, 
but have at least the theoretical potential to have them (e.g. children, the 
disabled, etc.). According to Fukuyama, every human being is born with 
a set of genes that allows him or her to behave in a species-typical way, 
in the sense that all humans are biologically equipped to “see colors, react 
to smells, recognize facial expressions, parse language for evidence of 
deceit, avoid certain dangers, engage in reciprocity, pursue revenge, feel 
embarrassment, care for our children and parents,”47 and so on. It is on 
the basis of these genetically programmed traits and behaviors that hu-
man beings are able to develop the higher qualities that are usually seen 
as distinctively human, such as reason, moral freedom and sociability. 







However, Factor X cannot be reduced to any one of these individual qual-
ities: “It is all of these qualities coming together in a human whole that 
makes up Factor X.”48 This allows Fukuyama to state more clearly what 
is wrong with human genetic modification, because to the extent that ge-
netic technologies will allow us to modify one or more of these traits 
and characteristics beyond the level of species-typicality, they will also 
threaten to disrupt the precarious balance among the qualities that under-
pin Factor X. Thus, Fukuyama concludes, if liberal democracy wishes 
to remain committed to a strong notion of universal human equality, it 
is urgently necessary that we create a new international regulatory organ 
that “not only would have to have a mandate to regulate biotechnology 
on grounds broader than efficacy and safety but would also have to have 
statutory authority over all research and development.”49
In his book-length essay The Future of Human Nature, Jürgen 
Habermas argues in a similar vein that human nature should be legally 
protected against genetic enhancement. Yet he founds this claim on a 
very different understanding of what it essentially means to be human. 
As liberal societies foster the belief that science and technology promote 
individual freedom and autonomy, Habermas is under no illusion that a 
return to a metaphysical or religious understanding of human nature as 
somehow sacred in itself might curtail the further development of tech-
nologies which seem to offer the prospect of increased health, prolonged 
lifespan and other benefits that will enlarge the scope of personal choice. 
Neither does he believe, however, that precise moral boundaries can be 
drawn on the basis of medico-scientific arguments about the dividing line 
between the scope of therapy and the scope of enhancement. For just as 
in the heated discussions surrounding the “beginning of life” and their 
relevance to issues having to do with interventions on prenatal forms of 
life, it will no doubt prove impossible to find unambiguous criteria which 
are sufficiently neutral with respect to the various “worldviews” and sci-
entific paradigms circulating in the public sphere of liberal democracies. 
Habermas therefore agrees with Fukuyama that we are in desperate need 
of a post-metaphysical conception of human nature that would place hu-
man dignity on more solid ground. Unlike Fukuyama, though, what he 
seeks to protect are not the “species-typical” characteristics and behav-
iors of homo sapiens, but “the conditions under which the practical self-
understanding of modernity may be preserved.”50 He argues that once we 






capacity to see ourselves as the authors of our own life histories,”51 we 
will realize that a liberal eugenics contradicts these conditions and should 
therefore be rejected.
Central to Habermas’s argument is the notion that dignity is not a prop-
erty one possesses simply by virtue of being human, but that it is the dis-
tinctive mode of being of a “communicatively structured form of life.”52 
What he means by this is that we are only able to understand ourselves as 
free and autonomous agents worthy of respect in the context of a moral 
community that consists of equal members interacting with each other on 
the basis of norms and reasoning. This communal aspect of human nature 
is much more fundamental to our conception of human dignity than any 
of the more substantive elements that have been attributed to it. After all, 
it is only by virtue of the existence of a community of equals capable of 
engaging “in interpersonal relations of mutual respect”53 that such norma-
tive claims can be defended at all. Thus, when Habermas states that the 
danger of genetic technologies lies in their power to change human na-
ture, he means that their free deployment threatens to undermine the very 
foundations of the moral community.
To demonstrate why this is so, Habermas invites us to consider that our 
lifeworld is still largely “Aristotelian,” in the sense that we tend to make 
automatic distinctions between “what is manufactured and what has come 
to be by nature,”54 between the “artificially produced” and the “organically 
grown.” This distinction is morally relevant insofar as it motivates us to 
adopt a particular mode of action when dealing with entities belonging 
to either one of these realms: while inert, inorganic entities are open to 
various forms of technical-instrumental intervention, self-regulated organ-
ic entities are not. According to Habermas, this is due to the fact that we 
spontaneously feel “empathy” for organisms which seem to possess a cer-
tain amount of subjectivity, no matter how minimal. We remain committed 
to this logic in the case of genetic interventions carried out on embryos for 
therapeutic purposes, firstly because our actions in this case are still guided 
by the natural processes of growth inherent to this prenatal form of life, but 
also because we imagine how the future person might give consent for any 
intervention that could prevent or cure a debilitating condition. In the case 
of genetic enhancement, however, a very different scenario emerges. Here, 
prospective parents are not treating the embryo as another subject who will 







dispose of if necessary. In other words, if the relationship between parent 
and child is reduced to that of producer and product, they will never be able 
to meet each other as equal members of the moral community.
According to Habermas, then, liberal eugenicists make the mistake 
of focusing solely on the freedom enacted in parental choice, while the 
proper question to ask is what consequences genetic intervention will 
have for the programmed person’s “capacity of being oneself ”55 on which 
one’s ethical self-understanding as a free and autonomous member of a 
liberal egalitarian society depends. It is true that if “we experience our 
freedom with reference to something which, by its very nature, is not at 
our disposal,”56 then the situation of the programmed person is not fun-
damentally different from that of an individual born the “natural” way, 
for neither have had any say in the genetic traits and characteristics they 
are endowed with. The crucial question to ask, however, is if it makes 
any difference whether these traits are the result of natural chance or of 
the deliberate intervention of a third person. Liberal eugenicists tend to 
play down the impact of this intervention on the existential situation of an 
enhanced individual by suggesting that there is no substantial difference 
between improving a person by modifying her social environment and 
doing so by modifying her genes. For Habermas, however, this is exactly 
what makes all the difference. In his view, while a genetically unenhanced 
person always retains the option of rejecting or reappraising her parents’ 
attempts to shape her personality through socialization, the enhanced per-
son “who is at odds with genetically fixed intentions is barred from devel-
oping […] an attitude towards her talents (and handicaps) which implies 
a revised self-understanding and allows for a productive response to the 
initial situation.”57 Moreover, a liberal eugenics would not only deprive 
the genetically enhanced person of the spontaneous self-perception of be-
ing the singular author of her own life, but also create the child’s perma-
nent and irreversible social dependence on the parent, which “is foreign 
to reciprocal and symmetrical relations of mutual recognition proper to 
a moral and legal community of free and equal persons.”58 As Habermas 
has already argued with regard to human cloning, such an asymmetrical 
relationship would surpass even slavery in cruelty, for it would never be 
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The New Eugenics and the End of Liberalism
It should be clear, then, that this debate mainly revolves around the 
question of whether the new eugenics concurs with or contradicts the 
central principles of liberalism. Broadly speaking, two of these principles 
seem especially relevant in this context: value pluralism and individual 
freedom. One of the most striking features of this debate, however, is that 
while all participants seem equally committed to these principles, they 
ultimately evaluate the new eugenics in diametrically opposed ways. In 
order to gain a clearer understanding of how this is possible, it may be 
helpful to point out that much depends on the actor that is given prior-
ity in this debate: while liberal eugenicists tend to emphasize the parent, 
critics believe that special consideration should be given to the prospec-
tive child. This difference of emphasis explains why the former group 
considers state neutrality in the domain of reproduction to be a sufficient 
guarantee of the liberality of the new eugenics. They argue that if the 
state remains neutral in this matter and does not intervene to enforce a 
particular conception of the good to be sought through genetic modifica-
tion, then, by giving parents more control over which genetic traits their 
children will inherit, a liberal eugenics will actually strengthen the free-
doms associated with reproduction. Critics, on the other hand, point out 
that the main threat to the liberal principles of value pluralism and in-
dividual freedom no longer comes from potential state intervention but 
from parents themselves. According to this group, it is not the freedom 
of parents that is at issue but the freedom of the children born to them. In 
particular, they stress the fact that children who are genetically designed 
according to the developmental goals of their parents will be unable to 
experience themselves as the autonomous authors of their own lives. To 
put it as succinctly as possible, the liberty of the parent is thus the bond-
age of the child.
Yet, on the face of it, this way of framing the new eugenics debate may 
not be entirely satisfactory, for it gives the impression that liberal eugeni-
cists believe there should be no moral or legal limitations whatsoever to 
the reproductive liberty of parents. This is obviously not the case. As with 
other individual liberties, reproductive choices tend to be judged for ac-
ceptability against John Stuart Mill’s principle of harm. As is well known, 
this principle broadly states that one is free to act as one chooses, as long 
as one’s actions do not cause harm to others.60 While this immediately 
raises the question of what counts as harm, there is still a more urgent 
issue to be considered here: in the case of reproductive liberty, the limit 
of individual freedom is not set by potential harm done to fellow citizens 
60 John Stuart Mill, On liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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but to human beings who do not yet exist. One of the most influential ap-
proaches to this complicated issue was developed by Derek Parfit, and is 
known as the “nonidentity argument.”61 The example Parfit gives is that 
of a 14-year-old girl who decides to have a child. Intuitively, we would 
be inclined to believe that she is likely to harm her child because, by dint 
of having such a young mother, the child is likely to receive “a bad start 
in life.”62 Furthermore, we would probably also believe that it would have 
been better for her child if the mother had waited longer to conceive, 
for then her child would have had better chances in life. Parfit shows, 
however, that this is an inaccurate appraisal of the situation. If the girl 
had indeed waited longer to have a child, this child would have been the 
product of a different egg and a different sperm. It would, in other words, 
have been a different child. The further implication of this is that the child 
born to her at the age of 14 has not been harmed, since the condition of 
this particular child should be compared not to that of the hypothetical 
child born a couple of years later but to the condition of not being born at 
all. In other words, being born to a 14-year-old mother is no worse for a 
child than being born to, for example, a 24-year-old mother, because the 
alternative is not being born at all. One of the conclusions that has been 
drawn from this argument is that in reproductive freedom, the threshold 
of harm should be set at the point where the child would have been bet-
ter off not being born. The underlying rationale is that all forms of life 
which fall short of this threshold constitute a “life not worth living” or a 
“wrongful life.”63
Obviously, the problem that some liberal eugenicists have with this ar-
gument is not that it would give prospective parents too little reproductive 
liberty, but that it would give them too much. Indeed, very few are willing 
to accept the ultimate conclusion to which this argument seems to lead, 
namely that parents’ reproductive liberty should be so wide as to include 
even the freedom to endow their children with a physical or psychological 
disability. If this seems too unlikely to be worth considering, we merely 
have to recall the Duchesneau case mentioned above to see that this is a 
realistic possibility. Yet, according to the nonidentity argument, a child 
would usually not be harmed by such an anomalous reproductive choice, 
for very few cases are likely to arise in which a child would find herself 
in such terrible conditions that it would have been better for her not to be 
born at all. It would, for example, be very difficult to maintain that being 
61 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 351-379.
62 Ibid., 358.
63 See for example Joel Feinberg (1986), ‘Wrongful life and the counterfactual element 
in harming,’ Social Philosophy and Policy 4 (1): 145-178.
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born deaf is worse than not being born at all. In order to escape this con-
clusion, liberal eugenicists usually fall back on what is called the princi-
ple of procreative beneficence, which, in one version, states that parents 
“should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is 
expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based 
on the relevant available information.”64 Broadly, this principle entails 
that parents are morally required to give their children the best possible 
genetic endowment. It is clear, however, that this principle is still much 
too formal to prevent parents from endowing their children with a dis-
ability. Consider again the Duchesneau case. The couple did not believe 
their child would suffer any serious harm as a result of being deaf. On the 
contrary, they were convinced that this intervention would actually be 
beneficial to the child’s wellbeing, for it would allow her to participate in 
the rich culture of the deaf community of her parents.
How, then, do liberal eugenicists attempt to resolve this conflict be-
tween the principles of reproductive freedom and procreative beneficence 
in the case of selecting for disability? One solution could be, first, to define 
disability as a diseased state and subsequently argue that deliberately cre-
ating a disabled child constitutes a clear violation of medical deontology. 
This solution would not be wholly satisfying, though, because it would be 
necessary to reintroduce an objectivist notion of normality or normal func-
tioning against which a given condition could be assessed. This is a solu-
tion that liberal eugenicists wish to avoid at all costs though. John Harris 
has therefore proposed defining disability as “a condition that someone has 
a strong rational preference not to be in and one that is moreover in some 
sense a harmed condition.”65 To determine whether a given condition is a 
harmed one, he suggests using what he calls the “emergency room test:”
I have in mind the sort of condition for which if a patient presented with it 
unconscious in the emergency room of a hospital and the condition could 
be easily and immediately reversed, but not reversed unless the doctor acts 
without delay, a doctor would be negligent were she not to attempt reversal.66
According to Harris, the main advantage of this conception of a harmed 
condition is that it is not defined in relation to the state of nonexistence, or 
to normal functioning, but “relative to possible alternatives.”67 Suppose, 
he explains, that someone was brought into the hospital with her little 
64 Julian Savulescu (2001), ‘Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best chil-
dren,’ Bioethics 15 (5/6): 415.





finger severed at the first joint and it could be sewn on again. Although 
it would obviously be absurd to maintain that the missing end joint of 
this person’s little finger meant that her life would be not worth living, 
there are nonetheless good moral reasons to maintain that the hospital 
staff would harm the patient by failing to reattach the finger. According to 
Harris, the same holds true for all other injuries, diseases and disabilities.
Catherine Mills has fiercely criticized this definition of disability, 
firstly because it neglects the simple fact that “some disabilities are nei-
ther irreversible nor removable,”68 and secondly because it uses the per-
spective of an “able-bodied person”69 as the standard against which to 
evaluate a given condition. Yet, though this criticism may certainly hold 
true in the present, Mills seems to ignore the fact that Harris develops this 
argument in relation to genetic modification technologies of the future. 
What he actually suggests is that when we have the choice to have a child 
either with or without a disability, we have good moral reasons to choose 
the second option. Another factor that critics have overlooked is that, as 
genetic science advances, it is likely not only to increase reproductive 
freedom and the responsibilities that come with it, but also to change the 
standards against which we seek to measure a harmed condition:
It is normal now, for example, to be protected against tetanus; the continued 
provision of such protection is not merely permissive. If the AIDS pandemic 
continues unabated and the only prospect, or the best prospect, for stemming 
its advance is the use of gene therapy to insert genes coding for antibodies 
to AIDS, I cannot think that it would be coherent to regard making available 
such therapy as permissive rather than mandatory.70
We cannot think of a stronger argument against deliberately endow-
ing one’s children with a disability. What Harris is saying here is that if 
parents have the power to prevent their child being born with a disabil-
ity, they should have not merely the freedom to use this power, but the 
obligation. The implications of this claim, however, are far more radical 
than they initially appear. Harris’s argument is not that the state should 
intervene to enforce this obligation – in his view, it is a moral obligation 
we have to our children71 – but we have no reason to assume that such 
demands will not be formulated as soon as these technologies become 
more widely available.
68 Catherine Mills, Futures of Reproduction. Bioethics and Biopolitics (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2011), 22.
69 Ibid.
70 Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 93; Emphasis added.
71 See also Julian Savulescu (2009), ‘The moral obligation to create children with the best 
chance of the best life,’ Bioethics 23 (5): 274-290.
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If, upon closer examination, the liberal eugenicists’ argument for the 
freedom to intervene in the genetic make-up of future generations resem-
bles an argument for the obligation to intervene, then it is seems that the 
critics are quite right to conclude that, far from concurring with the princi-
ples of liberalism, “liberal eugenics is a betrayal of liberal philosophy.”72 
Curiously, this is not how they themselves reach this conclusion. As we 
have seen, the danger that many see in a liberal eugenics is that it might 
change human nature. Although this argument takes many different 
forms, the basic idea is that genetically enhanced humans will be so dif-
ferent from their unenhanced predecessors that they will no longer be able 
to recognize each other as equal members of a free society. Habermas 
has developed what is probably the most sophisticated version of this 
approach. His main point of critique is that being endowed with specific 
genetic traits and characteristics will deprive the programmed person of 
“an unobstructed future of his own.”73 The idea is that a person who learns 
that some of her talents, skills and abilities were not given to her by “na-
ture” but by means of the deliberate intervention of another person will 
find it impossible to understand herself as the singular author of her own 
life. This argument can be understood in several different ways, but one 
of the most important seems to be that the programmed person may con-
sider her life to have been steered in a particular direction at the wish of 
another person.
Interestingly, however, the underlying idea of this argument did not 
originate in the context of a discussion about the consequences of new 
genetic technologies. What actually prompted Joel Feinberg to write his 
seminal essay ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future’74 was a series of 
lawsuits in which members of the Amish community challenged compul-
sory schooling laws in various states of the USA. As is widely known, the 
Amish live an extremely secluded life, far removed from the complex-
ity of the modern industrialized world. Amish communities traditionally 
educate their children for a life of industry and piety, teaching them only 
the crafts and skills deemed necessary to carry on their religious life-
style. External influences are thereby kept to an absolute minimum. In 
Wisconsin v. Yoder75 the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
an appeal made by the Amish community, noting that by forcing Amish 
children to attend state schools the State of Wisconsin infringed on their 
72 Dov Fox (2007), ‘The Illiberality of “liberal eugenics”,’ Ratio 10 (1): 24.
73 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 63.
74 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Child’s Right to an Open Future,’ in Whose Child? Children’s 
Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power, ed. W. Aiken and H. LaFollette (Totowa, 
NJ: Rowan & Littlefield, 1980).
75 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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constitutional religious rights. In his essay, Feinberg disagrees with this 
decision by arguing that:
[A]n education that renders a child fit only for one way of life forecloses ir-
revocably his other options. He may become a pious Amish farmer, but it will 
difficult to the point of practical impossibility for him to become an engineer, 
a physician, a research scientist, a lawyer, or a business executive. The chanc-
es are good that […] critical life-decisions will have been made irreversibly 
for a person well before he reaches the age of full discretion when he should 
be expected, in a free society, to make them himself.76
In other words, according to Feinberg, the Amish way of life infringes 
on Amish children’s right to an open future by prematurely closing off 
many of the other ways of life available in a free liberal society.
It seems somewhat odd that Habermas refers directly to Feinberg’s es-
say in his argument against enhancement technologies,77 for two reasons. 
Firstly, by likening attempts to shape children by altering their social en-
vironments to attempts to shape them by altering their genetic profiles, 
he actually seems to be pursuing one of the strategies that liberal eugeni-
cists employ to argue the opposite of what Habermas himself intends. As 
explained above, if there are no substantial differences between genetic 
intervention and the other influences that parents have over the develop-
ment of their children, then there is no reason to allow the latter while 
rejecting the former. Secondly, at the core of Habermas’s argument lies 
the contention that while the effects of “a pathogenic socialization pro-
cess” can always be “revised by critical reappraisal,”78 this is impossible 
in cases of genetic intervention. If, as it appears, he actually disagrees 
with Feinberg’s view on the intrusiveness of certain educational practices, 
why then does he claim to base his own argument on it?
The most plausible explanation for this confusion seems to be that 
Habermas wishes to retain the structure of Feinberg’s reasoning but not 
its content. That is to say, he agrees with him insofar as we should be 
especially concerned about a child’s right to an open future, but disagrees 
with him insofar as he rejects the notion that the greatest threat to this right 
comes from a “pathological” socialization process. Liberal eugenicists 
often liken the effects of socialization to those of genetic intervention in 
order to argue that the latter is no more problematic than practices that are 
now routinely accepted as part of normal parenting. Habermas would be 
unlikely to disagree with the argument that parents’ reproductive freedom 
76 Feinberg, Right to an Open Future, 132-133.




should also encompass genetic interventions. As soon as priority is given 
to the perspective of the “passive receiver,” however, then a very differ-
ent picture emerges. After all, whereas socialization occurs at a moment 
when a child is already able to respond to the actions of her educators, 
genetic intervention occurs before the child has even entered into ex-
istence and the resulting individual will therefore be unable to respond 
effectively to his or her producer’s intentions:
[…] such an imposition from within the community, even if it is excluded 
from the relationships obtaining between morally acting persons, must never-
theless not be confused with an external or alien determination of the natural 
and mental constitution of a future person, prior to an entry into the moral 
community.79
Most critics revert to the notion of human dignity in order to oppose 
these kinds of interventions. As we have seen, however, this road is not 
open to Habermas because it entails giving full rights to unborn life and 
in his view, it is clear that the question of whether “the in vitro embryo 
were already ‘another,’ who possessed completely valid basic rights […] 
can hardly be answered in the positive given the premises of an ethically 
neutral constitutional order.”80 If it is already extremely difficult – if not 
impossible – to reach consensus on the question of when life begins, then 
these problems are only likely to increase in the case of genetic interven-
tion, for gene modification can be performed not only at the zygote and 
embryo stages, but also in sperm and egg cells. It seem quite reasonable to 
assume that few would be willing to accept the absurd consequences that 
would follow from giving sperm and egg cells full human rights. While 
the proposed dilemma is quite clear, however, the same cannot be said 
about Habermas’s solution to it. When he contends that “legal protection 
might come to be expressed in a right to a genetic inheritance immune 
from artificial intervention,”81 then it remains far from evident who might 
be the beneficiary of this right. Since he rejects the idea of giving such a 
right to prenatal forms of life, he seems to mean that it would be bestowed 
upon the adult enhanced person. But how could such a person ever ex-
ercise her right to a genetic endowment free from artificial intervention, 
given that this irreversible act would have taken place well before she was 
a position to do so?
There is more to be said here, though. For what the debate between 
the advocates and opponents of a liberal eugenics also makes evident is 





that the emergence of enhancement technologies is likely to be accom-
panied by a growing tendency to impose severe normative constraints 
on certain potential forms of life. This is clear enough in the arguments 
of Fukuyama and Habermas, who draw on a normative conception of 
human nature to argue against genetic enhancement. What has not been 
sufficiently emphasized thus far, however, is the fact that any attempt 
to give normative content to human nature may be mobilized politically 
to exclude those who deviate from this norm.82 That is not to say that 
these authors’ conceptions of human nature could serve as grounds for 
excluding certain vulnerable groups, such as the disabled or the men-
tally ill, from the moral community. Instead, it could be said that these 
definitions preemptively deny any genetically enhanced being that may 
be brought into existence in the future the status of human being. What 
else could Habermas mean when he writes that “[t]his new type of re-
lationship [between programming parent and programmed child, NVC] 
offends our moral sensibility because it constitutes a foreign body in the 
legally institutionalized relations of recognition in modern societies”83? 
This statement seems, moreover, to cast further doubt on the effectiveness 
of Habermas’s call for a right to a genetic constitution free from genetic 
intervention. If an enhanced person is barred from establishing reciprocal 
relationships with “normal” human beings, and thus from entering the 
moral community of equal citizens, on what grounds, then, may such a 
person appeal to this right in the first place? Again we must ask who the 
bearers of this right would be if the only individuals to have an interest in 
it were denied legal subjectivity?
This tendency is not absent from the discourse of liberal eugenics, 
however. Quite the contrary, in fact. As explained above, many liberal eu-
genicists seek to avoid some of the more distressing consequences of the 
nonidentity argument by tempering the right to reproductive liberty with 
the principle of procreative beneficence. In their view, this is especially 
urgent as new genetic technologies continue to emerge, because these 
technologies will increase parents’ freedom to modify their offspring not 
only for the better, but also for the worse. Furthermore, we have shown 
that by insisting on the principle of procreative beneficence, liberal eu-
genicists actually argue for the obligation, rather than simply the freedom, 
to endow future generations with the best possible genes. The ultimate 
result of this argument is that parents would have the obligation both to 
prevent their children from being born with a disability or with a disease 
82 See for example Eduardo Mendieta (2003), ‘Communicative freedom and genetic en-
gineering,’ Logos 2 (1): 135-138.
83 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 14; Emphasis added.
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and to boost their capacities to a maximum. We should not lose sight of 
the justification behind this line of reasoning, however. What liberal eu-
genicists reject is not the notion of “wrongful life” as such, but only the 
criteria which are to be used to determine what forms of life are included 
in this category once genetic technologies become available. What they 
are actually arguing, therefore, is that while it may be true that it is cur-
rently better, for example, to be born deaf than not born at all, this may 
change once we have the power to choose between a deaf child and a 
hearing child. If it is true, on the other hand, that the emergence of genetic 
technologies will progressively raise the threshold of harm, then we are 
also about to witness a steady increase in the number of forms of life that 
will have to be categorized as wrongful life. It remains to be seen how far 
this category can be stretched but perhaps, in the not too distant future, 
human beings as we currently know them will all be judged as having a 
“life not worth living.”
Human genetic modification is still in its infancy, but the issues dis-
cussed above suggest that liberal political and moral philosophy remains 
rather ill equipped to address this controversial field. This is evident in 
the mere fact that a commitment to the central principles of liberalism 
is able to produce two diametrically opposed views on the subject, and 
also in that the two positions appear to be conceptually inconsistent: ulti-
mately, both lead to conspicuously illiberal conclusions. After all, as we 
have argued above, while the argument against a new eugenics necessar-
ily entails a preemptive dehumanization of any enhanced form of life, the 
argument for it threatens to reduce any non-enhanced form of life to the 
status of wrongful life. The final analysis might conclude, then, that any 
kind of liberal response to the challenges of the new eugenics unwittingly 
produces a form of life devoid of any intrinsic value. This is not to say 
that this outcome is inevitable. Clearly, though, we will need to rely on 
an alternate interpretative framework if we wish to gain a more precise 
understanding of the issues involved, since we appear to have left that of 




[A]t the opposite extreme, you no longer have a sovereign right that is in 
excess of biopower, but a biopower that is in excess of sovereign right. This 
excess of biopower appears when it becomes technologically and politically 
possible for man not only to manage life but to make it proliferate, to create 
living matter, to build the monster, and, ultimately, to build viruses that can-
not be controlled and that are universally destructive. This formidable exten-
sion of biopower […] will put it beyond all human sovereignty.1
The Biopolitical Turn
Recently, the notion of biopolitics has begun to receive increasing at-
tention in critical political thought, and is rapidly establishing itself as an 
independent theoretical paradigm. One of the main reasons why this no-
tion has seen such a sudden growth in popularity, and has even found its 
way into such diverse fields as bioethics, feminist studies and the social 
sciences, is that it purports to explain a large variety of highly relevant 
contemporary social and political events which seem to slip through the 
grasp of more traditional theoretical interpretations. Biopolitics can in-
deed be linked to issues as seemingly unrelated as birth control policies, 
ethnic conflicts, the proliferation of surveillance cameras in the public 
domain, unlawful detainee camps, the ramifications of climate change, 
the fight against illegal immigration, the threat of pandemics, “humani-
tarian” wars, and even agricultural subsidy policies. Yet, as diverse as 
these phenomena may seem, they all draw attention to the fact that the 
contemporary world is experiencing an increased politicization of hu-
man beings’ biological existence. If standard political theory is unable 
to produce a satisfying explanation of what is at stake in this process, it 
is mainly because its conceptual framework is not adequate for the task 
at hand. Throughout the history of political thought, virtually all major 
commentators have defined political action in terms of how it differs 
from activities driven by biological wants and needs. Politics, in the clas-
sic sense, entails free human interaction and performing actions that are 
worth pursuing as ends in themselves, and therefore transcends the realm 
1 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-
76, trans. D. Macey (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 253-254. 
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of biological necessity. Thus, from this point of view, a politics concerned 
purely with human biological life can only be a contradiction in terms.
It is certainly not the case, however, that this change went entirely un-
noticed in earlier political thought. When, for example, Hannah Arendt 
referred to “the rise of the social” and the concomitant “victory of the 
animal laborans”2 as the single most important event of political moder-
nity, she placed herself firmly within a biopolitical framework. The fact 
that her penetrating analysis received severe criticism for projecting a 
romanticized glorification of Greek polis life onto modern industrialized 
society is, in that sense, just one sign that political theory was not yet 
ready to rethink its basic assumptions and situate this epochal event in 
its proper context.3 Arendt herself was, of course, very much aware that 
she was entering uncharted territory, and that drawing extensively on the 
Greek polis experience was bound to lead to serious misinterpretations. 
Arguably, if Arendt thought it necessary to deal at great length with the 
original Greek understanding of politics in The Human Condition, it is 
because here we can still catch a glimpse of the basic political categories 
in their original, undistorted forms. This is not the most difficult aspect 
of her work to understand, however, for the real problem arises when 
she attempts to explain the meaning and sense of these categories in an 
entirely new context. She found it difficult not only to determine the 
precise nature of the central political subject once the boundary between 
the private realm (oikos) and the public realm (polis) ceases to exist, but 
also to conceive of the nature of the relation between those two realms 
once they begin to overlap. As for the first difficulty, the homo laborans 
could certainly not be a subject of free will. But neither was she draw-
ing on the Greek bíos politikos, for although the latter term contains a 
clear reference to the sphere of life in which the homo laborans was 
traditionally situated, in Greek understanding this term denotes precisely 
the political existence of human beings in the public sphere. If anything, 
Arendt seems to be referring to zoē: human life in its most elemental 
biological dimension. How, though, are we to conceive of a politics con-
structed around the most apolitical mode of existence imaginable? As for 
the second difficulty, we should consider what it means exactly to say 
that the boundaries between the private and the public are blurred. Does 
it mean that the ends of politics are now dictated solely by the biological 
necessities and limitations of human beings? Or that politics now seeks 
2 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 320.
3 See for example Martin Jay (1978), ‘The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt,’ 
Partisan Review 45 (3): 348-369 and Sheldon Wolin (1983), ‘Democracy & The Politi-
cal,’ Salmagundi 60: 3-19.
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to extend its reach to include human biological life within its sphere of 
power? In other words, how are we to understand the relation between 
life and politics?
While these are some of the questions central to the field of biopol-
itics, Arendt was not the first author who sought to address them; nor 
did she ever attempt to explore systematically the specific context from 
which they emerged, at least not explicitly. In order to gain a clearer un-
derstanding of the tension between the two concepts present in the notion 
of biopolitics, namely a politics of life and politics over life, we will start 
this chapter with a brief overview of the field’s history and the changes 
it has undergone.4 Subsequently, we will turn to Foucault’s theory of bio-
politics, for it is in his writings that the tension mentioned above is most 
clearly articulated. Foucault formulates this tension as a paradox: How is 
it possible that a form of power that seeks to protect and strengthen life 
was also able to generate a political regime – Nazism – whose eugenic 
practices aimed to suppress life? In the recent literature, two solutions 
have been suggested for resolving this conflict: Roberto Esposito’s para-
digm of immunity and Giorgio Agamben’s theory of the state of excep-
tion. After discussing the basic tenets of these solutions, I will suggest 
that they can also throw fresh light on the debate surrounding genetic 
intervention.
From Life Politics to a Politics of Life
The first author to use the term biopolitics is likely to have been the 
Swedish political scientist Rudolph Kjellén, in a book with the telling 
title The State as Form of Life (1916).5 In an earlier work, Kjellén had al-
ready shown that dynamic states with limited territory and scarce natural 
resources are compelled to conquer weaker states in order to secure suf-
ficient “vital space” (Lebensraum) for their ever-growing populations.6 
In The State as Form of Life, he subsequently argued that such “geo-
political” behavior, as he insisted on calling it, can only be explained if 
one assumes that states are not the artificial creations of free consenting 
4 For a more comprehensive historical overview of the notion of biopolitics, see Thomas 
Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction, trans. E. F. Trump (New York and Lon-
don: New York University Press, 2011), 9-32 and Roberto Esposito, Bíos: Biopolitics 
and Philosophy, trans. T. Campbell (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 
2008), 16-24.
5 Rudolph Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform (Berlin: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1924). 
Originally published in Swedish as Staten som Lifsform (Stockholm: Hugo Geber, 
1916). 




individuals, as the liberal contractualist tradition had always maintained, 
but in fact “living organisms” whose functioning transcends the will of 
those belonging to them. In Kjellén’s view, the different groups and class-
es in society represent nothing but the state-body’s organs, which inces-
santly strive to preserve themselves and to increase their power. However, 
in times of extreme crisis or external war, they feel the need for coop-
eration in order to secure the existence of the state organism as a whole. 
Kjellén’s organic conception of the state was to become especially popu-
lar in Weimar Germany, where scholars were already familiar with biolo-
gistic views of reality because of the influence of the Lebensphilosophie 
tradition. Moreover, the fact that Weimar Germany was going through a 
series of major political crises, marked by mass strikes and the threat of 
civil war, certainly played a role in how the organic theory of the state 
was received here. One only has to look at Jacob von Uexküll’s influ-
ential book Staatsbiologie (1920)7 to see that Weimar intellectuals were 
interested in this theory not only because of its explanatory value, but also 
because of the solution it offered. In von Uexküll’s view, translating po-
litical phenomena into biological terms was only the first step to be taken. 
In addition to this, it was also deemed necessary to introduce the language 
of medicine, for it is one thing to diagnose the diseases threatening the ex-
istence of the state organism – such as electoral democracy and the right 
to strike – but quite another to propose a remedy for them. He therefore 
proposed to create “a class of state doctors”8 who would be in charge of 
detecting and removing the tumors that were spreading throughout the 
body of the state organism.
From here it was only a small step to the National Socialists’ idea 
of the state as a racially homogeneous Volkskörper (“national body”). 
Central to the National Socialist ideology was the assumption that the 
state was not composed of an aggregate of individuals, but that it was an 
organic community with a shared biological heritage. In contrast to its 
liberal and communist competitors, this ideology did not see history as a 
continuous struggle between interest-driven individuals or between com-
peting social classes, but between different races. Moreover, it assumed 
that there was a natural inequality between the races, formed primarily 
by hereditary factors, such that it was possible to classify human beings 
according to a strict hierarchical order. National Socialist ideologues not 
only claimed that this racial worldview was based on objective scientific 
evidence, they also believed that politics should be arranged accordingly. 
7 Jacob von Uexküll, Staatsbiologie: Anatomie, Physiologie, Pathologie des Staates 




In the words of Hans Reiter, one of the leading physicians of the Reich, 
“[i]t is inevitable that this course of thought should lead to the recognition 
of biological thinking as the baseline, direction, and substructure of every 
effective politics.”9
The problem that faced Germany and the entire West was an ever-
worsening process of bio-spiritual degeneration, which threatened to 
enfeeble the national body and ultimately cause it to disintegrate. Yet, 
although the National Socialists believed that the mythical forces of race 
and heredity were beyond human control, they were also convinced that 
it was still possible to counter this degenerative tendency and restore the 
national body to health and perfection. To accomplish this, they imple-
mented a series of politico-medical interventions on the national body, 
carried out in the name of “racial hygiene” (Rassenhygiene). For the most 
part, works on racial hygiene, such as those by Reiter,10 Verschuer,11 and 
Ploetz,12 advocated the use of both positive and negative eugenics to re-
generate the race. In an attempt to increase the number of true Aryans, 
the regime launched a staunch pro-birth campaign. In addition to this, 
it also founded the Lebensborn project, which sought to produce a su-
perior race by means of selective breeding. More attention was paid to 
negative eugenic measures, however. Since it would take several genera-
tions for the results of a positive eugenics to become visible, in the short 
term, it would be necessary to hinder the reproduction of those endowed 
with what were deemed to be inferior hereditary traits. Measures along 
these lines were implemented almost as soon as the Nazi regime came to 
power. As early as July 1933, the ‘Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily 
Diseased Offspring’ was adopted, which ordered the sterilization of peo-
ple affected by conditions which were thought to be hereditary, such as 
imbecility, epilepsy, manic depression, blindness and even alcoholism. 
Moreover, to prevent interracial mixing, the ‘Law for the Protection of 
German Blood and German Honor’ was passed, prohibiting marriages 
between Aryan Germans and Jews. But these measures were only a prel-
ude to what was to come. In 1939, the regime launched the T4 program, 
which authorized the use of euthanasia among the genetically “unfit,” and 
9 Hans Reiter, ‘Unsere Biopolitik und das Auslandsdeutschtum,’ in Das Reichsge-
sundheitsamt 1933-1939: Sechs Jahre Nationalsozialistische Führung (Berlin: Julius 
Springer Verlag, 1939), 37-43.
10 Hans Reiter and Johannes Breger (eds.), Deutsches Gold: Gesundes Leben – Frohes 
Schaffen (München: Röhrig, 1942).
11 Otmar von Verschuer, Leitfaden der Rassenhygiene (Leipzig: Thieme, 1941).




in an ultimate attempt to cleanse the national body of harmful elements, it 
finally ordered their total destruction.
While the biopolitical dream of literally transforming politics into 
a form of applied biology was abandoned after the Second World War, 
the basic theoretical framework upon which it was based remained more 
or less intact. Postwar political scientists who continue to study politi-
cal phenomena from a naturalistic perspective have taken great pains to 
point out that this understanding of biopolitics does not necessarily lead 
one to prefer one particular political system over another, but their as-
sumptions are not radically different from their predecessors. Advocates 
of a naturalist approach to politics, which remains mainly an American 
affair, argue that the methodology of the social sciences is fundamen-
tally flawed insofar as it ignores the import of biological factors in its 
analyses.13 In particular, they reject the idea that the subjective motives 
and intentions of political actors are key to understanding political phe-
nomena, and propose that attention should be directed towards these 
actors’ empirically observable behavior. In the literature, two main ap-
proaches can be discerned.14 The first of these draws on sociobiological 
and ethological research to understand the biogenetic causes of political 
behavior. It argues that most of these causes, such as competition, coop-
eration and aggression, are interconnected with genetically programmed 
dispositions. If these behaviors can be observed universally, it is because 
they are essential to survival and thus “evolutionarily adaptive.” The 
second approach takes its inspiration from Neo-Darwinian evolution-
ary theory in describing and explaining the origins of state structures. 
Most authors working in this area agree that authoritarianism conforms 
most closely to human nature, since this form of government is the one 
most likely to result from genetically based behaviors that are central to 
human sociability, such as territorial drive and hierarchy formation. In 
this view, the emergence of democracy is not an evolutionary aberra-
tion, but it is possible only under very specific and rather rare evolution-
ary conditions and is therefore bound to remain an exceptional event.15 
That is not to say, however, that advocates of this naturalist approach are 
13 See for example James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Po-
litical Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1963), Roger D. Masters, The Nature of Politics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), and Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, 
Darwinism, Dominance, and Democracy: The Biological Bases of Authoritarianism 
(Westport: Praeger, 1997). 
14 See Robert H. Blank and Samuel M. Hines, Biology and Political Science (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), esp. 79-98. 
15 Tatu Vanhagen, Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1997), 21-26. 
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interested in formulating a model of politics directed at the preservation 
and promotion of the evolutionary conditions favorable to the demo-
cratic spirit. The conclusion they draw from their findings is that the 
only politics realistically possible is one that conforms to the immutable 
laws of biology.
Although the naturalist variant of biopolitics has not completely dis-
appeared from political science, it has been gradually superseded by a dif-
ferent approach to the question of the relation between life and politics. In 
simple terms, we might say that this shift in focus was necessitated by the 
recognition that politics is not merely the passive outcome of bio-natural 
processes, but that politics also actively intervenes in these processes. 
This new understanding of biopolitics has two different versions, each 
triggered by a particular set of events. The first version concerns itself 
with the detrimental effects that human activities have on the natural en-
vironment.16 Since the 1960s, we have seen a growing awareness that 
unlimited economic growth threatens to destroy the biosphere on which 
humanity depends for its survival. It was predicted that the worsening of 
environmental problems, such as air and water pollution, the depletion 
of natural resources, species extinction and population explosion, would 
cause severe economic and social problems, and could eventually lead 
to a global political crisis and even to war. In order to tackle these prob-
lems, a comprehensive program of socio-political measures was proposed 
which primarily sought to protect the environment from excessive human 
activities. During the early 1990s, when the issue of climate change be-
came a global political concern, this approach was supplemented by poli-
cies built on the assumption that the most effective means of addressing 
environmental problems was not to change attitudes and behaviors, but to 
develop “environmentally friendly” or “green” technologies.
The second version of a biopolitics premised on the idea that politics 
increasingly involves the regulation and organization of natural processes 
is also concerned with human intervention in nature but, in contrast to 
the ecopolitical variant, it focuses not on interventions in the human’s 
“outer nature” but on interventions in its “inner nature.” This strand of 
biopolitics is especially important for our topic, because it was conceived 
in direct response to the proliferation of new biotechnologies. The main 
idea guiding this approach is that if the development of genetic technol-
ogies demonstrates that there are no impermeable boundaries between 
nature and culture, then renewed political and legal efforts must be made 
16 For a general introduction to this field, see Neil Carter, The Politics of the Environ-
ment: Ideas, Activism, Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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to retrace and reestablish these boundaries.17 As we saw in the preceding 
chapter, this biopolitical strategy can take a variety of forms. The most 
prevalent of these strategies seeks to limit technological intervention in 
the human genome by constructing a robust moral conception of human 
nature. Advocates of this approach argue that a substantive idea of human 
nature is intrinsic to our conceptions of justice and human rights. Genetic 
interventions are therefore seen as a threat to our moral and political self-
understanding as free acting agents. Liberal eugenicists, on the other 
hand, pursue a diametrically opposed strategy. They argue that, far from 
contradicting the freedoms and rights associated with liberalism, genetic 
technologies actually promise to extend them significantly.
We have argued that both positions are highly problematic, because 
both involve the dehumanization of a particular form of human biological 
life. This is a puzzling outcome, especially in view of the fact that, while 
the advocates of a liberal eugenics aim “to create healthier, longer-lived, 
and altogether ‘better’ individuals,”18 its detractors seek to preserve the 
biological foundations of human existence. For how is it possible that 
these attempts to conceive of a life-centered and life-affirming politics 
become transformed into the opposite of what they intend? At this point, 
we can see that something remains unthematized in the classic notion of 
biopolitics, something that impinges directly on the relation between the 
two central concepts under discussion. Thomas Lemke makes the point 
with particular clarity when he states that
[t]he interpretation of biopolitics as a mere province of traditional politics 
is inadequate, in that it presumes that the substance of the political sphere 
remains untouched by the growing technological possibilities for regulating 
life processes. This, however, is not the case. Biopolitical questions are fun-
damental precisely because not only are they objects of political discourse, 
but they also encompass the political subject him- or herself.19
In other words, despite clear differences, the two positions presuppose 
the existence of a stable, autonomous subject, both an individual who is 
capable of making political decisions concerning the boundary between 
the “natural” and the “artificial,” the “grown” and the “made,” and an 
individual for whom such decisions are to be made. The problem, how-
ever, is that the nature of this subjectivity is less an origin than an effect 
of political decisions. In this view, biopolitics is less a particular kind of 
17 Odelia Funke (1985), ‘Biopolitics and public policy: controlling biotechnology,’ Po-
litical Science 18 (1): 69-77. 
18 Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 5.
19 Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction, 30.
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politics that deals with issues related to the biological existence of human 
beings than it is a force field in which the meaning, value and purpose of 
these notions are configured. Perhaps nobody saw this more clearly than 
Michel Foucault.
The Power to “Make Life” and “Let Die”
Given the fact that Foucault only occasionally mentioned the notion of 
biopolitics explicitly in his writings, it may be somewhat surprising that 
he is now generally referred to as the most important author in this field, 
or even its founding father. The term “biopolitics” itself makes its first 
appearance in a short lecture he gave at a conference in Rio de Janeiro in 
1974,20 and then returns in the final session of his 1976 Collège de France 
lectures,21 and again at the very end of the first volume of The History 
of Sexuality,22 which appeared the same year. In addition, while the titles 
of his 1978 and 1979 Collège de France lectures give the impression that 
he intended to flesh out the notion of biopolitics more thoroughly here, 
one only need look at the topics discussed in these lectures to conclude 
that they appear to deal with a somewhat different problematic, most no-
tably that of governmentality.23 However, if this appears to suggest that 
the issue of biopolitics was only of minor importance to Foucault, we 
should look again; in reality, it was central to his work at least from the 
publication of Discipline and Punish on.24 The latter book is presented 
as a historical inquiry into the profound changes undergone by the pe-
nal system over the previous three centuries. But the evolution described 
here, from a system centered on public executions to one based on closely 
monitored prisons, is but one manifestation of a much more fundamental 
transformation in the power structures of modern societies. Foucault saw 
this shift as entailing a transformation in the mechanisms of power away 
from that of sovereignty, which deals primarily with legal subjects, to that 
of biopower, which focuses on the biological existence of human beings:
20 Michel Foucault (2004), ‘The crisis of Medicine or the crisis of antimedicine?’ 
 Foucault Studies 1: 5-19. 
21 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 239-264.
22 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1998). 
23 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1977-1978, trans. G. Burchell (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2007), Michel Foucault, The 
Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, trans. G. Burchell 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).




It seems to me that one of the basic phenomena of the nineteenth century was 
what might be called power’s hold over life. What I mean is the acquisition 
of power over man insofar as man is a living being, that the biological came 
under State control, that there was at least a certain tendency that leads to 
what might be termed State control over the biological.25
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault explains the principal difference 
between these two regimes of power in terms of the contrast between “de-
duction” and “production.” According to him, sovereign power operates 
through the “right to seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life 
itself.”26 It reserves the right to deduce or to extract goods and services 
from its subjects. The most extreme manifestation of this sovereign right 
is the capacity to decide on the life and death of subjects. From the per-
spective of the sovereign, life and death are not natural phenomena but 
constitute the outer limits of the domain which falls within its sphere of 
power. Only the sovereign can grant the subject the right to be alive or 
to die. However, in practice, priority is granted to the sovereign’s right to 
kill: the sovereign can exercise its right over life only through its decision 
to kill or not to kill.
During the classical age, this “ancient right to take life or let live” was 
gradually replaced by “a power to foster life or disallow it to the point 
of death.”27 In contrast to sovereign power, this new power mechanism 
does not function by suppressing life and sapping its strength, but seeks 
to make it productive by controlling, regulating, reinforcing and optimiz-
ing the vital processes pertaining to it. It is impossible to pinpoint exactly 
what caused this fundamental transformation in the power structure, but 
it would certainly not have been possible without a number of develop-
ments that occurred outside of the field of politics, such as the steady 
increase in economic and agricultural productivity and the availability of 
new scientific and medical knowledge. As a result of these developments, 
the biological existence of human beings was no longer considered to be 
the impassable natural limit of politics, but gradually became its prime 
object:
For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in 
political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate 
that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its 
fatality; part of it passed into knowledge’s field of control and power’s sphere 
of intervention.28
25 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 239-240.





That is not to say, however, that it would ever be possible for this pow-
er mechanism to control life in all its forms. As soon as life is no longer 
regarded as an unalterable given, and enters the realm of explicit politi-
cal calculations, hitherto unknown dimensions of life show themselves 
everywhere. Seen from this perspective, life and politics are engaged in 
a never-ending struggle in which neither side is ever strong enough to 
completely master the other. For Foucault, then, biopolitics is situated 
precisely in this “dual position of life that placed it at the same time out-
side history, in its biological environment, and inside human historicity, 
penetrated by the latter’s techniques of knowledge and power.”29
Historically and conceptually, Foucault distinguishes between two di-
mensions of this life-oriented politics: an “anatomo-politics of the body” 
and a “bio-politics of the population.”30 The first of these emerged in 
the late 17th century and centered on the individual body as a machine. 
It mainly sought to create politically docile and economically produc-
tive individuals by subjecting their bodies to the supervision and con-
trol of disciplinary technologies in various institutions such as schools, 
army barracks, asylums, hospitals, factories and prisons. In the second 
half of the 18th century, this disciplinary power was complemented by a 
new power technology, one which no longer targeted “man-as-body” but 
“man-as-living-being.”31 This “security technology,”32 as Foucault called 
it, was not only employed in a much more centralized manner, it also 
operated on a larger scale. It included, for example, the development of 
state policy in relation to birth control and the problem of morbidity. In 
order to address the challenges and dangers bound up with these phenom-
ena, a system of health care was set up which mainly focused on public 
hygiene. Other important fields of intervention included those related to 
the problems associated with old age, accidents, infirmities and various 
anomalies. This led to the creation of new control mechanisms such as 
insurance, collective savings and safety measures. Furthermore, the bio-
political regime also began to focus its attention on conditions related to 
the natural and artificial environment insofar as these had an influence on 
the well-being of those living in them: the draining of swamps, the build-
ing of dikes, urban development, and so on. What all these phenomena 
have in common is, firstly, that they are “collective phenomena which 
have their economic and political effects,”33 and that they are visible only 
29 Ibid., 143.
30 Ibid., 139.





at population level. In other words, the risks and dangers inherent to these 
phenomena all result from the existence of a population as a biological 
entity. Secondly, they are all essentially “aleatory events that occur within 
a population that exists over a period of time.”34 This means that bio-
politics will employ mechanisms with very different functions from those 
employed by disciplinary power: forecasts, statistical estimates, and so 
on. These mechanisms do not intervene at the level of the individual but 
at the level of the population, and they do this in such a way as to achieve 
a general equilibrium: “it is, in a word, a matter of taking control of life 
and the biological processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they 
are not disciplined, but regularized.”35
In the 1976 Collège de France lectures and in The History of Sexuality, 
Foucault’s outline of the concept of biopolitics remains somewhat sche-
matic; it is analyzed in more detail, however, in the 1978 and 1979 lec-
tures. In these lectures, he seeks to excavate the genealogy of biopolitics 
through a historico-critical examination of the process of “governmentali-
zation” as it developed from “the archaic model of the Christian pastor-
ate,” through the 17th century “diplomatic-military model,” to that of “the 
police.”36 What this analysis adds to our understanding of biopolitics is 
that it is not a unidirectional relationship in which life is simply at the 
mercy of power mechanisms, but that it also produces new forms of sub-
jectivity. Crucially, Foucault does not conceive of government as a purely 
political concept but places it in a much broader analytical context. In 
this enlarged sense, government refers not only to the political art of gov-
erning men, but also to various religious, philosophical, economic and 
pedagogical practices of control, guidance and management. The main 
thread of Foucault’s argument is that the modern state is the result of a 
complex combination of Greco-Roman and Christian forms of govern-
ment. While the former developed mechanisms for establishing obedi-
ence to legal and moral norms, the latter focused on techniques for the 
comprehensive guidance of individuals. Christian pastoral power centers 
on the relationship between shepherd and flock and is concerned with the 
notion that individuals conduct themselves in such a way as to ensure the 
salvation of their souls in the hereafter. Importantly, the shepherd does not 
merely seek to enforce his will upon his subjects, but exercises his power 
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[I]f the Christian pastor teaches the truth, if he forces men, the sheep, to ac-
cept a certain truth, the Christian pastorate is also absolutely innovative in 
establishing a structure, a technique of, at once, power, investigation, self-
examination, and the examination of others, by which a certain inner truth 
of the hidden soul, becomes the element through which the pastor’s power 
is exercised, by which obedience is practiced, by which the relationship of 
complete obedience is assured, and through which, precisely, the economy of 
merits and faults passes.37
What is therefore peculiar about this form of power is that it requires 
subjects to participate in their own subjugation. But by doing so, by ex-
amining and exposing the content of their own consciences, the subju-
gated also come to see themselves as individual subjects: “[T]he person 
who examined himself could take control and become master of himself 
by knowing exactly what he had done and in what respect he had made 
progress. It was therefore a condition of self-mastery.”38
According to Foucault, this dialectic between subjugation and sub-
jectivation inherent to the pastoral model of power will have a decisive 
impact on the formation of the modern state. In the 17th century, it reap-
peared in secularized form as the doctrine of “reason of state.” The defin-
ing characteristic of this art of governing was that it no longer relied either 
on theological principles or on the particular interests of the monarch, 
but acquired its own proper rationality. What Foucault means by this is 
that the purpose of government was no longer simply to preserve and in-
crease the power and wealth of the sovereign, but to improve the welfare 
of the population. That is not to say that governmental power abandoned 
the ambition to establish dominance over its subjects. But it strove to 
achieve this precisely by adhering to those subjects’ demands and needs. 
On the one hand, then, governmental power began to take responsibility 
for the well-being of its population by taking measures to improve living 
conditions, increase wealth, and so on. On the other hand, however, it 
was also necessary to extend governmental power to areas of life which 
had previously been considered part of the private sphere, such as the 
economy and individual health.
This mutually reinforcing logic was to receive its most comprehen-
sive expression in the 18th century’s “science of the police.” According 
to Foucault’s usage, the term “police” does not signify the institution of 
the police in the modern sense, as in “the arm of law,” but refers instead 





preserving the state in good order.”39 By means of a reading of von Justi’s 
Elements of Police (1756) and De Lamare’s Treatise on the Police (1729), 
Foucault shows that the aim of policing was to foster all aspects of the 
lives of the citizens, not only their material and physical conditions but 
also their moral and spiritual ones. More specifically, the science of po-
lice concerned itself with the number of citizens, life necessities such as 
food and housing, health, work and the circulation of bodies and goods. 
In other words, this new power mechanism was no longer commanded 
by “the immediate problem of surviving and not dying, but [was] now 
commanded by the problem of living and doing a little better than just 
living.”40 But just as with reason of state thinking, the science of the po-
lice did not seek to improve the lives of citizens as an end in itself, but 
developed interventions and means to “ensure that living, better than just 
living, coexisting will be effectively useful to the constitution and devel-
opment of the state’s forces.”41
Foucault’s genealogy of governmentality brings the contrast between 
the paradigms of sovereignty and biopolitics into the sharpest possible 
relief. While sovereign power was a preeminently negative or deductive 
power, which suppressed life in order to preserve itself, biopolitics may 
be said to be a positive or productive power, which fosters and strengthens 
life in order to extend itself. Yet, if a biopolitical regime can reproduce 
and expand only by optimizing, reinforcing and multiplying the lives of 
its subjects, then it is also bound to experience opposition:
[A]gainst this power that was still new in the nineteenth century, the forces 
that resisted relied for support on the very thing it invested, that is, on life 
and man as a living being. […] [W]hat was demanded and what served as an 
objective was life, understood as the basic needs, man’s concrete essence, the 
realization of his potential, a plenitude of the possible. […] Life as a political 
object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back against the system 
that was bent on controlling it.42
However, according to Foucault, these forms of resistance do not re-
ally pose a threat to the biopolitical system as such and are the prelude 
to a world in which biopolitical conflicts surrounding claims about “the 
‘right’ to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of 








What form will these conflicts take and what will be their outcome? 
Will they lead to the creation of new areas of freedom and result in the 
emergence of new forms of subjectivity, or will they in fact enable power 
to tighten its grip on life? If Foucault does not seem to provide a definitive 
answer to this question, it is because it highlights a paradox in his concep-
tion of biopolitics which he was never really able to account for. For how 
is it possible that the rising to dominance of a form of power that precisely 
seeks to protect and strengthen life has also generated totalitarian regimes 
which unleashed a wave of destruction never seen before in history?:
If it is true that the power of sovereignty is increasingly on the retreat and 
that the disciplinary or regulatory disciplinary power in on the advance, how 
will the power to kill and the function of murder operate in this technology of 
power, which takes life as both its object and its objective? How can a power 
such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong 
its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for 
failing? […] How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised 
in a political system centered upon biopower?44
What is at stake in this question is the relation between sovereign 
power and biopower, between “the right to take life” and “the right to 
make live,” or again, between the power over life and the power of life. 
If it is true that “Nazism was in fact the paroxysmal development of the 
new power mechanism,” in the sense that “controlling the random ele-
ment inherent in biological processes was one of the regime’s immedi-
ate objectives,”45 how, then, should we understand the fact that it also 
exercised the sovereign right to kill to a degree hitherto unparalleled, 
even to the point of complete self-destruction? At this point, Foucault 
seems to have been left with two possible responses, both of which are 
clearly unsatisfactory: either totalitarianism marked a temporary break 
in the otherwise steady evolution from sovereign power to biopower, 
or it showed that, in a completely enclosed biopolitical order, power is 
freed from all previously existing boundaries (legal, religious, etc.) and 
is therefore compelled to discharge itself on the very same vital element 
from which it draws its strength. Choosing the first option would force 
Foucault to explain totalitarianism as an anomaly – and thus leave it un-
explained – in order to save his theory from being invalidated. In choos-
ing the second, he would be forced to argue that genocidal totalitarianism 
constitutes the culmination of the entire edifice of political modernity.46 In 
44 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 254.
45 Ibid., 259.
46 Some of Foucault’s remarks actually point in that direction: “Of course, Nazism alone 
took the play between the sovereign right to kill and the mechanisms of biopower to 
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the end, Foucault attempts to escape this dilemma by arguing that racism 
provides the point of articulation between sovereign power and biopower 
in the mechanism of totalitarianism, because racism functions as a means 
of “establishing a biological caesura within the population […] between 
what must live and what must die.”47 However, this explanation has the 
unfortunate side effect of additionally forcing him to position communist 
totalitarianism within a racist matrix;48 not only is this less than convinc-
ing, it also threatens to reduce Nazi biopolitics to the status of an example.
It will always remain an open question whether Foucault had really 
reached an impasse in his analysis of biopolitics or whether his untimely 
death kept him from developing a theoretical perspective that would en-
able him to overcome these striking inconsistencies. Be that as it may, in 
recent literature, two solutions have been suggested to Foucault’s paradox 
of a biopolitics that could simultaneously nurture life and kill, both of 
which seek to explain the coincidence of these seemingly mutually exclu-
sive poles within a single interpretative framework: Roberto Esposito’s 
paradigm of immunity and Giorgio Agamben’s work on the state of ex-
ception. It is to these two recent contributions to biopolitics that we will 
now turn.
Existence Without Life
Why does a life-affirming politics always risk being transformed into 
a life-negating politics? Although it is only in one of his most recent books 
that Esposito attempts a solution to the paradox contained in Foucault’s 
analysis of biopolitics, in reality this solution builds on a body of work 
that he has been developing over at least the last two decades:
Either life holds politics back, pinning it to its impassable natural limit, or, on 
the contrary, it is life that is captured and prey to a politics that strains to im-
prison its innovative potential. Between the two possibilities there is a breach 
in signification, a blind spot that risks dragging the entire category into a 
vacuum of sense. It is as if biopolitics is missing something (an intermediary 
segment or a logical juncture) that is capable of unbinding the absoluteness 
of irreconcilable perspectives in the elaboration of a more complex paradigm 
that, without losing the specificity of its elements, seizes hold of the internal 
connections or indicates a common horizon.49
this paroxysmal point. But this play is in fact inscribed in the workings of all states” 
(ibid., 260).
47 Ibid., 254.
48 See Ibid., 261-263.
49 Esposito, Bíos, 32.
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The paradigm Esposito refers to in the above passage from Bíos: 
Biopolitics and Philosophy is that of immunization. Hence, in order to 
understand his intervention in the field of biopolitics in all its intricacy, 
we must first examine his earlier reflections on this concept.
The first point to note is that, for Esposito, the concept of immunitas is 
ineluctably tied up with that of communitas. In his search for a more orig-
inal interpretation of the notion of community, one that goes beyond its 
traditional definition of what individuals have in common (koinos, com-
mun, gemein), Esposito draws attention to the fact that a more thorough 
examination of the original Latin term from which it derives, namely mu-
nus, yields three additional meanings: onus, officium and donum. While 
the first two of these refer to a duty or an obligation one has to fulfill, such 
as taking up office (officium), the third meaning indicates a gift. Although 
these two initially seem to contradict each other – how can a gift be ob-
ligatory? – Esposito explains that it actually concerns a particular gift. In 
contrast to the gift as donum, the gift as munus is a gift for which one is 
obliged to give something in return: “once someone has accepted the mu-
nus, an obligation (onus) has been created to exchange it either in terms 
of goods or service.”50 In other words, in the case of the gift as munus, 
the accent falls entirely on the gift that one gives and not on what one re-
ceives. The conclusion Esposito draws from this etymological review of 
the concept of communitas is that the members of a particular community 
are united less by a particular quality they might share (language, descent, 
religion, etc.) but by the obligation to give to the other, and that therefore 
establishes a lack at the level of the subject: “[C]ommunitas is the total-
ity of persons united not by a ‘property’ but precisely by an obligation or 
a debt; not by an ‘addition’ but by a ‘subtraction’: by a lack, a limit that 
is configured as an onus, or even as a defective modality for him who is 
‘affected.’”51
Thus, according to Esposito, the community is not a place where sub-
jects encounter others endowed with similar qualities and with whom 
they can therefore identify, but an empty zone or void that expropriates 
what is most proper to them, namely their very subjective identities:
[T]he community cannot be thought of as a body, as a corporation in which 
individuals are founded in a larger individual. Neither is community to be 
interpreted as a mutual, intersubjective “recognition” in which individuals 
are reflected in each other so as to confirm their initial identity […]. The 
community isn’t a mode of being, much less a “making” of the individual 
subject. It isn’t the subject’s expansion or multiplication but its exposure to 




what interrupts the closing and turns it inside out: a dizziness, a syncope, a 
spasm in the continuity of the subject.52
Conceived this way, the community is not to be understood as a di-
mension in which one feels safe and secure. On the contrary, exposing 
oneself to the community is one of the riskiest actions one can perform. 
Since it involves the painful loss of borders which are supposed to ensure 
the subject’s identity, it always involves the imminent risk of violent con-
flict. Because if communitas radically de-subjectifies and de-centers the 
self, if it renders it impossible for the subject to distinguish between what 
is ‘mine’ and what is ‘thine,’ then a violent need to restore the lost integ-
rity of these borders will also always emerge. Esposito is therefore led 
to introduce into his analysis a second element of the constitutive nature 
of community. Essentially, communitas always appears to have already 
been traversed by an opposing force which seeks to restrain its radical 
expropriating tendency: immunitas. Etymologically speaking, immunitas 
is a privative term whose meaning derives from what it negates, namely 
the munus as an obligatory gift:
Those who are immune owe nothing to anyone, in terms of both vacatio and 
excusatio: whether referring to an originary autonomy or the later release 
from a previously contracted debt, what counts in defining the concept is 
exemption from the obligation of the munus, be it personal, fiscal, or civil.53
However, in addition to this privative meaning of exemption, im-
munity can also, and perhaps even more primarily, be understood in a 
comparative sense as a privilege one enjoys. Immune, then, is he who is 
released from the burden of exposing himself to the communal circuit 
of gift-giving, and who is therefore protected from the expropriating ef-
fects of the community. However, this does not mean that Esposito views 
immunization as an exclusively negative or harmful process that always 
threatens to lead to the disintegration of the community. A certain de-
gree of immunization cannot be avoided, for without it the community 
would eventually implode under the weight of an unbearable excess of 
expropriation: “To survive, the community, every community, is forced 
to introject the negative modality of its opposite, even if the opposite 
remains precisely a lacking and contrastive mode of being of the com-
munity itself.”54
Yet even this does not completely exhaust the meaning of immunity. 
After all, in contemporary usage the term more commonly refers to the 
52 Ibid., 7.
53 Esposito, Immunitas, 5.
54 Esposito, Bíos, 52.
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biological condition of an organism’s resistance to infection or disease. 
What is particularly interesting about this form of immunity, and which 
will allow Esposito to give it an explicit juridico-political significance, 
is that immunity can be acquired not only naturally but also artificially, 
for example, through vaccination. The idea behind this second type of 
biological immunity is that an organism can be protected from an infec-
tion by injecting it with an attenuated dose of the same infectious disease, 
which means that the immune mechanism functions precisely by expos-
ing itself to what it seeks to destroy. Put differently, immunity involves 
life preserving itself paradoxically by opening itself up to the very power 
that negates it:
For life to remain as such, it must submit itself to an alien force that, if not 
entirely hostile, at least inhibits its development (…). This is where the struc-
turally aporetic character of the immunitary process is to be located: unable 
to directly achieve its objective, it is forced to pursue it from the inside out. 
In so doing, it retains its objective in the horizon of meaning of its opposite: it 
can prolong life, but only by continuously giving it a taste of death.55  
Although the notion of immunity originated in a juridico-political 
context, it is certainly no coincidence that medicine defines it in these 
terms. In fact, according to Esposito, there is a structural analogy between 
biological and political immunization, so much so that it is possible to see 
politics as an immune system that protects the members of a community 
by suppressing the violent conflicts engendered by an excess of commu-
nal expropriation.
Esposito claims that this understanding of politics allows us to see 
more clearly what is wrong with Foucault’s notion of biopolitics. In 
Foucault’s view, there is a clear historical and conceptual distinction be-
tween sovereign power and biopower. As mentioned above, the former is 
a negative power which suppresses life in order to reproduce itself, while 
the latter is a positive power which improves life in order to extend itself. 
But, as we have seen, by insisting so strongly on the irreducible difference 
between the two, Foucault was unable to explain how it is possible that a 
biopolitical regime could also turn against life. What he therefore failed 
to articulate is the idea that both of these power regimes actually function 
according to an immunitary logic:
In relation to the analysis initiated by Foucault, sovereignty is understood not 
as a necessary compensatory ideology vis-à-vis the intrusiveness of control 
dispositifs nor as a phantasmal replica of the ancient power of death to the 
55 Esposito, Immunitas, 8-9.
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new biopolitical regime, but as the first and most influential that the biopoliti-
cal regime assumes.56
According to Esposito, politics has always been biopolitics, in the 
sense that politics has always been preoccupied with the preservation of 
life and thus with the need for immunization; however, it will only be-
come explicitly so at the moment this issue is no longer seen as something 
given but as a problem to be addressed and solved:
By this it is understood that all civilizations past and present faced (and in 
some way solved) the needs of their own immunization, but that it is only in 
the modern ones that immunization constitutes its most intimate essence. One 
might come to affirm that it wasn’t modernity that raised the question of the 
self-preservation of life, but self-preservation is itself raised in modernity’s 
own being, which is to say it invents modernity as a historical and categorical 
apparatus able to cope with it.57
It should therefore not be too much of a surprise that Esposito sees 
Thomas Hobbes as the founding father of modern immunitary biopolitics.
It is well known that Hobbes places the problem of self-preservation 
(conservatio vitae) at the center of his political philosophy. In fact, ac-
cording to Hobbes, it constitutes man’s most essential natural right. Man 
is free to use any means necessary to preserve himself in being. However, 
in the state of nature this attempt at self-preservation is bound to fail be-
cause it is accompanied by an equally strong natural impulse that tends 
to contradict the first one: the inexhaustible desire for acquisition: if all 
individuals were to pursue only their own self-interest and simply take by 
force whatever was deemed necessary for their own survival, there would 
inevitably be continuous violent conflict. In other words, this would lead 
to a “war of all against all” which would cause man’s life to be “solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” It is in order to counter this fatal logic 
that Hobbes develops an immunitary strategy. If left to its own devices, 
life is destined to contradict its own most natural impulse. That is why 
it is necessary for life to renounce its natural right to unlimited acquisi-
tion and to transfer the task of self-preservation to an external power: “[I]
n order to save itself, life needs to step out from itself and constitute a 
transcendental point from which it receives orders and shelter.”58 Faced 
with the imminent threat of generalized conflict, humans in their natural 
state are forced to institute a sovereign power which acts to protect them 
from a possible return to conflict. According to Esposito, Hobbes’s theory 





of the social contract is therefore little more than a thinly veiled attempt 
to immunize the community from the danger of communal expropriation. 
In describing the threat to humans in their natural state as a consequence 
of the conflict inherent to their excessive desire to appropriate one an-
other’s goods, Hobbes ultimately proposes a model in which the hori-
zontal yet conflict-ridden relationships among equals are replaced by the 
vertical relationships between a sovereign and its individual subjects. In 
this sense, one might even say that “sovereignty, in the final analysis, is 
nothing other than the artificial vacuum created around every individual 
– the negative of the relation or the negative relation that exists between 
unrelated entities.”59
In fact, though, this is only the first stage of Hobbes’s immunitary 
strategy – its ‘positive’ side, so to speak. As we know from medical prac-
tice, immunization involves injecting the body with a sample of the very 
same infection we wish to protect it from and thus submitting the body to 
a hostile force that, in a way, subtly counters the infection from the inside 
out. In order to protect life, the immune system needs to reproduce the 
malign force that besieges it in an attenuated yet essentially no less lethal 
form. The same holds true for the immunization of the political body. If 
sovereign power is created to protect the community from violent con-
flict, it does not mean that it can provide for the complete elimination of 
violence in the commonwealth. Rather, violence is reproduced in the per-
son of the sovereign himself, who is the only individual in the common-
wealth to retain the natural right to kill. The paradox is that the subjects do 
not even have the right to resist this sovereign power over life and death 
because they have granted the sovereign this power of their own free will:
This exception – the liminal coincidence of preservation and capacity to be 
sacrificed of life – represents both a remainder that cannot be mediated and 
the structural antinomy on which the machine of immunitary mediation rests. 
[…] It is as if the negative, keeping to its immunitary function of protecting 
life, suddenly moves outside the frame and on its reentry strikes life with 
uncontrollable violence.60
Contrary to what Foucault thought, then, biopower and sovereign 
power are not mutually exclusive but should be seen as two sides of the 
same coin. If a politics that sets itself the task of preserving life always 
ends by negating life, it is because it can only do so by subjecting life to 





However, this does not entirely answer the question of how we should 
understand the specificity of Nazi biopolitics. As we recall, Foucault al-
ways oscillated between the continuist and discontinuist approaches with-
out ever decisively opting for either one. In order to save his theory from 
becoming invalidated, he turned to the concept of racism to explain the 
emergence of totalitarianism. But not only does this neglect the question 
of how we should conceive of a communist racism, it also threatens to 
erase the difference between totalitarian biopolitics and modern biopoli-
tics in general, which, in Society Must Be Defended, Foucault also traced 
back to a racist matrix. Relating both sovereign power and biopower to 
the paradigm of immunization, Esposito thus has no need of a mediating 
concept such as racism in explaining the dialectical reversal from a life-
affirming politics to a life-negating politics. Yet this still fails to explain 
why only Nazism has propelled the thanatological drive of biopolitics to 
its most complete realization. For this is what Nazi biopolitics gives us 
to think: it not only sought to cleanse the German national body of all in-
ternal and external enemies but – as we know from Telegram Number 71 
sent from Hitler’s bunker – it also tended toward its own self-destruction.
Esposito detects both quantitative and qualitative differences between 
modern biopolitics and Nazi biopolitics. Firstly, no other biopolitical re-
gime has ever ventured to push the use of biological metaphors further 
than Nazism did. Biological terms such as “body” and “constitution” have 
frequently been used to illustrate some particular political concept, but 
only Nazism took these metaphors so seriously that its leaders “use[d] bio-
logical processes as criteria with which to guide their own actions.”61 In 
this sense, it could be argued that Nazism did not politicize biology but in 
fact biologized politics. This also accounts for Nazism’s essential differ-
ence from communist totalitarianism: “While the transcendental of com-
munism is history, its subject class, and its lexicon economic, Nazism’s 
transcendental is life, its subject race, and its lexicon biological.”62 This is 
already clear from the fact that the German medical class was accorded a 
key role in the regime’s genocidal practices. Esposito notes, for example, 
that the Reich’s legal code required the active participation of a physician 
in all stages of the process. Only doctors were allowed to decide who was 
to be given a ‘merciful’ death in the T4 euthanasia program and who, upon 
entry to the concentration camp, was to be sent immediately to the gas 
chambers; in addition, though, they were also the only individuals quali-
fied to administer a lethal injection or to open a gas valve. From this point 





about the health of their patients, if by this it is understood that they iden-
tified the patient to be the German Volkskörper, and that they were con-
vinced that restoring this body to health required the elimination of all of 
the harmful elements that were devouring this body from the inside out. If 
this still gives the impression that Nazism was merely a more radicalized 
version of modern immunitary biopolitics, however, this is only partially 
correct according to Esposito. For if it is true that the Nazi immunitary 
apparatus above all “propagated the fight to the death against the Jews as 
the resistance put up by the body (and originally the healthy blood) of the 
German nation against the invading germs that had penetrated within and 
whose intent it was to undermine the unity and life of the German nation 
itself,”63 even to the point of destroying its own body, then it would be 
more correct to say that Nazism is characterized by an autoimmune logic.
Esposito captures the logic that underpinned the Nazi (auto-)immu-
nitary apparatus in a single formulation: “regeneration overcomes de-
generation through genocide.”64 As indicated in an earlier section in this 
chapter, the notion of ‘degeneration’ played a key role in the self-legiti-
mation of the Nazi regime. Originally coined in late 18th century biology, 
the term featured prominently in the philosophical, juridical and medical 
discourses of prewar Germany. The essential idea was that a growing seg-
ment of the population was affected by hereditary malformations which 
could eventually lead to sterility and even to the extinction of the entire 
hereditary line. Above all, a degenerate was defined as someone who de-
viates from the norm. This was not to say that their aberrant physical or 
psychological traits might represent natural variation within a population 
that could lead to successful adaption: rather, they were considered to be 
suffering from atavism, in the sense that they were situated within a zone 
where the boundary between the human and the animal was indistinct:
Degeneration is the animal element that reemerges in man in the form of 
an existence that isn’t properly animal or human, but exactly their point of 
intersection: the contradictory copresence between two genera, two times, 
two organisms that are incapable of producing a unity of the person and con-
sequently for the same reason incapable of forming a juridical subjectivity.65
This largely explains the extraordinary development of German an-
thropology and zoology of that time. If doubts arose about the stability 
of the borders separating humans from animals, efforts had to be made 
to reestablish them. This not only yielded a new taxonomy of human 
63 Ibid., 116.




biotypes – which ranged from the Aryan overman and the Mediterranean 
average man to the Slavic subhuman and the Jewish anti-man – but also 
led to the incorporation of animal and vegetable species within the hu-
man race. Contrary to what has generally been assumed, then, Nazi sci-
ence did not animalize man but actually widened the definition of man 
to include animals of inferior species: “He who was the object of per-
secution and extreme violence wasn’t simply an animal (which indeed 
was respected and protected as such by one of the most advanced pieces 
of legislation of the entire world), but was an animal-man: man in the 
animal and the animal in man.”66 Moreover, not only was it believed that 
deficient traits and behaviors were inexorably transmitted from genera-
tion to generation, these deficiencies were also considered to have the 
potential to spread from one body to the next until they affected the entire 
population. It was therefore thought that unless measures were taken to 
stop this process from running its full course, civilization would eventu-
ally come to an end.
If degeneration was the infectious disease that harmed the national 
body, this body could only be restored to health through a regenerative 
program that aimed to remove the sick parts. This was to be achieved 
through eugenics or, what amounted to the same thing, racial hygiene: 
“Racial hygiene is the immunitary therapy that aims at preventing or ex-
tirpating the pathological agents that jeopardize the biological quality of 
future generations.”67 In contrast to its American counterpart, which fo-
cused almost exclusively on measures for improving the hereditary quality 
of the population, the Nazi eugenics program mainly aimed to prevent the 
degenerative process from causing further damage to the national body. 
Or, in other words, it was believed that the most effective way to produce 
the healthiest beings required the elimination of the unhealthiest. It was 
therefore no coincidence that the law on forced sterilization was one of 
the first legislative measures taken by the Nazi’s when they came into 
power because, since it “intervene[d] at the root, at the originary point in 
which life is spread, […] it concerned the principle according to which 
the political body had to be vaccinated beforehand from every disease 
that could alter the self-preserving function.”68 If we recall that Fritz Lenz, 
then the head of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Anthropology, Human 
Heredity and Eugenics, had estimated that approximately one third of the 
German population would have to be sterilized in order to achieve the aim 






the phenomenon of birth was for the Nazi regime – indeed, so important 
that none of its aspects escaped state control and supervision.
If sterilization constituted one pole of the negative eugenic appara-
tus, euthanasia constituted the other. With regard to this issue, Esposito 
stresses the importance of two books which appeared only a couple of 
decades before the T4 euthanasia program was officially launched. The 
first of these is Adolf Jost’s Das Recht auf den Tod69 [The Right to Die]. 
Jost was not only the first to introduce the concept of a “life without 
value” (negativen Lebenswert) but also one of the first scholars to argue 
that the right to end life belonged exclusively to the state. Even more sig-
nificant, however, is Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche’s Die Freigabe der 
Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens70 [Authorization for the Annihilation 
of Life Unworthy of Being Lived], which contains a detailed legal dis-
cussion of the question of whether it might be desirable to extend the law 
on the legality of suicide to the killing of the incurably ill and the men-
tally disabled. While the jurist Binding quickly becomes engaged with 
the complex technical question of whether the patient’s consent would 
be necessary to terminate his or her life, and, if so, how consent could be 
obtained in cases where the patient was incapable of giving it, Hoche’s 
analysis takes a somewhat different approach to the issue by arguing that 
the lawful killing of such persons could be justified on biological grounds 
alone. The terms he uses to describe their condition of existence – “half-
men,” “damaged beings,” “mentally dead,” “human ballast,” “empty hu-
man husks” – are meant to indicate that it would not really mean killing 
a human being because “the persons whom it strikes are already dead.”71 
There is hardly any doubt that this is exactly what the regime had in 
mind when it issued an instructional film for personnel attached to the 
T4 program, the telling title of which was Dasein ohne Leben [Existence 
without Life]. Such an existence without life, a form of life entirely lack-
ing in ‘spirit,’ was nothing more than bare biological existence and thus 
could be disposed of as “a life unworthy of being lived.” Of course, spirit 
should not be understood here in any dualistic sense as a faculty that 
opens the biological body up to transcendence. As we know from Alfred 
Rosenberg’s The Myth of the Twentieth Century, for example, it is only 
by belonging to a racial hereditary line that one’s body receives spirit. 
It therefore amounts to much the same thing whether we say that what 
the regime wished to eliminate was existence without life or existence 
69 Adolf Jost, Das Recht auf den Tod (Göttingen: Grunow & Co., 1895). 
70 Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche, Die Freigabe der Vernichtung Lebensunwerten Le-




without spirit. What matters from this point of view is that death was both 
the target and the instrument of the regime’s regenerative therapy – the 
sickness and its remedy:
The disease against which the Nazis fight to the death is none other than death 
itself. What they want to kill in the Jew and in all human types like them isn’t 
life, but the presence in life of death: a life that is already dead because it is 
marked hereditarily by an original and irremediable deformation; the conta-
gion of the German people by a part of life inhabited and oppressed by death. 
[…] [T]he Nazi regime strengthened its own immunitary apparatus to the 
point of remaining victim to it. The only way for an individual or collective 
organism to save itself definitely from the risk of death is to die. It was what 
Hitler asked the German people to do before he committed suicide.72
Fighting death by killing in ever greater degrees, the Nazi immunitary 
apparatus finally became autoimmunitary and turned against itself.
Sacred Life
Giorgio Agamben is perhaps the single most significant contem-
porary thinker to emerge in the wake of Foucault’s concept of bio-
politics. Although he was already fairly well known for his work in 
aesthetics and the philosophy of language,73 it was only after the pub-
lication of the first volume of his multi-volume project Homo Sacer 
that Agamben would become truly renowned in philosophical circles 
and beyond,74 not least because of its extremely provocative undertone. 
Agamben’s claims that there is “an inner solidarity between democ-
racy and totalitarianism”75 and that the concentration camp consti-
tutes “the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West,”76 have been 
fiercely criticized for their crude and reductionist view of the modern 
political condition.77 Although we will not discuss here whether these 
72 Ibid., 137-138.
73 See especially Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. 
K. E. Pinkus and M. Hardt (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 
and Giorgio Agamben, Idea of Prose, trans. M. Sullivan and S. Whitsitt (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1995). 
74 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. D. Heller-
Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University press, 1998). 
75 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 10.
76 Ibid., 181.
77 See for example Jacques Rancière (2004), ‘Who is the subject of human rights?’ South 
Atlantic Quarterly 103: 297-310 and Niels Werber (2002), ‘Die Normalisierung des 
Ausnahmefalls: Giorgio Agamben sieht immer und überall Konzentrationslager,’ Mer-
kur 56: 618-622. 
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particular critiques really invalidate the basic tenets of his argument, 
it is already clear that they touch upon the core issue of our discus-
sion so far: how is it possible that biopolitics can divide into both a 
life-affirming politics and a life-denying politics? We have shown that 
Foucault was unable to explain the emergence of totalitarian thanato-
politics without invalidating his fundamental thesis that, in the modern 
period, the sovereign power to take life was replaced by a biopower 
that fosters life. Esposito sought to resolve this paradox by arguing that 
the paradigm of immunity constitutes the ultimate terrain within which 
to understand both sovereign power and biopower as immunitary 
dispositifs centered on the specifically modern problem of the pres-
ervation of life. Describing Nazism by means of an autoimmunitary 
logic, Esposito makes it clear that Nazism shares much with modern 
biopolitics but simultaneously denies that one can be wholly reduced 
to the other. Agamben also locates the “blind spot” of Foucault’s theory 
in “the hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institution-
al and the biopolitical models of power”78 and therefore presents his 
thesis on biopolitics as a “correction or, at least, completion”79 of the 
Foucauldian thesis. But, in contrast to Esposito, he believes that this 
convergence of sovereign power and biopower is not an exclusively 
modern phenomenon. Arguing that “the production of a biopolitical 
body is the original activity of sovereign power”80 and that “biopolitics 
is at least as old as the sovereign exception,”81 Agamben traces the 
origin of this mechanism back to the very beginning of the Western 
political tradition.
The starting point of Agamben’s critical analysis of biopolitics is 
what he calls “the paradox of sovereignty,” which consists in the fact 
that the sovereign is both inside and outside of the legal order simultane-
ously. Agamben relies heavily on the work of the German legal schol-
ar Carl Schmitt to explain what is at stake in this paradox. Writing in 
the context of latent civil war characteristic of early Weimar Germany, 
Schmitt argued that the liberals’ ignorance of the possibility that some 
exceptionally threatening event might occur kept them from develop-
ing a consistent theory of emergency powers that could protect the legal 
order in times of extreme peril. More specifically, Schmitt detects two 






fundamental flaws in the liberal theory of the state.82 Firstly, some of 
its most essential principles, such as the separation of powers and the 
system of checks and balances, impede the state in deciding clearly who 
has the power to proclaim a state of exception and take the necessary 
measures to restore law and order. Secondly, since the exception cannot 
be subsumed under a preexisting legal norm, it is impossible to appeal 
to codified law to determine in advance what must done to suppress ex-
tremely dangerous threats to the legal order. The first line of Schmitt’s 
Political Theology, “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception,”83 
should be read as a remedy to both of these flaws in the liberal consti-
tutional state. By reintroducing a concept of sovereignty that explicitly 
assumes the existence of a powerful sovereign ruler who can proclaim 
the state of exception and, if necessary, suspend the law, Schmitt claimed 
to have found a viable alternative to liberalism’s bureaucratic rule-bound 
formalism. As Agamben clarified in The State of Exception, what is ul-
timately at issue here is “the question of the juridical significance of a 
sphere of action that is in itself extrajuridical.”84 For Agamben, then, sov-
ereignty is truly a borderline concept, for “the sovereign stands outside 
the juridical order and, nevertheless, belongs to it, since it is up to him 
to decide if the constitution is to be suspended in toto.”85 The paradox is 
that, in order to protect the legal order, the sovereign has the power to 
legally place himself outside of it.
However, what especially interests Agamben about the sovereign ex-
ception is that it creates “the very space in which the juridico-political 
order can have validity.”86 In order for the law to be applicable, a normal 
order must be established because no law is applicable to chaos alone. 
By deciding on an exception, the sovereign excludes an individual case 
from the law. Being beyond the reach of law, however, does not mean 
that the exception is entirely without relation to it. On the contrary, in 
the state of exception, the individual case which is excluded from the 
law remains tied to the law precisely in the form of the law’s suspension. 
82 Both critiques are captured in the following quote: “The essence of liberalism is ne-
gotiation, a cautious half measure, in the hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive 
bloody battle, can be transformed into a parliamentary battle and permit the decision to 
be suspended forever in an everlasting discussion.” See Carl Schmitt, Political Theol-
ogy. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 63.
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As Agamben puts it, “[t]he rule applies to the exception in no longer 
applying, in withdrawing from it.”87 According to Agamben, this means 
that the state of exception is not the chaos preceding the legal order 
but rather the result of the sovereign decision to suspend the law in its 
entirety. Or, in other words, by suspending itself, the rule gives rise to 
the exception and, “maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first 
constitutes itself as a rule.”88 Ultimately, then, the function of the sover-
eign decision is to determine what is included in the juridical order and 
what is excluded from it. But it can only do so by creating an indistinct 
zone between order and chaos – the state of exception – on the basis of 
which the distinction between what is included in and excluded from 
the juridical order first becomes meaningful. The situation of the excep-
tion is therefore one of neither fact nor right, but constitutes a threshold 
between the two.
Agamben argues that this sovereign legal structure can best be under-
stood by comparing it to the structure of language. In the same way that a 
word can only be used to refer to a particular aspect of reality because the 
word is also meaningful independently of that aspect, a juridical rule can 
only be applied to a concrete case because it is also valid independently of 
that particular case. In both instances, the abstract principle can only refer 
to a concrete situation because it is already in force as pure potentiality in 
relation to every actual reference:
[J]ust as language presupposes the nonlinguistic as that with which it must 
maintain itself in a virtual relation (in the form of langue or, more precisely, a 
grammatical game, that is, in the form of a discourse whose actual denotation 
is maintained in infinite suspension) so that it may later denote it in actual 
speech, so the law presupposes the nonjuridical (for example, mere violence 
in the form of the state of nature) as that with which it maintains itself in a 
potential relation in the state of exception.89
What Agamben means here is that, for example, in order for a law 
prohibiting homicide to become applicable, the concrete fact to which it 
refers (the act of killing) cannot be qualified as homicide as such, because 
it only becomes homicide once it is subsumed under the law prohibiting 
it. This means that, in taking exception to itself, the law prohibiting homi-
cide presupposes the act of an unsanctionable killing as a condition of its 






The sovereign exception (as zone of indistinction between nature and right) 
is the presupposition of the juridical reference in the form of its suspension. 
Inscribed as a presupposed exception in every rule that forbids something (for 
example, in the rule that forbids suicide) is the pure and unsanctionable figure 
of the offence that, in the normal case, brings about the rule’s own transgres-
sion (in the same example, the killing of a man not as natural violence but as 
sovereign violence in the state of exception).90
The term Agamben uses to describe the law’s capacity to apply in no 
longer applying is the “ban.” That which is excluded from the law in the 
sovereign exception is not simply placed outside of the law and made ir-
relevant to it, but is in fact abandoned by it, in the sense that it becomes 
impossible to say whether it sojourns inside or outside the juridical order.
Although Agamben’s conception of the sovereign exception is much 
indebted to Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, there is also a crucial dif-
ference. While for Schmitt the exception reveals a lacuna in the liberal 
theory of the state, Agamben sees it as constituting an essential condi-
tion for the law’s application. That is, for Agamben, the lacuna resides 
less – or not only – in the relation between liberal positive law and the 
state of emergency but instead, more fundamentally, in that between law 
and reality. It is because the law cannot immediately be applied to real-
ity that “it is ultimately necessary to suspend its application, to produce 
an exception.”91 However, in speaking of “reality” it remains much too 
vague, for the gap that the sovereign exception attempts to fill is more 
precisely that between law and life: “Law is made of nothing but what 
it manages to capture inside itself through the inclusive exclusion of the 
exceptio: it nourishes itself on this exception and is dead letter without 
it. In this sense, the law truly ‘has no existence in itself, but rather has its 
being in the very life of men’.”92 But if life can only be brought into the 
sphere of law by means of the sovereign decision on the exception, then 
this operation will always produce a “limit-figure of life, a threshold in 
which life is both inside and outside the juridical order.”93 In a sense, then, 
for the paradoxical figure of the sovereign who is both inside and outside 
of the legal order, there is an equally paradoxical corresponding figure 
of life which is also both inside and outside of the legal order. Central 
to Agamben’s understanding of this perfect coincidence of law and life 
in the state of exception is a discussion between Gershom Scholem and 
Walter Benjamin about the structure of the law in Kafka’s writings. In a 
90 Ibid., 21.
91 Agamben, State of Exception, 40.




letter to Benjamin, Scholem writes that the impenetrability of the law in 
Kafka’s The Trial can best be described as “the Nothing of Revelation,” 
by which he means that the law is emptied of all significance yet still 
remains in force. According to Agamben, Scholem’s phrase “being in 
force without significance”94 (Geltung ohne Bedeutung) perfectly cap-
tures the structure of the law in the state of exception. In being reduced 
to its pure form, the law is not absent but in fact suspended in its applica-
tion, and thus only “appears in the form of its unrealizability.”95 But, as 
Benjamin responds, if the law has lost its content and intelligibility, and 
only retains its form, then “the law has become indistinguishable from 
life.”96 A law in force without significance corresponds to a life entirely 
transformed into law.
But how should we understand this “limit-figure of life” which, ac-
cording to Agamben, founds the law? At the beginning of Homo Sacer, 
Agamben notes that the Greeks had two distinct terms for what we call 
“life:” zoē, “which expressed the simple fact of living common to all liv-
ing beings (animals, men, or gods)” and bios, “which indicated the form 
or way of living proper to an individual or a group.”97 As we know from 
Aristotle’s political treatises, the Greeks saw zoē or natural life entirely as 
an affair of the private household (oikos), while bios was the form of life 
that concerned the polis. It is therefore interesting that when, in describing 
the process that led to the emergence of biopolitics, Foucault notes that 
“for millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal 
with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an 
animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.”98 
Here, he means that biopolitics consists precisely in an overturning of 
this fundamental Greek distinction between zoē and bios. While ancient 
politics insisted on the radical separation of biological life and political 
life, modern politics sees in the former its principal object. In Agamben’s 
words, “if anything characterizes modern democracy as opposed to clas-
sical democracy, then, it is that modern democracy presents itself from the 
beginning as a vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly 
trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to 
speak, the bios of zoē.”99 Modern biopolitics thus seeks to include in the 





98 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 143.
99 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 9.
Redesigning Life
78
from it was the original founding act of the sovereign space of the polis. 
According to Agamben, this political project clearly rests on a paradox, 
for “it wants to put the freedom and happiness of men into play in the 
very place – ‘bare life’ – that marked their subjection.”100 Bare life, then, 
the product of this operation, is neither zoē nor bios but “the zone of in-
distinction in which zoē and bios constitute each other in including and 
excluding each other.”101
Importantly, Agamben argues, in contrast to Foucault, that the politi-
cization of natural life and the ensuing production of bare life is not ex-
clusive to the modern period but in fact “the hidden foundation on which 
the entire political system rested.”102 In order to demonstrate this, he turns 
to the obscure figure of homo sacer from archaic Roman law. Quoting 
Pompeius Festus, Agamben explains that the “sacred man”
is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not per-
mitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for 
homicide; in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that ‘if someone kills 
the one who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered 
homicide.’ This is why it is customary for a bad and impure man to be called 
sacred.103
On the one hand, then, the homo sacer is excluded from human law, 
for the one who kills him will not be considered a murderer; on the other 
hand, however, he is also excluded from divine law, for his killing could 
not be viewed as a form of ritual purification. In other words, the homo 
sacer was someone who was banned from human law without being al-
lowed to enter into the sphere of divine law. But, Agamben adds, not only 
is the homo sacer excluded from both human and divine law, he is simul-
taneously included in these realms: “homo sacer belongs to God in the 
form of unsacrificeability and is included in the community in the form 
of being able to be killed.”104 Doubly captured and doubly excluded, the 
homo sacer is thrown into a liminal zone between profane and divine law 
where he finds himself abandoned to unsanctionable violence. According 
to Agamben, this shows that there is a striking symmetry between the 
figure of homo sacer and that of the sovereign, in the sense that both 
are simultaneously included and excluded from the law: “The sovereign 








homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life – that is, life 
that may be killed but not sacrificed – is the life that has been captured in 
this sphere.”105
Even if Agamben sees the sovereign capture of bare life as the 
“originary exclusion through which the political dimension was first 
constituted,”106 and thus holds that sovereignty and biopolitics were origi-
nally intertwined, this does not mean that he recognizes no difference be-
tween the ancient and modern versions of this biosovereign mechanism. 
The crucial difference is that while in the ancient world the sovereign pro-
duction of bare life was only an exceptional event, in the modern world it 
has increasingly become the rule:
[W]hat characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoē in 
the polis – which is, in itself, absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life 
as such becomes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State 
power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the 
exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is orig-
inally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coin-
cide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, 
bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.107
At the center of Agamben’s interpretation of modern biopolitics is the 
provocative thesis that bare life has become the central political subject, 
which implies that man’s inclusion in the modern political order could 
only be achieved by his being constantly exposed to sovereign violence. 
Agamben traces the first appearance of the modern homo sacer back to 
the famous writ of habeas corpus in 17th century England. This principle, 
which holds that a person under arrest must be brought before a court, 
is generally considered to be one of the most fundamental tenets of the 
Western legal tradition in that it is intended to protect the individual from 
arbitrary state action. Agamben, however, points out the biopolitical op-
eration at work in this principle (“you will have to have a body to show”), 
which makes the body the central object of the juridico-political: “he who 
will appear later as the bearer of rights […] can only be constituted as 
such through the repetition of the sovereign exception and the isolation 
of corpus, bare life, in himself.”108 Even more radically, Agamben claims 
that this is also what is ultimately at stake in the French Declaration of the 







document of modern democracy and human rights, Agamben takes the 
notion that “men are born and remain free and equal in rights” to imply 
that it is precisely bare life – the mere fact of being born – that is given 
rights and made the principal political subject. Moreover, by stating that 
“the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation,” the dec-
laration makes these “inalienable rights” immediately contingent upon 
one’s belonging to the nation (from nascere, to be born): “the fiction im-
plicit here is that birth immediately becomes nation such that there can 
be no interval of separation between the two terms.”109 This is what con-
stitutes the hidden aporia of modern politics: since its project of politiciz-
ing natural life is ultimately grounded on a fiction, it will continuously 
produce bare life as an inevitable side effect of its failure to establish this 
connection. According to Agamben, the figure of the refugee represents 
the most clear example of this failure. Stripped of his rights as a citizen 
of the nation-state and thereby bringing to light the fictitious connection 
between nativity and nationality, the refugee “causes the secret presup-
position of the politics domain – bare life – to appear for an instant within 
that domain.”110
Clearly, then, like Foucault and Esposito, Agamben views biopolitics 
as an irreducibly double-sided phenomenon:
[T]he spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts 
with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing 
inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new 
and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they 
wanted to liberate themselves. […] The fact is that one and the same affirma-
tion of bare life leads, in bourgeois democracy, to a primacy of the private 
over the public and of individual liberties over collective obligations and yet 
becomes, in totalitarian states, the decisive political criterion and the exem-
plary realm of sovereign decisions.111
If Agamben detects “an inner solidarity between democracy and 
totalitarianism,”112 then it is because both types of regime are founded on 
the same living substance – bare life. Yet this does not necessarily mean 
that they can be wholly reduced to one another. Rather, Agamben’s point 
is that totalitarian rule is quantitatively but not qualitatively different from 
democratic rule of law. According to him, the former simply pushes to 







in the latter. By this he means that totalitarian rule was not ‘lawless;’ on 
the contrary, it sought to extend the law to the point of becoming indis-
tinguishable from life. Only if we recognize that what Nazism aimed at 
was a total normativization of life can we begin to understand Agamben’s 
most provocative thesis that the concentration camp was not a historical 
anomaly but “the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which 
we are still living.”113 It is commonly thought that the Nazi project of total 
domination in the concentration camps represented an – unexplainable – 
exception to the rule. For Agamben, however, “the camp is the space that 
is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule.”114
To understand why this is so, Agamben invites us not to study the hor-
rible fate of those who suffered in the camps – this he will do in another 
volume of Homo Sacer115 – but to examine instead the juridico-political 
structure of the camp itself. The first thing to note is that the juridical 
basis for internment in the camp was Schutzhaft or “protective custody.” 
This exceptional measure, which has its origin in 19th century Prussian 
law, allowed the police to detain people solely on the suspicion that they 
posed a threat to the security of the state. Importantly, this measure could 
only be applied after the government had proclaimed the state of excep-
tion and thus after it had first suspended the articles in the constitution 
guaranteeing personal liberties. It is worth noting, too, that the Nazi re-
gime did not invent this juridical construction. Given that during its short 
period of existence the liberal Weimar republic proclaimed the state of 
exception many times, it could be said that by incorporating this con-
struction in its famous ‘Decree for the Protection of the People and State’ 
the Nazi regime merely continued a practice that was already well estab-
lished in many parliamentary democracies of that time. The crucial differ-
ence, however, was that the decree permanently suspended these articles 
of the constitution without mentioning the notion of the state of excep-
tion as a precondition, so that in the Nazi regime the state of exception 
became “confused with the juridical rule itself.”116 But if we accept that 
the camps nonetheless fall within the scope of Schutzhaft, then the further 
implication of this is that “in the camp, the state of exception, which was 
essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a fac-
tual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which 
113 Ibid., 166.
114 Ibid., 168-169.
115 See Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. 
D. Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002). 
116 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 168.
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as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order.”117 The camp is 
therefore nothing less than the space where the state of exception is real-
ized normally and thus where law and fact, norm and exception, enter 
into a zone of indistinction. Moreover, those who were brought into the 
camps had already been denaturalized and stripped of their rights as citi-
zens. In this way, the camp was also “the most absolute biopolitical space 
ever to have been realized, in which power confronted nothing but pure 
life, without any mediation.” This explains why, in such a camp, to use 
Arendt’s famous phrase, “everything is possible.”
Form-Of-Life
At the end of the last chapter, we argued that liberal political and 
moral philosophy might not be the most appropriate framework in which 
to address the challenges associated with human genetic modification. 
The reason for this is that attempts to argue either for or against genetic 
enhancement seem to lead to highly illiberal conclusions: while the ar-
gument against it entails a preemptive dehumanization of any potential 
enhanced form of life, the argument for it threatens to reduce any non- 
enhanced form of life to the status of wrongful life. We therefore suggest-
ed that in order to understand this paradoxical outcome, it is necessary to 
turn to an interpretative framework that focuses specifically on the bio-
logical dimension of human beings as both objects and subjects of politi-
cal action. Although, as we have seen, the growing convergence between 
life and politics in modernity has been a hot topic in political thought at 
least since the end of the 19th century, it was Foucault who first addressed 
this issue in a systematic and critical way. Having shown, however, that 
Foucault was never quite capable of explaining how the rise to dominance 
of a type of politics that seeks precisely to protect and strengthen life 
could culminate in the emergence of the most life-suppressing regime 
that history has ever seen, we provided a detailed account of how two of 
the most important contemporary biopolitical thinkers have, each in their 
own way, sought to resolve this paradox. If we now attempt a tentative 
extension of Esposito’s and Agamben’s theories of biopolitics in order to 
deal with the liberal eugenics debate, it must be that we are led to do so 
because this debate seems to founder on the very same paradox. That is 
not to say that liberalism in general, and liberal eugenics in particular, can 
be wholly reduced to Nazi biopolitics, as Agamben sometimes seems to 




very biopolitical regime that, though configured in the opposite way, gave 
rise to Nazism.”118
In what manner, then, are we to understand this latter claim? It is not 
hard to see that the discourse of the opponents of genetic enhancement is 
largely indebted to an immunitary lexicon that Esposito sees as central to 
modern biopolitics. In order to ascertain that this is indeed the case, we 
merely have to recall that in his argument against genetic enhancement 
Habermas sets out his uncompromising support for “a right to a genetic 
inheritance immune from artificial intervention.”119 In order to prevent 
genetic intervention creating the child’s permanent and irreversible de-
pendence on the parent and thus causing the moral community of equals 
to disintegrate, Habermas is led to introduce a transcending legal norm of 
biological life. There are two problems with Habermas’s position, howev-
er. First, as Esposito has shown, the members of a community are united 
less “by reciprocal and symmetrical relations of mutual recognition,”120 as 
Habermas assumes, and more “by an ‘obligation’ […] that expropriates 
them of their initial property (in part or completely), of the most proper 
property, namely, their very subjectivity.”121 The community is not con-
stituted of an aggregate of individuals who share an essential ‘proper-
ty’ or ‘nature’ but, as Esposito puts it, by those “who have nothing in 
common.”122 Second, and in addition, Habermas’s attempt to immunize 
the community against the danger of disintegration by giving normative 
content to human nature actually risks reproducing the very danger he 
seeks to avoid, inasmuch as he seems to preemptively deny any future 
enhanced person the legal status of full membership in a moral and politi-
cal community.
That is not to say that such immunitary logic is absent from the dis-
course of the advocates of a liberal eugenics. In the latter case, however, 
it is not an abstract notion of human nature that needs to be immunized 
against the threat of genetic intervention; instead, it is the body of the 
individual subject that must be protected from the dangers and risks as-
sociated with its free and unhindered ‘natural development.’ Furthermore, 
a case could be made that their position is largely driven by the same three 
“immunitary dispositifs” that Esposito has detected in Nazi biopolitics. 
The first of these is what Esposito calls the “absolute normativization 
118 Roberto Esposito, Community, Immunity, Biopolitics, trans. R. N. Welch (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2013), 107.
119 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 27; Emphasis added. 
120 Ibid., 65.




of life.”123 This dispositif could be said to underpin not only the position 
of those who invoke a normative conception of human nature to oppose 
genetic intervention, as we showed above, but also the project of a liberal 
eugenics. After all, as we saw above, in the same way that the German 
medical class was accorded a key role in all facets of the Nazi eugenic 
campaign against degeneration, so too will the power and influence of 
geneticists and molecular biologists increase in a future regime of liberal 
eugenics as they will be the ones to establish the limits within which life 
may unfold. The second Nazi immunitary dispositif that makes its reap-
pearance in the context of the debate over genetic technologies is that of 
the “double enclosure of the body.”124 The first closure of the body that 
Esposito detects in the mechanisms of Nazi biopolitics relates to the es-
tablishment of an “absolute identity between our body and ourselves.”125 
In the view of Nazi biopolitics, we don’t ‘have’ our body but ‘are’ our 
body: the biological given represents the ultimate truth from which we 
can never escape. This first closure of the body is then reinforced by a 
second one, by which Esposito means that, in Nazi biopolitics, the self 
was not only incorporated in its own body, but also “into a larger body 
that constitutes the organic totality of the German people.”126 To illus-
trate this second operation, Esposito refers to the fact that, during Nazism, 
posters were issued which stated: “Dein Körper gehört dem Führer” (Your 
body belongs to the Führer). It is not unlikely that genetically enhanced 
persons would experience a similar double closure of their bodies. This 
is because, in a sense, their bodies would no longer belong to themselves 
but to the persons who designed them, meaning they would ‘be’ a body 
that they don’t ‘have,’ but also because – and this constitutes the second 
closure – their bodies could also be said to belong to science and the free 
market, for it is at this level that decisions would be made about which 
genetic traits and characteristics were desirable or not. With regard to 
Esposito’s third Nazi immunitary dispositif, the “anticipatory suppression 
of birth,”127 we should note immediately that the interventions proposed 
by liberal eugenics are far less intrusive than those of Nazi eugenics. With 
genetic intervention, selecting the types of human beings to bring into 
existence would no longer occur through enforced sterilization or eutha-
nasia, but by endowing embryos directly with the desired genetic traits. 
Note, however, that a ban on genetic intervention, as proposed for exam-







ple by Habermas and Fukuyama, would also involve a kind of selection 
or, in negative terms, “suppression of birth,” since this would imply that 
certain enhanced forms of life would not be allowed to come into being.
This brings us to Agamben’s take on the biopolitics of genetic inter-
vention. It should be noted that Agamben himself has never explicitly 
intervened in the liberal eugenics debate; however, there is some evi-
dence in his writings, most notably in Homo Sacer, that he believes that 
the production of bare life is now most likely to occur in the field of 
medical intervention. For example, having analyzed Karl Binding’s book 
Authorization for the Annihilation of Life Unworthy of Being Lived, dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter, Agamben suggests that this category may 
easily be extended beyond the limits set by Binding’s discussion and, 
moreover, argues that:
It is even possible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceptio 
of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but 
extend itself in the history of the West and has now – in the new biopolitical 
horizon of states with national sovereignty – moved inside every human life 
and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a def-
inite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.128
Agamben remains, however, extremely vague about the concrete im-
plications of this supposed intensification and generalization of the pro-
duction of bare life in the contemporary world. He only says that the 
line marking the point at which biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics 
is “now in motion and gradually moving into areas other than that of 
political life, areas in which the sovereign is entering into an ever more 
intimate symbiosis not only with the jurist but also with the doctor, the 
scientist, the expert, and the priest.”129 Remember, however, that what 
Binding’s book argues is that the law on suicide should be extended to the 
killing of the incurably ill and the mentally disabled – hence to “life un-
worthy of being lived.” Agamben takes this as a statement that the “sov-
ereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart 
in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any 
juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a 
homicide.”130 We can well imagine, then, what Agamben might have to 
say about the project of a liberal eugenics. If parents’ reproductive free-
dom were to be legally extended to include the right to intervene in the 
genetic makeup of their offspring, then this would cause a similar shift in 





the threshold of harm below which life would be seen as “wrongful” or 
“valueless,” and thus not worth living.
Yet, Agamben’s analysis of biopolitics also illuminates another crucial 
aspect of the liberal eugenics debate. Earlier, we mentioned that Scholem 
and Benjamin’s discussion of the inscrutability of the law in Kafka’s writ-
ings was important to Agamben’s understanding of the perfect coincidence 
of law and life in the state of exception. In particular, it was Benjamin’s 
view that, in Kafka’s writings, the law seems to have become indistin-
guishable from life that proved to be a key inspiration for Agamben’s work 
on the intimate connection between biopolitics and juridico-sovereign 
power. Perhaps we could say, then, that the debate over the moral and 
legal acceptability or otherwise of genetic technologies first makes it clear 
what he means by this. After all, whether or not these technologies will be 
permitted in the future, it will certainly be the case that the very existence 
or non-existence of certain potential forms of life will depend completely 
on a politico-juridical decision: in the coming age of genetic engineering, 
life might possibly become really indistinguishable from law.
How, then, should philosophy respond to the bleak prospect of a fu-
ture in which the biological existence of human beings is increasingly 
contingent upon the twin power of juridico-political regulation and tech-
nological development? As we have argued, the dangers associated with 
a project such as liberal eugenics cannot be removed simply by placing 
legal restrictions on the further development of genetic technologies, nor 
by instituting “a right to a genetic inheritance immune from artificial in-
tervention.” Such conservative responses to the question of genetic in-
tervention will not avert these dangers, but in fact reproduce them on 
another plane. Both Agamben and Esposito have therefore suggested that 
in order to escape the perils of contemporary biopolitics, it is urgently 
necessary to develop a conception of a life-affirming politics that can no 
longer be reversed into a life-negating politics. In Agamben’s words:
[U]ntil a completely new politics – that is, a politics no longer founded on the 
exceptio of bare life – is at hand, every theory and every praxis will remain 
imprisoned and immobile, and the “beautiful day” of life will be given citi-
zenship only either through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to 
which the society of the spectacle condemns it.131
Unfortunately, Agamben provides no comprehensive description of 
what this new politics might look like.132 But he does make it clear that it 
131 Ibid., 11.
132 Although we will not go deeper into this matter here, it should be noted that, in the 
past couple of years, Agamben has increasingly argued that the foundations of such a 
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will require us to seek a politico-philosophical redefinition of life. Or, as 
Esposito puts it, the emergence of a more responsible biopolitics or what 
he calls “affirmative biopolitics” will depend on our efforts to “interpret 
life’s relationship with politics philosophically.”133 In Means Without 
Ends, Agamben defines this new conception of life as “form-of-life:”
By the term form-of-life, I mean a life that can never be separated from its 
form, a life in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked 
life. […] It defines a life – human life – in which the single ways, acts, and 
processes of living are never simple facts but always and above all possi-
bilities of life, always and above all power. Each behavior and each form of 
human living is never prescribed by a specific biological vocation, nor is it 
assigned by whatever necessity; instead […] it always retains the character of 
possibility; that is, it always puts at stake living itself.134
The distinctive characteristic of this new conception of life is that it 
no longer allows for a separation between biological life and political life, 
zoē and bíos. It is therefore a form of life in which it is never possible to 
isolate bare life as an object of sovereign power. In other words, form-of-
life is a life in which the biological and political dimensions of the human 
being coincide without any remainder and is therefore “a life over which 
sovereignty and right no longer have any hold.”135
In the remaining chapters we will seek to explore and substantiate this 
claim in more concrete terms. While remaining faithful to both Agamben’s 
and Esposito’s notions of affirmative biopolitics, our approach differs 
from theirs in two ways. First, we will show that Esposito is mistaken 
in suggesting that the outlines of an affirmative biopolitics premised on 
form-of-life cannot be found in the work of Hannah Arendt because, as 
he says, “Arendt didn’t think the category of life thoroughly enough.”136 
I will show in Chapter Four that it was not Arendt who “reached a blind 
spot concerning the problem of biopolitics,”137 but that Esposito himself 
did not read Arendt carefully enough. It will be argued that, contrary to 
the standard interpretation of her work – including Esposito’s – Arendt 
“coming politics” will have to be sought in forms of religious anarchism, especially 
in the Paulinian messianic tradition. See for example Giorgio Agamben, The Time 
that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. P. Dailey (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005).
133 Esposito, Bíos, 150.
134 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics, trans. V. Binetti and 
C. Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 3-4. 
135 Ibid., 115.




didn’t argue for a return to the ancient Greek understanding of politics 
with its strict separation of the private and the public, oikos and polis. On 
the contrary, her concept of natality precisely undoes any strict division 
between the realms of freedom and necessity because it names the radical 
co-implication of biological birth and politico-linguistic birth, zoē and 
bíos. Second, we will challenge Agamben’s claim that “the biopolitical 
body of the West […] cannot be overcome in a passage to a new body – a 
technical body.”138 In Chapter Five, we will argue, through a reading of 
the work of Bernard Stiegler, that it makes no sense to speculate about the 
biopolitical significance of a possible passage to a new technical human 
body, because the human and the technical have always been radically 
bound up with each other. To conclude, we will suggest that this notion 
of the “originary technicity” of life throws fresh light on the genetic en-
hancement debate. First, however, we will turn to Heidegger’s dispersed 
writings on biotechnology and the question of genetic intervention. It will 
be suggested that his understanding of these developments is far more 
original and fruitful than those put forward by the participants in the cur-
rent debate but that, despite his critical re-articulation of key concepts 
such as ‘life,’ ‘nature,’ and ‘technology,’ he ultimately fails to rethink the 
question of genetic enhancement in a sufficiently radical way.




Τέχνη can merely cooperate with φύσις, can more or less expedite the cure; 
but as τέχνη it can never replace φύσις and in its stead become the άρχη 
of health as such. This could only happen if life as such were to become a 
technically producible artifact. However, at that very moment there would 
also no longer be such a thing as health, any more than there would be birth 
and death. Sometimes it seems as if modern humanity is rushing headlong 
towards this goal of producing itself technologically. If humanity achieves 
this, it will have exploded itself, i.e., its essence qua subjectivity, into thin air, 
into a region where the absolute meaningless is valued as the one and only 
‘meaning’ and where preserving this value appears as the human ‘domina-
tion’ of the globe.2
Heidegger and Biotechnology
Heidegger wrote down these prophetic words as early as 1939. One 
must, therefore, admire his lucid appraisal of the possibilities lying dor-
mant in the scientific project of his time, the realization of which must have 
seemed but the most paradigmatic case of science-fiction. It is true that 
considerable progress had already been made in the domain of what we 
today call the life-sciences, which probably allowed Heidegger to engage 
in these speculations about the advent of a biotechnological revolution 
in the first place. For example, in his essay ‘Overcoming Metaphysics’ 
Heidegger refers to the pioneering research of the 1938 Noble Prize win-
ner in chemistry Richard Kuhn, which, as Heidegger suggests, “already 
opens up the possibility of directing the breeding of male and female 
organisms according to plan and need,”3 and he adds that “[s]ince man is 
the most important raw material [Rohstoff], one can reckon with the fact 
that someday factories will be built for the artificial breeding of human 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Nathan Van Camp (2012), ‘Hei-
degger and the question concerning biotechnology,’ Journal of Philosophy of Life 2 
(1), 32-54.
2 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. W. McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 197.
3 Martin Heidegger, Four Seminars, trans. A. Mitchell and F. Raffoul (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), 106.
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material […].”4 Furthermore, in his Heraclitus seminar with Eugen Fink, 
Heidegger discusses the coercive steering of genes in cybernetic biology.5 
And in one of his Le Thor seminars, he argues that what is most disturb-
ing today is the “transformation of biology into biophysics,” which will 
bring about that “the human can be produced according to a definite plan 
just like any other technical object.”6
With the advantage of more than seventy years of hindsight, we know 
that genetic science still cannot actually industrially produce “human ma-
terial,” let alone entire human beings, but it would be unfair to simply 
brush aside Heidegger’s speculations on the basis of his clearly oversim-
plified description of the actual technical procedures involved. Indeed, 
we have meanwhile witnessed the emergence of technologies that al-
low us to manage reproduction such as IVF and artificial insemination 
and while it is already possible to transform embryonic stem cells into 
other kinds of cell tissue for therapeutic purposes, it will very soon prob-
ably also be possible to grow stem cells into complete organs that can 
be used to replace damaged ones. While the curative potential of these 
technologies is almost unanimously hailed as a positive achievement of 
contemporary techno-science, this is certainly much less the case with 
technologies for reproductive cloning and genetic enhancement. The pos-
sibility to intervene in the human genome and to improve the constitution 
of the human body and mind inevitably raises questions not only about its 
technical feasibility, but also and especially about its moral permissibil-
ity. As said, the dangers the opponents of genetic enhancement invoke 
to prevent these technologies from being further pursued are manifold. 
They range from the increased risks of deformations and miscarriages 
that might result from experimentation on humans and, later on, from the 
technology’s actual implementation, to the prospect of a world populated 
by a uniform type of human beings, to the fear that mankind will be divid-
ed into a small enhanced elite and a large non-enhanced underclass. They 
therefore urge governments to adopt regulations that bring the develop-
ment of intrusive biotechnologies to a halt. The main question, however, 
is whether it is actually possible to distinguish between the appropriate 
and inappropriate use of biotechnology.
After recapitulating the debate between Jürgen Habermas and the ad-
vocates of a liberal eugenics about the moral permissibility of human 
genetic enhancement, it will be argued that both sides share a number of 
4 Ibid.
5 Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heraclitus Seminar, trans. C. H. Seibert (Evanston: 




assumptions about ideas of ‘life,’ ‘nature’ and ‘technology’ that prevent 
them from reflecting on the challenge that is presented by the current 
biotechnological revolution in a sufficiently radical way. Subsequently, 
we will turn to Heidegger’s writings and suggest that his philosophy of 
technology allows us to think the question of biotechnology in a more 
fruitful way, but that, ultimately, he takes the radical challenge of bio-
technology both too seriously and not seriously enough. Too seriously, 
because it is unclear why he would fear the annihilation of man’s essence 
in a future biotechnological epoch if he is convinced that this essence is 
not related to man’s biological equipment in the first place. Not seriously 
enough, in the sense that by arguing that the danger of biotechnology is 
that it challenges us to understand ourselves as modifiable organic mate-
rial, Heidegger at the same time remains convinced that even the most 
intrusive interventions in the human body and mind will not disrupt man’s 
ontological essence.
The Grown and the Made
One of the side-effects of the current biotechnological revolution is 
that the literary genre of science-fiction has suddenly gained an unex-
pected credibility. Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World remains exemplary 
in this respect. Although many of such literary speculations about human-
ity’s biotechnological future are dismissed by scientists as products of an 
imagination gone wild, there is every reason to take dystopian fictions like 
these seriously. After all, most of the technologies Huxley described in his 
novel, like the use of psychotropic drugs and artificial insemination, are 
currently available while others, like genetic engineering, will very likely 
become available in the near future. In The Future of Human Nature, 
Jürgen Habermas gives two additional reasons why we should pay close 
attention to even the most speculative predictions of this kind. First, there 
is always the risk that the ever increasing speed of scientific discoveries 
will take society by surprise and render it impossible for decision making 
bodies to put a stop to certain developments once they are on the verge of 
being implemented in clinical settings. Second, the mere expectation that 
more far-reaching possibilities will become available in the not so dis-
tant future has already brought about a radical uprooting of “deep-rooted 
categorical distinctions which we have as yet, in the description we give 
of ourselves, assumed to be invariant,”7 and the awareness of this alone 
“might change our ethical self-understanding as a species in a way that 
could also affect our moral consciousness.”8




From a political perspective, decision making bodies are confronted 
with the paradoxical challenge that they have to enact clear cut regula-
tions regarding technologies that at the same time radically destabilize 
the conceptual distinctions upon which our normative frameworks are 
grounded in the first place. Nowhere is this destabilization more dis-
quieting, Habermas suggests, than in the case of the hitherto obvious 
distinction between “the nature we are and the organic equipment we 
give ourselves,”9 between “what is manufactured and what has come by 
nature,”10 or in its ancient Greek formulation, between entities which are 
engendered by tekhnē and those which are engendered by physis. As said 
earlier, the ethical significance of the distinction between the grown and 
the made is that it is intrinsically connected with the morally proper modes 
of action one should adopt when dealing with entities pertaining to one 
of these two ontological realms. In contrast to inorganic entities, whose 
inert nature makes them freely available for technical-instrumental inter-
ventions, the auto-regulated nature of organic entities severely restricts 
the modes of action one should impose on them. Referring to Aristotle’s 
description of the various attitudes one should adopt when dealing with 
organic entities, Habermas gives the examples of the peasant, the doctor 
and the breeder who should respectively cultivate, heal, and select the 
entities which are entrusted to their care. Only these ‘therapeutic’ modes 
of action are responsive to the inherent dynamics of self-regulated or-
ganic entities. Since Habermas ultimately wants to argue that “the genetic 
foundations of our existence should not be disposed over,”11 he thinks that 
only a revaluation of an Aristotelian distinction between different modes 
of action could yield specific guidelines to determine where the boundary 
lies between a negative eugenics, which Habermas considers permissi-
ble and even ethically binding, and a positive eugenics, which he thinks 
should be legally banned. The difference between a negative eugenics 
and a positive eugenics is that in case of the former genetic interventions 
are carried out to prevent or cure genetic defects, while in case of the 
latter they are aimed at enhancing man’s genetic make-up. Therefore, in 
Habermas’s view, the problem is not human genetic modification per se, 
but its use beyond the traditional logic of healing.
While the vivid memory of Nazi Germany’s experimentation with eu-
genic policies probably explains why Habermas is so determined to set 
out clear boundaries between a positive eugenics and a negative eugen-






has taken a different direction. Here, the main issue is to show that in 
contrast to the ‘old eugenics’ or ‘authoritarian eugenics,’ the ‘new eu-
genics’ or ‘liberal eugenics’ holds out the promise to drastically increase 
the individual’s freedom to design how her future and that of her off-
spring will look like. As one of main proponents of the liberal eugenics, 
Nicholas Agar, argues, while the old eugenics “sought to produce citizens 
out of single centrally designed mould, the distinguishing mark of the 
new liberal eugenics is state neutrality.”12 In Agar’s view, the drama of 
20th century eugenics was that it was a state directed project which sought 
to coercively improve the genetic stock of the population in the direc-
tion of a ‘healthier’ or ‘superior’ race. In contrast, proponents of a lib-
eral eugenics think that it should not be centrally decided which direction 
these improvements should take, but that it is up to the free individuals 
themselves to choose which genetic traits they want to provide their chil-
dren. Agar asks, for example, whether Habermas’s distinction between 
a negative eugenics and a positive eugenics does not also unwittingly 
reproduce certain politico-normative presuppositions. It seems indeed an 
impossible and even a dubious task to draw up an unbiased list of physi-
cal and psychical characteristics which should be considered defective 
and which, in Habermas’s view, would therefore be eligible for genetic 
therapy. In Agar’s view, the inability to draw a solid boundary between 
healing and enhancing is paralleled by the inability to make a clear dis-
tinction between a positive eugenics and enhancement of the human by 
modifications of the environment. For example, in Agar’s view there is no 
difference between increasing a person’s intelligence by genetic interven-
tion or by providing her with an excellent education and that opponents 
of genetic enhancement often overestimate the role of genetic factors and 
downplay the role of environmental factors in the shaping of a person.
Agar’s argument that there is no substantial difference between ge-
netic enhancement and socialization obviously poses a problem for 
Habermas who maintains that there is a fundamental difference between 
the manipulation of ‘subjective nature’ and the manipulation of ‘objective 
nature.’ Yet, Habermas argues that the advocates of a liberal eugenics all 
too easily ignore the embodied perspective of the programmed person 
herself and do not take into account that genetically modified humans 
would be refused the possibility to respond to the demands that are im-
posed on them by their creators. Knowledge of the fact that one’s disposi-
tions, talents and bodily characteristics are genetically programmed will 
inevitably have consequences for one’s self-understanding as it will trans-
form intergenerational communication into an unidirectional imposition. 
12 Agar, Liberal Eugenics, 137. 
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While the parents’ efforts to modify the environment of their child to 
steer her development into a certain direction might be subsequently met 
by the child by developing a revisionary self-understanding, the possibil-
ity to change one’s life history is cut off for the child when it concerns a 
modification of the genome.
Slavoj Žižek has, however, pointed out a striking paradox in 
Habermas’s reasoning. If Habermas fears that modification of the hu-
man genome will decisively alter the fundamental parameters guiding the 
human’s self-understanding and, more specifically, that it will deprive 
the human being of her inalienable right to possess a genetic inheritance 
immune from intervention by another person, then he is basically argu-
ing that human beings can only retain their freedom and autonomy by 
leaving the distribution of genetic dispositions and characteristics to the 
contingent processes of nature. The paradox obviously being that, hence-
forth, “autonomy can only be maintained by prohibiting access to the 
blind natural contingency that determines us, that is, ultimately, by limit-
ing our autonomy and freedom of scientific invention.”13 What would, 
in Habermas’s view, deprive a person of her freedom, Žižek argues, “is, 
paradoxically, the very fact that was hitherto left to chance becomes de-
pendent on the free decision of another person.”14 Habermas’s argument 
that human beings can only experience their freedom with reference to 
something which is not at their disposal only makes sense if this gifted 
aspect is really out of their reach. If this is not the case, however, then it 
seems that Habermas is actually arguing that the only way for us to main-
tain our sense of dignity and autonomy is by committing ourselves to an 
illusion. 
When asked in the posthumously published Der Spiegel interview 
what is exactly wrong with technology given the many benefits it offers 
to mankind, Heidegger indignantly replied:
Everything is functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything 
is functioning and that the functioning drives us more and more to even fur-
ther functioning.15
In Heidegger’s view, the danger of technology, including biotechnol-
ogy, is not that something might go terribly wrong, but, quite the contrary, 
that everything will actually function according to plan. Heidegger would 
not deny that genetic intervention could provoke certain factual dangers, 
13 Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies (London/New York: Routledge, 2004), 126.
14 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 307.
15 Martin Heidegger, The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin 
(Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 105-106.
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but for him this is not what is most disquieting about it. The most threat-
ening prospect would precisely be that the human genome could be modi-
fied without any undesirable side effects. In that case, Heidegger predicts, 
the human being would have transformed himself into an entity that could 
hardly still be called human. However, this does not mean that Heidegger 
would side with critics like Habermas and Bill Mckibben,16 who argue in 
favor of a legal ban on germ line intervention, but do allow for somatic 
gene therapy. Since Heidegger rejects the broadly held view that technol-
ogy is a means to an end, he considers the belief that one can control the 
development of technology through regulation a metaphysical illusion. 
Human beings do not master technology. Just when they believe they can 
control and regulate technology, it may turn out that they are actually its 
most docile servants.
Now, if technology is not merely a means to an end, then, by challeng-
ing the de-differentiation of eugenics and socialization on the argument 
that it erroneously “presupposes a leveling out of the difference between 
the grown and the made, the subjective and the objective,”17 Habermas 
seems to succumb to a curious perspective fallacy, for it seems that this 
kind of intervention will precisely render meaningless the distinction be-
tween what is ‘natural’ and what is ‘artificial.’ In a biotechnological fu-
ture, this distinction will be performatively abolished, so to speak, and it 
would therefore be self-deceptive to continue to use this distinction as a 
point of reference for evaluating the totally new reality that is looming on 
the horizon. As Slavoj Žižek puts it:
[D]oes the very fact of the possibility of biogenetic manipulations not retro-
actively change the self-understanding of ourselves as “natural” beings, in the 
sense that we now experience our “natural” dispositions themselves as some-
thing “mediated,” not simply as something immediately given but as some-
thing that can be in principle manipulated (and is thus simply contingent)?18
To argue that genetic intervention will destroy the ‘naturalness’ of the 
human presupposes the idea that human beings had a ‘natural’ essence 
in the first place. Yet, this assumption is precisely what the possibility of 
genetic modification radically puts into question and, therefore, cannot be 
wielded as an argument against it.
The advocates of a liberal eugenics, on the other hand, start from the 
same petitio principii, but arrive at the exact opposite conclusion. Since 
16 Bill Mckibben, Enough! Staying Human in an Engineered Age (New York: Henry Holt 
& Company L. L. C., 2003), 127.
17 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 50.
18 Žižek, Organs Without Bodies, 125-126.
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they also conceive technology as a means, they expect to find the human 
being unscathed on the other side of the biotechnological threshold. They 
assume that genetically enhanced humans will have the same goals, as-
pirations, and dreams as their non-enhanced predecessors, but with this 
decisive difference, that they will be better equipped to achieve them. 
Heidegger already exposed this fallacy as early as 1967 in a lecture for 
the Greek Academy of Arts and Sciences.19 The essence of modern sci-
ence, Heidegger argues here, reveals itself in the victory of the scientific 
method over science, because it is the method that determines in advance 
which phenomena are experimentally accessible and which ones not. On 
Heidegger’s account, the victory of the scientific method manifests itself 
pre-eminently in what was at the time considered to be the science of 
the future, namely cybernetics. Cybernetics – from the Greek kybernētēs, 
steersman – only takes into account the reality of information flows be-
tween various systems and subsystems. Significantly, it does not differen-
tiate between organic and inorganic systems. In cybernetics, it is assumed 
that both are steered by the same basic principle, namely the feedback 
loop of information. It is by applying these principles to the study of the 
human body, Heidegger argues, that the life sciences discovered that the 
germ cell contains the information that regulates the living character of 
human beings [Das Lebendige im Leben des Menschen], their “life plan” 
[Lebensplan], so to speak. It is by gaining access to this kind of informa-
tion that “one day we will be able to techno-scientifically produce and 
breed human beings.”20 However, the problem with the biotechnological 
future as projected by what Heidegger calls “futurology” [Futurologie] 
is that it is merely a “stretched present” [eine verlängerte Gegenwart]. 
Biotechnology remains a project of the epoch of subjectivity, but it curi-
ously enough ignores the fact that its accomplishments will actually nul-
lify the distinction between subject and object.
Dasein and Life
Perhaps the most fundamental weakness of all arguments against ge-
netic enhancement is that they accept as given the idea that the human 
being’s essence is ultimately grounded its genetic constitution. From this 
point of view, it can indeed be reasonably argued that genetic intervention 
will dramatically change our present understanding of what a meaningful 
19 Martin Heidegger, Denkerfahrungen 1910-1976 (Frankfurt a/M: Klostermann Verlag, 
1983), 135-149.
20 “Aus seine Kenntnis gründet man die sichere Aussicht, eines Tages die wissenschaftlich- 




existence entails, yet, by the same token, it cannot be maintained that 
it will deprive existence of meaning as such. As Žižek remarks: “Who 
knows what this ‘posthuman’ universe will reveal itself to be ‘in itself’?”21 
Heidegger is an exception in this regard. Although he also regards human 
genetic modification as an imminent danger for the human essence, he 
nonetheless consistently rejected biological determinations of this es-
sence. He was never tired of repeating that the metaphysical tradition 
erroneously defined the human being as a natural entity to which some 
higher capacity such as speech, reason, or soul is added. According to 
Heidegger, the essence of the human being lies in his receptivity to Being, 
which he calls “being-in-the world,” “ek-sistence,” or “transcendence:”
Ek-sistence can be said only of the essence of man, that is, only of the human 
way ‘to be.’ For as far as our experience shows, only man is admitted to the 
destiny of ek-sistence. Therefore ek-sistence can also never be thought of as 
a specific kind of living creature among others.22
Does that mean that according to Heidegger the human being does not 
belong to the realm of nature, or even that the human being is not a living 
creature at all? Such a position would even exceed religious dogma in 
anti-Darwinism. Yet, for Heidegger the burden of proof does not rest with 
those who, like himself, challenge what he calls “zoological definitions” 
of the human, but with those who claim that the essence of the human 
being is somehow grounded in ‘life.’ The human being or Dasein is not 
‘life’ plus something else added to it. Rather, ‘life’ is Dasein from which 
something is subtracted. As Heidegger puts it in Being and Time:
Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but essentially it is accessible only in 
Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a private interpreta-
tion; it determines what must be the case if there can be anything like mere-
aliveness [Nur-noch-leben]. Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is 
it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it 
as life (in an ontologically indefinite manner) plus something else.23  
In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that Being-in-the world is 
Dasein’s essential way of being, its most basic state. Hence, what needs 
to be subtracted from Dasein to arrive at an understanding of what ‘life’ 
means is ‘world.’ In Being and Time, Heidegger does not further investi-
gate what this would mean. On the contrary, he argues that Dasein does 
21 Žižek, The Parallax View, 195.
22 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. D. F. Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 
228.
23 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962), 75.
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not have access to such a thing as ‘pure life’ because our understanding 
of the entities that surround us is necessarily mediated by the world. The 
world constitutes the ultimate horizon of our understanding of entities be-
hind which we cannot penetrate. The same can be said about the concept 
of ‘pure nature.’ The conception of natural beings which are somehow 
independently present as present-at-hand objects derives from a more 
originary understanding of entities that are ready-to-hand, namely tools 
and objects of use:
The wood is a timber forest, the mountain a rock quarry, the river a hydraulic 
force, the wind ‘in the sails.’ When the ‘environment’ is disclosed, the ‘na-
ture’ thus disclosed is encountered too.24
The same for animals. Although it is affirmed that animals are not sim-
ply artifacts or automatons, as Descartes still maintained, in Heidegger’s 
existential analytic animals are entities that appear within the everyday 
world of Dasein as merely useful for this or that purpose: as leather for 
shoes, as power source, etc. The idea of a living being as such can only 
arise if one makes abstraction of this more original, worldly encounter.
Apart from a telling remark that animals simply perish, never prop-
erly die as Dasein does – of which Jacques Derrida will make much25 
– Being and Time remains otherwise silent on the question of the being 
of life. This should not come as too great a surprise, though. Being and 
Time was written with the explicit intention to reopen the question of 
Being as such. Therefore, the attempt to determine the being of particu-
lar regions of entities such as life can only be successful after this more 
fundamental issue has been properly addressed. Yet, merely three years 
later, in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, the question of ani-
mal being comes to occupy a central place in his thinking. The guiding 
threat of Heidegger’s argument in this lecture course is constituted by 
three theses: the stone is wordless, the animal is world-poor and man is 
world-forming. Note that Being and Time’s conceptual framework still 
informs the relationship between these theses. Life is considered to be 
only accessible through a subtraction of world from Dasein: the animal is 
“poor in world.” Hence, as Heidegger reasserts his earlier claim, “[t]he 
essence of life can become accessible only if we consider it in a decon-
structive fashion.”26 Heidegger will conclude that the essence of the ani-
24 Ibid., 100.
25 See Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. T. Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993).
26 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Soli-




mal consists in being “captivated” [benommen]. The animal is trapped in 
its environment by the ring or circle of its drives and instincts. The animal 
has access to the entities that penetrate its circle of instincts, but that it can 
only react to these entities, never truly act in relation to them. Heidegger 
avidly describes an experiment of the biologist Jacob von Uexküll, dur-
ing which a bee is brought in front of a cup of honey. It appeared that the 
bee continued to suck up the honey even after the bee’s abdomen was 
cut away and the honey visibly streamed away behind it. According to 
Heidegger, this experiment convincingly demonstrates that the bee does 
not recognize the food as too much food and that it can only continue its 
instinctual activity. What is withheld from the bee is the ability to appre-
hend the honey as such. Since the animal is completely captivated or ab-
sorbed by the entities constituting its environment, it cannot let an entity 
be what it is. This phenomenological capability to reveal an entity in its 
being is reserved for Dasein only. The fact that Dasein is world-forming 
implies that Dasein always already moves within a horizon of meaning 
(Lichtung) from out of which which present themselves as this or as that.
However, it remains unclear how Dasein’s possibility to reveal en-
tities as such relates to what is biologically given to him. Does it not 
find its condition of possibility there, in the sense that it surely cannot 
be denied that Dasein’s ek-sistence or being-in-the-world must somehow 
be grounded in his physical constitution? This is not at all obvious to 
Heidegger. Quite the contrary, in fact. He maintains that ek-sistence is 
more original than the body and owes nothing to it. In sense perception, 
for example, we do not first register ‘raw data’ such as noises or sounds 
to which we subsequently apply the categories of understanding as to 
finally arrive at a meaningful representation. Such a hylomorphic detour 
is totally redundant. Phenomena immediately present themselves as this 
or as that:
What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking 
wagon, the motor cycle. […] The fact that motor-cycles and wagons are what 
we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as 
Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-
the-world. […] Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside 
what is understood.27
On Heidegger’s view, it is understanding which makes possible hear-
ing, not the mere ‘natural’ fact of being endowed with ears. Heidegger 
maintains the priority of understanding over bodily sense perception to 
a point where it almost becomes absurd, as to even claim that faculties 
27 Heidegger, Being and Time, 207.
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are more original than physical organs: “We do not hear because we 
have ears, but we have and are able to have ears because we can hear.”28 
Biological organs merely register what, on a more fundamental level, has 
already been actualized by the faculty of understanding.
It should be more than clear, then, that Heidegger seeks at all costs to 
counter the modern tendency to define the essence of man in biological 
or physiological terms. Yet, even though such an approach could be plau-
sibly defended, it seems to deprive his critique of biotechnology of any 
meaningful content, for why would he consider biotechnology as a threat 
to the human being’s essence if this essence is thinkable in terms of the hu-
man’s biological equipment in the first place? Such a critique seems to be 
in keeping with the reaction of the Catholic Church to cloning and genetic 
engineering: If the human being’s essence, the soul, is really immortal, then 
why oppose biotechnological interventions on the perishable body? The an-
swer is that Heidegger understands the notions of ‘nature,’ ‘life’ and ‘tech-
nology’ in a completely different way. Therefore, to really understand why 
Heidegger rejected the idea of human genetic modification, we must turn 
to his reinterpretation of the ancient Greek concepts of physis and tekhnē.
The Essence of Biotechnology
“Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology,”29 
Heidegger states at the beginning of his famous essay ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology.’ Almost everything we thought we knew about 
technology – it is an inert, neutral means utilized by human beings – may 
well be “correct,” but it is certainly not “true.” To understand why these 
characteristics do not determine technology in its essence, Heidegger’s 
claim has to be placed against the backdrop of his interpretation of the 
ancient Greek notion of tekhnē. Tekhnē does not refer to the production 
and utilization of tools and machines, but to a kind of knowledge, a know-
how.30 Heidegger explains this through an interpretation of Aristotle’s 
theory of causality which, importantly, also seems to inform the still 
widely accepted conception of technology as a means. As is well known, 
Aristotle posits four causes: the material cause, the formal cause, the final 
cause, and the efficient cause. Conventional readings of Aristotle take this 
28 Martin Heidegger, Heraklit (Frankfurt a/M: Klostermann Verlag, 1979), 247. 
29 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1979), 4.
30 “Technē means neither art not technology but a kind of knowledge, the knowing dis-
posal over the free planning and arranging and controlling of arrangements.” Martin 
Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. G. Fried and R. Polt (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000), 18.
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to imply that technology involves man as efficient cause imposing form 
upon inert matter to his own end. According to Heidegger, though, such 
an interpretation of the term is completely un-Greek. The term which we 
now call “cause,” the Greeks called “aition,” “that to which something 
else is indebted.” This “something else” is the artifact, the end result of 
tekhnē. The moderns think that only the human being is responsible for 
the production of the artifact, in the sense that human beings are supposed 
to be those who control the production process from A to Z. The Greeks, 
however, understand this process differently. For the Greeks, the human 
being isn’t the pivot in tekhnē, but merely one of the four aitia. The impli-
cation is that tekhnē is not a means to achieve a freely chosen end, but a 
process of co-creation involving all four aitia and leading to a coming into 
being of what is not yet a being. In Heidegger’s words, tekhnē “lets what 
is not yet present arrive into presencing.”31 Tekhnē is a mode of poiēsis, a 
bringing-forth. This leads Heidegger to a final conclusion. As a mode of 
poiēsis, tekhnē lets something which is concealed come into unconceal-
ment: tekhnē is closely related to what the Greeks called alētheia, truth. 
It is through the know-how involved in tekhnē that the human is able to 
grasp truth, which for Heidegger is nothing less than the truth of Being.
What about modern technology? Modern technology is also a mode 
of revealing, but no longer a bringing-forth, a poiēsis leading to truth, but 
a challenging-forth [Herausfordern] that “puts to nature the unreasonable 
demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”32 
In modern technology, Being is reduced to a standing-reserve [Bestand] 
of energy that can be stockpiled and used to serve the human’s subjective 
needs. Through modern technology humanity seems to be finally able 
to realize Bacon and Descartes’ project of making itself master and pos-
sessor of nature. Heidegger casts this anthropocentric view into doubt. 
What appears to install humanity in a position of absolute mastery over 
the natural world is actually something that has been donated to it: we are 
only able to reveal Being as mere raw material ready for exploitation by 
modern technology because Being has already revealed itself to us in this 
form. In this sense, modern technology is not a human accomplishment, 
but a sending of Being. In Heidegger terms, it is a destining [Geschick]. 
Such a revelation of Being that challenges man to, in turn, challenge na-
ture is what Heidegger calls das Gestell [enframing]. Now, not only does 
the human lack control over the revelation of Being at work within mod-
ern technology, but human beings are themselves profoundly subject to 




that revelation. Here we finally arrive at an answer to the question why 
Heidegger considers biotechnology a threat to the human essence:
When destining reigns in the mode of Gestell, it is the supreme danger. […] 
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but 
does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of ob-
jectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes 
to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he 
himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.33
In the age of modern technology, and even more so in the dawning 
age of biotechnology, the human herself is challenged or revealed as a 
standing-reserve of genetic material to be exploited by the life-sciences. 
It should be noted, though, that the entire discussion is entirely played out 
on the level of understanding. The danger of biotechnology does not pri-
marily consist in concrete empirical threats posed by technical interven-
tions on the genome, but in the threat that we will understand ourselves 
as bio-genetic entities that can be manipulated at will. This is what is 
most dangerous about biotechnology, not the fact that we will actually use 
these technologies to modify the genome. This is why Heidegger would 
probably say that the discussion between Habermas and the advocates 
of a liberal eugenics about the permissibility of genetic intervention is 
beside the point. Both sides already presume that the human essence is 
somehow grounded in the human being’s genetic constitution and, in that 
sense, the damage has already been done:
The actual threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potential-
ly lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already 
affected man in his essence.34
In Heidegger’s view, such a tacit agreement between the advocates 
and the critics of genetic enhancement would merely demonstrate that the 
Gestell has become hegemonic and dictates the terms in which the discus-
sion is to be pursued.
On the one hand, then, man is so thoroughly in the grip of the illusion 
of absolute sovereignty over Being conjured up by the Gestell that he is 






he does not apprehend Gestell as a claim. […] he fails to see himself as the 
one spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respect he 
ek-sists, from out of his essence, in the realm of an exhortation or address.35
On the other hand, the Gestell’s total monopoly over the process of 
revelation blocks off all other possible revelations of Being, including 
poiēsis:
Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of re-
vealing. Above all, the Gestell conceals that revealing which, in the sense of 
poiēsis, lets what presence come forth into appearance.36
In the end, then, the Gestell not only excludes all other possible rev-
elations such as ancient tekhnē, but it even occults its own status as a rev-
elation and the ontological structure of Being as a process of revealing. In 
other words, the Gestell simply becomes synonymous with “what is.”37
Now, despite Heidegger’s extreme pessimism regarding man’s pos-
sibility to extract himself from the hegemony of the Gestell, he still men-
tions a “saving power.” If the Gestell denotes Being in its contemporary 
form, then this means that it is also a revelation bestowed upon man, 
rather than one created or imposed by him. In fact, Heidegger already 
said at the beginning of the essay that it is only by thinking the “ambigu-
ous essence”38 of technology as a disclosure granted to the human by 
Being, rather than an empirical technical instrument in the hands of a 
free subject, that the human is able to receive the possibility of a “free 
relationship”39 to modern technology. Since we know that for Heidegger 
the essence of technology is that it is a mode of revealing, the implication 
is that that such a free relationship can only be attained by retrieving the 
original meaning of poiēsis:
Revealing is that destining which, ever suddenly and inexplicably to all think-
ing, apportions itself into the revealing that brings forth and that also chal-
lenges, and which allots itself to man. The Gestell has its origin as a destining 
in poiēsis.40
Why, however, after first arguing that the Gestell blocks poiēsis, does 
Heidegger now see the Gestell as itself poetic in origin and why, moreo-









At this point, it becomes necessary to turn to Heidegger’s interpreta-
tion of the pre-Socratic notion of physis. Physis does not correspond to 
the domain of entities that we conventionally call ‘nature,’ which is actu-
ally merely a metaphysical interpretation of it, but names an ontological 
concept that is prior to any particular process that may take place like the 
growing of a tree, because it refers to the event through which particular 
entities originally receive their essence. In other words, Physis is noth-
ing less than the original disclosure of Being itself. In the Introduction 
to Metaphysics, Heidegger says that “physis is Being itself, by virtue of 
which beings first become and remain observable.”41 More specifically, 
Heidegger defines physis as “what emerges from itself, the unfolding that 
opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding, and hold-
ing itself and persisting in appearance – in short, the emerging-abiding 
sway.”42 Furthermore, Heidegger explains that for the Greeks physis also 
included some of the concepts to which that notion is traditionally op-
posed like soul (psychē), position (thesis), law (nomos), and more im-
portantly for our purposed, even technology (tekhnē). As Heidegger will 
repeat in ‘The Question Concerning Technology:’
[N]ot only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into 
appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis. Physis also, the 
arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiēsis. Physis is 
indeed poiēsis in the highest sense.43  
If poiēsis is the non-technological essence of technology which we 
should retrieve from oblivion if we want to free ourselves from pervasive 
modern technology, it is because it achieves its highest form of expres-
sion in physis. Both tekhnē and physis are modes of poiēsis, but since 
physis is poiēsis to a higher degree, the poietic revealing of tekhnē can 
only be properly understood from the vantage point of physis. Heidegger 
explains why physis has priority over tekhnē in his essay on Aristotle’s 
Physics. Faithful to Aristotle’s basic principle that to know is to become 
one with the thing known, Heidegger seeks to explain the difference 
between physis and tekhnē by examining the things that are revealed 
through both modes of poiēsis: natural things (physei onta) and techni-
cal things (tekhnē onta). The most basic quality of a natural thing is that 
it is in movement (kinesis) or, in other words, that it has the tendency 
to change from something into something else (metabolē). Hence, for 
Aristotle, movement does not only mean change of place, but also growth 
41 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 15.
42 Ibid.
43 Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, 10. 
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and diminution, alteration, and generation. Technical things are also mov-
ing beings, but usually we encounter them in a state of rest as that which 
has been produced and is now ready to use. Aristotle will thereupon argue 
that technical entities nonetheless differ from natural entities insofar as 
they move differently: while natural things contain within themselves the 
source (archē) of their movement, technical things have no impulse to 
change arising from themselves.
For the purpose of our present discussion we need not to go into the 
details of Heidegger’s Aristotle interpretation. Let it suffice to say that 
the reason why Aristotle is such an important interlocutor for Heidegger 
is that his theory of physis is at the crossroads of the truthful account of 
the essence of physis in pre-Socratic philosophy and its later metaphysi-
cal determination that will culminate in the Gestell. In Heidegger’s view, 
the moderns have turned the ancient Greek understanding of the relation 
between physis and tekhnē upside down in the sense that in the age of the 
Gestell it is believed that it is in technology that poiēsis achieves its high-
est form of expression. In modernity, Being is no longer the “emerging-
abiding sway” of physis, but is reduced to inert matter or standing-reserve 
passively awaiting technical formation by the human. Heidegger says, for 
example, that defining living beings as organisms actually boils down to 
interpreting them as “artifacts that make themselves.”44
Aristotle could be said to have inspired such a technological under-
standing of Being because he tried to explain the self-emerging sway of 
physis in terms of matter and form. Heidegger therefore seeks to read 
Aristotle’s form/matter distinction in such a way that it remains faithful 
to the pre-Socratic view that physis is superior to tekhnē. Why is this so? 
First, because matter (hylē) and form (morphē) belong together neces-
sarily in physis, but only incidentally in tekhnē. Wood is necessary for a 
tree, but incidental to a table, which could also be made out of iron for 
example. Moreover, in contrast to the bringing-forth of technical things, 
in which the form must first exist in the mind of an external agent prior 
to production, in the generation of natural things no such external help is 
required. If they did require outside assistance, Heidegger remarks, “this 
would mean an animal could not reproduce itself without mastering the 
science of its own zoology.”45
Second, since matter and form belong together only incidentally in 
tekhnē, technical things have no impulse to change arising from them-
selves, except insofar they are also always partly made out of natural 
things. A wooden bed will eventually rot not because it is a bed, but 




because it is made out of wood. The imposition of a form by an external 
agent in tekhnē does not destroy the original complicity of form and mat-
ter in the natural things that form the basis of technical things. This is an 
important thing to note for Heidegger because it carries the implication 
that physis is necessarily prior to tekhnē and, therefore, that the movement 
characteristic of physis will always eventually overpower the movement 
of tekhnē. For the ancients, then, tekhnē does not consist in imposing a 
preconceived form on inert matter, but in a mode of poietic disclosure that 
operates in accordance with the poietic self-disclosure of physis:
Tekhnē is a mode of proceeding against physis, though not yet so as to empow-
er it or exploit it, and above all not to turn use and calculation into principles, 
but, on the contrary, to retain the holding sway of physis in unconcealment.46
The human is not the master of nature, but merely assists the embry-
onic process of coming-into-appearance that is already underway in phy-
sis. Such an understanding of technology and nature sounds quite alien 
to modern ears. It implies, for example, that the production of a wooden 
table doesn’t involve a carpenter imposing a subjectively chosen shape to 
an indifferent piece of wood, but that the wood, the hylē, already contains 
the potential to disclose itself as a table and that the carpenter merely ‘as-
sists’ the wood to show itself as what it potentially already is:
The change of the appropriate wood into a table consists in the fact that the 
very appropriateness of what is appropriated emerges more fully into view 
and reaches its fulfillment in the appearance of a table and thus comes to stand 
in the table that has been pro-duced, placed forth, i.e., into the unhidden.47
Now we are sufficiently prepared to return to the fragment we quoted 
at the beginning of the chapter:
Τέχνη can merely cooperate with φύσις, can more or less expedite the cure; 
but as τέχνη it can never replace φύσις and in its stead become the άρχη of 
health as such.
It is not the doctor or the engineer who cause health by their technical 
skills, but the emerging-abiding sway of physis. Medicine or biotechnol-
ogy merely determine the conditions for the body’s self-emergent health 
to reassert itself, but ultimately it is always physis which heals.
46 Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected Problems of Logic, 
trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 
179-180.
47 Heidegger, Pathmarks, 218.
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Sometimes it seems as if modern humanity is rushing headlong towards this 
goal of producing itself technologically. If humanity achieves this, it will have 
exploded itself, i.e., its essence qua subjectivity, into thin air […].
If the human decides not to follow the leads that physis provides and 
declares herself to be the master of physis, then humanity is on the verge 
of losing its essence. Note, though, that Heidegger says that the human 
will then have exploded his essence qua subjectivity. Humans will no 
longer understand themselves as autonomous subjects because they will 
become aware that they are much less placed in a situation of mastery 
over nature by technology than they are subjected to the imperatives of 
technology. It is for this reason that Heidegger claims that the saving 
power only arises when the danger is at its highest.
But can human beings also lose their ontological essence qua ek- 
sistence? Can they abandon their relation to Being? It seems not, for, as 
we have seen, also as the servant of technology they merely respond to 
the call of Being that claims them to challenge Being as standing reserve. 
Even if they would be completely genetically modified, this would not 
really affect the core of their being because their essence is not grounded 
in their biological constitution, but in their ek-static belonging to Being. 
What is uncanny about technology, Heidegger says, is that “calculative 
thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only 
way of thinking.”48 Yet, modern technology as calculative thinking is still 
a mode of thinking and as such remains responsive to the self-revealing 
of Being.
In the final analysis, then, it appears that, in Heidegger’s view, bio-
technology is not so dangerous after all. It might well be the case that 
the life-sciences may one day succeed in reducing man to a homeostatic 
biogenetic entity, but for Heidegger one thing remains certain: “Man will 
never become a machine.”49 The human’s ek-static essence renders such 
a transformation simply impossible. The use of biotechnology could tem-
porarily suppress the emerging-abiding sway of physis, but in the long 
run physis will always prevail. In a sense, then, Heidegger is very close 
to Habermas who also argues that what is at stake in biotechnology is the 
blurring of the boundaries between the grown and made. But in contrast 
to Habermas, Heidegger remains convinced that the human will never 
lose the ability to discriminate between what is engendered according to 
physis and what is engendered according to tekhnē:
48 Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. J. M. Anderson and E. H. Freund 
(New York: Harper Perrenial, 1966), 56.




Differentiating between what appears of and by itself from what does not 
appear of and by itself is a χρίνιν [krinein, to decide or to separate] in the 
genuinely Greek sense: separating out what is superior from what is inferior. 
Through this “critical” ability for differentiating, which is always decision, 
the human being is lifted out of mere captivation by what presses upon and 
preoccupies him or her and is placed out beyond it, into the relation to being.50
In other words, the human can neither lose the potential to discrimi-
nate between the grown and the made, nor the potential to recognize that 
the former is far superior to the latter, because the human actually is noth-
ing other than this potential, that is to say, the entity which exists in the 
form of potentiality-for-being.




History and nature have become equally alien to us, namely, in the sense 
that the essence of man can no longer be comprehended in terms of either 
category.2
Hannah Arendt and Biotechnology
In what are practically the opening lines of The Human Condition 
Hannah Arendt makes a bold yet apt prediction about the future of 
humanity:
For some time now, a great many scientific endeavors have been directed 
toward making life also “artificial,” toward cutting the last tie through which 
even man belongs among the children of nature. It is the same desire to escape 
from imprisonment to the earth that is manifest in the attempt to create life in 
the test tube, in the desire […] to produce superior human beings and to alter 
their size, shape and function.3
Given the wide interest in contentious bioethical issues like repro-
ductive cloning and genetic enhancement, it is somewhat surprising that 
so few have yet taken serious interest in this intriguing remark. This 
is as much striking as is it is regrettable, not only because Arendt’s 
thought could throw a fresh light on a prominent question in much cur-
rent bioethical and politico-philosophical debates, but also because the 
specific stakes of the question of biotechnology could, in turn, yield a 
new understanding of her celebrated yet still rather poorly understood 
concept of natality. “Natality,” Arendt explains at the beginning of The 
Human Condition, “may be the central category of political thought,” 
because “the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the 
world only because the newcomer possess the capacity of beginning 
1 An earlier version of this chapter has been published as Nathan Van Camp (2014), 
‘Enhancing the natal condition: Hannah Arendt and question of biotechnology,’ Sym-
posium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 18 (2), 179-189.
2 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 2004), 
378.
3 Arendt, The Human Condition, 2.
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something anew, that is, of acting.”4 Thus, if the human capacity to act 
is ontologically rooted in the bare biological fact of being born, then it 
seems that prenatal technological intervention in the genetic endowment 
of a human being cannot remain without consequences for the new-
born’s capability to become a free acting agent. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that the few authors who do invoke Arendt’s thought in the context 
of an ethical discussion of biotechnology do so with specific reference 
to the concept of natality.5
Yet, despite Arendt’s clear concern about the possible effects of such 
technological developments on the human capacity to initiate new begin-
nings, it is far from obvious that Arendt’s concept of natality lends itself 
so obviously to arguments that oppose genetic intervention, as, for exam-
ple, Habermas and Michael Sandel seem to believe. It is indeed true that 
she sees in the desire to redesign our biogenetic base a “wish to escape 
the human condition” and a “rebellion against human existence as it has 
been given,”6 but that does not necessarily mean that she also considered 
it a threat to the human’s natal condition. Rather, it may even be surmised 
that the opposite is true, that is, that she developed the concept of natality 
precisely in response to this looming possibility. Habermas invokes the 
condition of natality to argue that, for human freedom to be retained, it 
is essential that our biogenetic properties must remain outside the reach 
of planned technological intervention. But is it not paradoxical to argue 
that human freedom is grounded in something that is given by necessity? 
Readers of Arendt have always been puzzled by the fact that, while she 
appears to assume a sharp distinction between the realms of necessity and 
freedom, she nonetheless argues that the capacity to act freely is rooted 
in the biological fact of birth. In this chapter it will be argued that this 
apparent contradiction can only be removed if we recognize that natal-
ity is a concept that deconstructs any blunt opposition between zoē and 
bios, biological birth and politico-linguistic birth. Expanding on Arendt’s 
largely neglected footnote to the German anthropologist Arnold Gehlen 
in The Human Condition, it will be argued that the key to this enigma can 
be found in what is known in evolutionary biology as the phenomenon 
of neoteny or fetalization. It will become clear, then, that Habermas and 
4 Ibid., 9.
5 See Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 58-60; Sandel, The Case Against Perfec-
tion, 82-83; Anne O’Byrne, Natality and Finitude (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2010) and Jean-Pierre Dupuy, ‘Cybernetics is Antihumanism: Advanced Tech-
nologies and the Rebellion Against the Human Condition,’ in Transhumanism and its 
Critics, ed. G. R. Hansell and W. Grassie (Philadelphia: Metanexus, 2011), 227-248. 
6 Arendt, The Human Condition, 2.
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Sandel are mistaken to assume that her concept of natality yields a strong 
argument against human genetic intervention.
The Techno-Human Condition
An entry in Arendt’s Denktagebuch (Thought Diary) dated early 1958 
suggests that one of the main reasons why she abandoned the project of 
writing a book on the totalitarian elements in Marxism and instead began 
to focus on the basic components of the vita activa, was that she became 
increasingly occupied with the question of what impact major impending 
technological developments will have on the human condition:
Ad Kafka, “Investigations of a Dog:” The greatest and most horrible danger 
for human thought is that what we once believed to be true could be shat-
tered by the discovery of a fact that was previously unknown. For example, if 
one day we would succeed in making humans immortal, then everything we 
had ever thought concerning death and its profundity would become simply 
laughable […]. One can surely maintain that this is simply too high a price to 
pay for the removal of death.7
Such thought experiments may seem totally harmless, were it not be 
for the astonishing fact that a growing number of researchers in artificial 
intelligence now think it is possible in principle to download conscious-
ness onto a hard drive and in this way bestow virtual immortality onto 
the individual mind. Hence, if Arendt says of science-fiction literature 
that “unfortunately nobody yet has paid the attention it deserves,”8 this 
means that, in any case, she had then already decided to no longer take 
for granted the commonly accepted dividing line between reality and fic-
tion and that she was prepared to follow even the most speculative of 
paths. In fact, in what follows it will be suggested that we ought to read 
The Human Condition as one last great attempt to describe in rigorous 
phenomenological fashion the three most fundamental human activities 
as Arendt thought they were on the verge of being swept away by techno-
logical change. From this perspective, the book reads as a hardly veiled 
analysis of the historico-intellectual genesis of technoscience and its pos-
sible impact on “those general human capacities which grow out of the 
human condition and are permanent, that is, which cannot be irretrievably 
lost so long as the human condition itself is not changed.”9
7 Hannah Arendt, Denktagebuch 1950-1973, ed. U. Ludz and I. Nordmann (München/
Zürich: Piper, 2003), 591. The translation is mine.




The three fundamental human capacities (labor, work, and action) cor-
respond to the most general human conditions, “birth and death, natality 
and mortality.”10 Yet, although the question of a technological induced 
“removal of death” still features prominently in the prologue – as can be 
gauged from her poignant remark that man’s “wish to escape the human 
condition, I suspect, also underlies the hope to expand man’s life-span far 
beyond the hundred-year limit”11 – the remainder of the book contains 
one long drawn out reflection on the fate of the condition of natality in an 
increasingly technological driven society. Arendt’s remark that natality 
constitutes “the central category of political, as distinguished from meta-
physical thought,”12 is usually interpreted as implying that she wrote The 
Human Condition out of a dissatisfaction with Heidegger’s prioritization 
of the event of death in his existential analytic of Dasein.13 This rather 
negative explanation of why the event of birth holds such a prominent 
place in her thought, while certainly not wrong, seems to miss the sense 
of historical urgency which prompted Arendt to write a phenomenology 
of the active life. If action, the most political of human activities, is rooted 
in the fact of natality, and natality currently stands exposed to the threat of 
technological usurpation, then the question of biotechnology, so Arendt in 
the prologue, “is a political question of the first order.”14 That is to say, it 
is not just a practical question that professional politicians need to address 
by enacting legislative measures. It is also, and even more so, a question 
in which the essence of the political itself is at stake. If human beings are 
no longer born, but ‘made,’ then their capacity to act freely may undergo a 
metamorphosis so great as to become unrecognizable; the capacity, let us 
not forget, that enables them to make political decisions about such issues 
as technological development in the first place. There is no question that 
this kind of threat to the essence of the political is unprecedented. Arendt, 
however, submits that, when viewed from a broader perspective, the age 
of biotechnology actually represents but one episode in a much longer 
long history of the decline of the political. For another important thread 
that runs through The Human Condition is the eclipse of the political as 
the phenomenological structure informing the capacity to act is perpetual-




13 See for example Patricia Bowen-Moore, Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy of Natality 
(Basingstoke/London: The Macmillan Press, 1989), 2-5 and Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, 





day world dominated by the wordless animal laborans. Arendt concludes 
the book by arguing that not everything is lost though, because, as she 
suggests in the very last section, “the capacity for action […] is still with 
us, although it has become the exclusive prerogative of the scientists.”15 
Scientific experimentation is itself an expression of our capacity to intro-
duce unpredictability in the world whose results are not yet knowable. 
Hence, fully aware that she is writing “at the very moment when [the 
nature of society] was overcome by the advent of a new and yet unknown 
age,”16 she does not venture to make a prediction about how the human 
capacity to act will fare in the dawning age of pervasive biotechnology.
Although, arguably, the biotechnological threshold had already been 
crossed with the introduction of IVF in 1978, something which Arendt 
discussed as early as 1958 – “creating life in the test tube”17 –, the perti-
nence of her thought for reflecting on biotechnological issues was only 
discovered quite recently. As we have seen, in The Future of Human 
Nature Habermas strongly opposes non-therapeutic genetic intervention 
and even suggests that it should be legally banned on the basis of a “right 
to a genetic inheritance immune from artificial intervention”18 because it 
would radically infringe on the genetically programmed person’s capac-
ity to act freely.19 For a person to know herself as the irreducible origin 
of her own free actions, Habermas explains, it seems necessary that she 
experiences her actions with reference to an origin that exceeds her and 
somebody else’s control. Such a condition, he suggests, is what Arendt 
attempted to articulate through the concept of natality: “In acting, human 
beings feel free to begin something new because birth itself, as a divide 
between nature and culture, marks a new beginning.”20 In order to expe-
rience oneself as the unique origin of authentic actions, the distinction 
between “what is manufactured and what has come by nature,”21 between 




18 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 27.
19 Michael Sandel has expressed a similar concern about the corrosive effect of bioge-
netic engineering on one’s ethical freedom to be the undivided author of one’s own 
life. In his argument against genetic enhancement he also avails himself of Arendt’s 
concept of natality and argues that biotechnological intervention exhibits “a stance of 
mastery and domination that fails to appreciate the gifted character of human powers 
and achievements, and misses the part of freedom that consists in a persisting negotia-
tion with the given” (Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, 83).




ing by physis, seems categorical. It is only because we are aware that an 
essential aspect of our identity was already fixed at the time of our birth, 
that we are capable of experiencing ourselves as the initiators of actions 
for which we are uniquely responsible:
What is suggested by [the concept of natality] is, I believe, the onset, with 
birth, of a differentiation between the socialization fate of a person and the 
natural fate of her organism. It is only by referring to this difference between 
nature and culture, between beginnings not at our own disposal, and the plas-
ticity of historical practices that the acting subject may proceed to the self-
ascriptions without which he could not perceive himself as the initiator of his 
actions and aspirations […]. The fact that this natural fate, this past before our 
past, so to speak, is not at our human disposal seems to be essential for our 
awareness of freedom.22
Habermas acknowledges that from Arendt’s description of the condi-
tion of natality it does not necessarily follow that a genetically programmed 
person will no longer be able to experience her actions as constitutive of 
new beginnings, but he gives an additional reason why, nonetheless, this 
will very likely be the case. Unlike the situation of someone who finds her-
self confronted with the expectations and stimulations of her parents to act 
upon her natural talents given at birth, a programmed person can only in-
terpret, but not revise or undo her parents’ choice to purposefully intervene 
in her genetic make-up. In other words, genetic intervention will establish 
a paternalistic, asymmetrical relationship that – as he had already argued 
in an earlier essay23 – even surpasses slavery in cruelty, for it will never be 
possible to emancipate oneself from this inferior, programmed position.
Natality Between Necessity and Freedom
Reflecting on Marx’s seemingly incompatible statements that labor 
is the most human of man’s activities and that the abolition of labor will 
inaugurate the realm of freedom, Arendt writes:
Such fundamental and flagrant contradictions rarely occur in second-rate 
writers, in whom they can be discounted. In the work of great authors they 
lead into the very center of their work and are the most important clue to a 
true understanding of their problems and new insights.24
22 Ibid., 59-60.
23 See Jürgen Habermas, ‘An Argument against Human Cloning. Three Replies,’ in The 
Postnational Constellation. Political Essays, tr. and ed. M. Pensky (Malden, Mass.: 
Polity Press, 2007), 163-172. Originally published in Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 
17-18, 1998.
24 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought 
(New York: Penguin, 2006), 24.
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Thus, if it is true that the real originality of great authors reveals itself 
especially in the contradictions in their work, then one cannot claim to 
have really understood the thought of Arendt, nor claim that it contains 
an argument against human genetic modification unless the meaning and 
sense of the concept of natality has been completely unraveled. Natality, 
Arendt explains in The Human Condition, names the fact that “[b]ecause 
they are initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take 
initiative, are prompted into action.”25 But is it not paradoxical for Arendt 
either to argue that natality constitutes the “central category of political 
thought”26 if she also maintains that it is through the activity of labor, not 
action, that men deal with the biological processes forced upon them by 
necessity? In other words, how can Arendt both claim that political free-
dom is rooted in such a plain biological phenomenon as parturition and 
that everything related to “the life of the individual and the survival of the 
species” is a “non-political, household affair by definition”27?
Indeed, it is striking that Arendt is not very consistent in her descrip-
tion of the nature of and the relation between the activities pertaining 
to the realms of necessity and freedom respectively. In the first part of 
The Human Condition, she appears to accept the ancient Greek view and 
makes a clear-cut separation between the private and the public realm, 
oikos and polis, even to the point of endorsing the Greek idea that it is le-
gitimate to use violence in the private sphere on condition that it serves the 
purpose of liberating “oneself from the necessity of life for the freedom of 
world.”28 Arendt’s “phenomenological essentialism,”29 as Seyla Benhabib 
has called her one-to-one coupling of human activities and worldly loca-
tions, seems to lead her to accept the Greek view that we are all born as 
unequal, needy creatures irredeemably tied to the necessities of the life 
process, but that we are nevertheless intermittently capable of raising our-
selves out of this slavish condition by erecting an artificial public realm 
in which our biological wants and needs can be temporarily suppressed:
The distinctive trait of the household sphere was that in it men lived together 
because they were driven by their wants and needs. […] The realm of the polis, 
on the contrary, was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship be-
tween these two spheres, it was a matter of course that the mastering of the ne-
cessities of life in the household was the condition for the freedom in the polis.30




29 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Oxford: Rowan & Lit-
tlefield, 2003), 123.
30 Arendt, The Human Condition, 30-31.
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From remarks like these it has often been concluded that Arendt suf-
fered from an ardent “polis envy,” in the sense that she would have pos-
ited the socio-political structure of the Greek polis as a normative ideal 
against which modern society, with its conspicuous “unnatural growth of 
the natural,”31 can be critically measured.32 In other words, her virulent 
hostility toward what she calls “the rise of the social,” the encroachment 
of the activities having to do with life, labor, and reproduction on the 
political realm, is seen by many as the result of the fact that she made her 
idiosyncratic understanding of the Greek polis life the standard against 
which modern society is assessed and, obviously, found wanting.
However, there are also passages in which she seems to argue the 
exact opposite, namely, that there is nothing that more clearly reveals 
the anti-political thrust of the Western tradition than its deep-seated drive 
to violate biological life. This is, for example, the case at the end of 
the chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism entitled ‘The Decline of the 
Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man.’ Describing the fate of the 
millions of displaced and stateless persons in interbellum Europe, Arendt 
argues that these people were deprived of their human rights the moment 
they most needed them. Both the French and the American proclamations 
of the Rights of Man state that each human being is endowed with a set of 
fundamental rights that are “self-evident” or “given with birth.” Yet, the 
very moment one lost one’s political status as a citizen of the nation-state, 
it turned out that one could not appeal to these so-called “inalienable 
rights.” Quite the reverse, more than often these stateless people found 
themselves reduced to “the abstract nakedness of being human and noth-
ing but human,”33 the extreme case being the camp inmate reduced to noth-
ing more than “a specimen of the animal-species man.”34 Totalitarianism 
can be said to have brought this violent, anti-political drive to its most 
extreme conclusion, but in fact it has determined Western politics since its 
inception. “Ever since the Greeks,” Arendt explains at the very end of the 
chapter, “we have known that highly developed political life breeds […] 
a deep resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact that 
31 Ibid., 47.
32 See for example Bernard Flynn, Political Philosophy at the Closure of Metaphysics 
(Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1992); Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves, The Po-
litical Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London: Routledge, 2003); Hanna Pitkin, The 
Attack of the Blob. Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2000) and Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children. Hannah Arendt, Karl 
Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2001).




each of us is made as he is – single, unique, individual.”35 The dark back-
ground formed by what is biologically given to us at birth “breaks into the 
political scene as the alien which in its all too obvious difference reminds 
us of the limitations of human activity” and “indicates those realms in 
which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, therefore, he has 
a distinct tendency to destroy.”36 Contrary to what she will argue ten years 
later in The Human Condition, then, Arendt concludes that such a sup-
pression of biological life has to be avoided at all costs:
The human being who has lost his place in a community […], is left with those 
qualities which usually can become articulate only in the sphere of private life 
and must remain unqualified, mere existence in all matters of public concern. 
This mere existence, that is, all that which is mysteriously given us by birth 
and which includes the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds, can 
be adequately dealt with only by the unpredictable hazards of friendship and 
sympathy, or by the great and incalculable grace of love, which says with 
Augustine, “Volo ut sis [I want you to be],” without being able to give any 
particular reason for such supreme and unsurpassable affirmation.37 
It obviously goes without saying that such a “basic gratitude for eve-
rything that is as it is,” for “things that are physei and not nomō,”38 is dia-
metrically opposed to what Arendt, apparently approvingly, described as 
the ancient Greek hierarchy between the biological and politico-linguistic 
dimensions of man.
But again, how then should we conceive the relation between birth and 
the freedom to act that grounds Arendt’s concept of natality? And how 
will this condition fare in the dawning age of biotechnology? Does bio-
logical birth really condition the capacity to act, in which case Habermas 
seems to be fully justified in invoking the concept of natality to oppose 
the use of technologies that bring qualities that are given by birth within 
the reach of planned technical intervention? Or are they antithetical no-
tions, as Arendt also seems to argue, in which case the concept of natality 
would rather turn into a weapon in the hands of those, like the liberal 
eugenicists, who believe that our present physical and psychical constitu-
tion is an obstacle that impedes the realization of our full potentialities 
and who therefore belief that that prospective parents should be given as 
much freedom as possible to decide which genetic traits their children 




38 Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah (New York: Grove Press, 1978), 246.
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The Symbolic Reduction of the Event of Parturition
Many of Arendt’s commentators have circumvented the above-men-
tioned contradiction in her description of the relation between birth and 
action by assuming that she made a sharp distinction between biological 
birth and politico-linguistic birth, zoe and bios, and that for her only the 
latter kind of birth genuinely expresses the fact of natality.39 According 
to Ronald Beiner, for example, Arendt “conforms to a strict dualism of 
Nature and Freedom”40 and he even goes as far as claiming that Arendt’s 
concept of natality forms the core of what he calls her “anti-naturalistic 
philosophy.”41 Such an understanding of natality fits nicely into the stand-
ard interpretation of The Human Condition, which holds that it obviously 
could not have been Arendt’s intention to root political freedom in the 
biological event of parturition, because all evidence points to the conclu-
sion that Arendt bemoaned the victory of the animal laborans by unfa-
vorably comparing its mode of existence to what the Greeks understood 
as a genuine bios politikos. Moreover, these commentators point out, the 
capacity to begin something new presupposes a form of temporality that 
is fundamentally at odds with the temporality that humans experience in 
their biological processes, which are, as Arendt explains, “part of the cy-
clical movement of nature and therefore endlessly repetitive.”42 Contrary 
to the eternal circularity of natural processes, the processes that the hu-
man sets into motion through action have a definite beginning in time. 
The fact that Arendt invokes the event of the birth of a child to character-
ize the emergence of the new inherent in political action should, accord-
ing to them, be understood from the perspective of the strategic value that 
it possesses. For it provides an age dominated by the worldless animal 
laborans with an example of the one natural event that discloses the same 
mode of temporality that structures worldly action. Put otherwise, on this 
reading, politico-linguistic birth should be seen as the supreme actualiza-
tion of the potentiality for beginning something new that biological birth 
only expresses symbolically.
The assumption that biological birth stands merely for the human’s 
capacity to initiate new beginnings would then find further confirmation 
39 See for example Margaret Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt 
( London: Methuen, 1974); Ronald Beiner, ‘Action, Natality and Citizenship: Hannah 
 Arendt’s Concept of Freedom,’ in Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, ed. 
Z.  Pelczynski and J. Gray (London: Athlone Press, 1984) and Margarete Durst (2003), 
‘Birth and Natality in Hannah Arendt,’ Analecta Husserliana Vol. 79, 777-797. 
40 Beiner, Action, Natality and Citizenship, 361. 
41 Ibid., 358.
42 Arendt, The Human Condition, 98.
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in Arendt’s 1929 doctoral dissertation Love and Saint Augustine in which 
she explores the close connection between human creatureliness and free-
dom. The central aim of this early study was to question the possibility 
of grounding the precept “Love thy neighbor as thyself” in the Christian 
notion of love of God. In the first chapter of the book, Arendt shows that 
Augustine’s notion of love as craving is not suitable for this purpose. 
Since it presupposes that the “highest good” (i.e. the “happy life”) can 
only be attained in an absolute future which lies beyond worldly life and 
death, this kind of love demands complete self-denial and forsakenness 
of the human world and hence, so Arendt, “makes the central Christian 
demand to love one’s neighbor as oneself well-nigh impossible.”43 In 
the chapter entitled ‘Creator and Creature,’ Arendt shows, however, that 
Augustine’s writings contain yet another notion of love which is not pri-
marily oriented toward an absolute future, but toward an absolute past: 
“When happiness is projected into the absolute future, it is guaranteed 
by a kind of absolute past, since the knowledge of it, which is present in 
us, cannot possibly be explained by any experience in this world.”44 In 
order to love happiness, one must already know what happiness is, and 
this knowledge “is given in pure consciousness prior to all experience.”45 
Hence, Arendt concludes, the only way to reach the idea of happiness is 
through remembrance: “[S]ince recollection presents a knowledge that 
necessarily lies before every specific past, it is also truly directed toward a 
transcendent and transmundane past – that is, toward the origin of human 
existence as such.”46 This other notion of love, then, is a love of God that 
can only be actualized through a return, in recollection, to the One who 
created man:
The creature in its createdness derives its sense of meaning from a source that 
precedes its creation, that is, from the Maker who made it […]. The fact that 
man has not made himself but was created implies that the meaningfulness of 
human existence both lies outside itself and antedates it.47
Arendt confirmed the assumption that her early work on Augustine 
was the zero-point of her philosophy of natality by adding a passage in 
the 1964-5 revised English edition in which she explicitly calls the rela-
tion between human creatureliness and meaningfulness an expression of 








the fact of natlity.48 But the mere fact that it was also possible for her to 
develop a theological understanding of natality would then be yet another 
indication that the biological understanding of natality that she develops 
in The Human Condition is but one historico-paradigmatic figure of the 
capacity to initiate new beginnings that finds its most basic experience in 
politico-linguistic action.
Yet, if Arendt really intended to say that there is merely a structural or 
symbolic analogy between the unexpected arrival of a new human being 
through birth and the emergence of the new through worldly action, just 
as there is an analogy, as she argues elsewhere, between divine creation 
ex nihilo or the unexpected birth of Jesus of Nazareth and the “miracle 
of action,”49 then why does she, nonetheless, claim that in this politico-
linguistic birth “we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our 
original physical appearance”50? Moreover, it is also highly unlikely that 
the ancient Greek separation between the realms of necessity and free-
dom, oikos and polis, and between the modes of existence appropriate to 
each, zoe and bios, underpins Arendt’s concept of natality, if only because 
she repeatedly insists that it names a concept “which Greek antiquity ig-
nored altogether.”51
In a number of recent publications on Arendt’s concept of natality it 
has, therefore, been forcefully argued that the reference to biological birth 
was not merely a metaphorical gesture, but that she really wanted to say 
that the human capacity to act is literally conditioned by the bare bio-
logical fact of being born. Neither, however, was it an attempt to ground 
political action in an immutable human nature, as also has been suggest-
ed.52 Peg Birmingham, for example, has argued that Heidegger’s notion 
of solicitude (Fürsorge) could help us to understand that the newborn’s 
entrance into the world is never simply a physical event, but always al-
ready also a politico-linguistic event: “Linguistic natality cannot be laid 
over physical natality, and this suggests that both births are inseparable 
and always found together.”53 It is thus not the case, she explains, that for 
48 Ibid., 52-53.
49 “It is this faith in and hope for the world that found perhaps its most glorious and most 
succinct expression in the few words with which the Gospels announced their ‘glad 
tidings’: ‘A child has been born unto us’” (Arendt, The Human Condition, 247).
50 Ibid., 176.
51 Ibid., 247.
52 See for example Martin Jay, ‘The Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt,’ in 
 Hannah Arendt: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, Vol. 3, ed. 
G. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2006), 191-213.
53 Peg Birmingham, Hannah Arendt and Human Rights. The Predicament of Common 
Responsibility (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 25.
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Arendt the newborn is simply a specimen of the animal-species man who 
only actualizes her potentiality to become a unique self when she inserts 
herself into the public world through words and deeds. “Naked facticity,” 
Birmingham writes, “is always already the site of language,”54 namely, in 
the sense that the newborn is always immediately exposed to the welcom-
ing address of the other.
Anne O’Byrne agrees with Birmingham that biological birth and po-
litico-linguistic birth are so deeply implicated as to be inseparable, but 
she retorts that by identifying their moment of convergence with the nam-
ing of the newborn, Birmingham still sets too great a distance between 
the biological and the linguistic components of the event of natality. The 
problem with this understanding of natality, O’Byrne explains, is that it 
expels the intimate relationship between the maternal body and the fetus 
to the presocial and prelinguistic sphere and that it privileges the pater-
nal moment in the event of natality. O’Byrne’s notion of natality’s syn-
copated temporality offers a way out of this impasse. By this mode of 
temporality she means “a mode of being in time that can grasp itself only 
belatedly.”55 If the moment of my physical birth constitutes a past that was 
never present to me, because I was not ‘there’ to experience it, but at a 
later moment in time still turns out to have been my birth, then the tempo-
ral structure of this event also determines our politico-linguistic birth. The 
outcome or meaning of one’s actions also only reveals itself to the back-
ward glance of the storyteller or the historian, never to the actor himself 
– the meaning of one’s deed only reveals itself after the event. Following 
O’Byrne, then, it can be argued that the intimate connection between both 
kinds of births shows itself by the fact that our politico-linguistic birth 
always arrives too late, in the sense that our biological birth has always 
already ‘happened’ to us. No one was present at her own birth. This event 
constitutes an absolute past which necessarily remains outside our field of 
experience. Yet, one could wonder whether even Anne O’Byrne’s articu-
lation of the co-implication of biological birth and politico-linguistic birth 
does not still leave too great a gap between both events. After all, both 
the ability to reflect on one’s moment of birth and the ability to under-
stand the stories that others tell about this event develop only gradually 
over time, while Arendt clearly suggests that both events always occur 
together. Arendt is quite clear about the fact that the mere event of being 
born alone predisposes one to act freely. Therefore the task remains to 
think the co-implication of biological birth and politico-linguistic birth in 
still more radical fashion.
54 Ibid., 29.
55 O’Byrne, Natality and Finitude, 95.
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The Prematurity of Natal Life
When, in a crucial yet largely neglected footnote in The Human 
Condition, Arendt states emphatically that her description of the con-
dition of natality is “supported by recent findings in psychology and 
biology”56 and refers to the German anthropologist Arnold Gehlen’s 
book Der Mensch [Man] as her main source of inspiration, she is most 
likely referring to what in the field of evolutionary biology is called the 
phenomenon of neoteny or fetalization. In the first chapter of his book, 
Gehlen discusses the Dutch anatomist Louis Bolk’s essay ‘Das Problem 
der Menschwerdung’ [The Problem of the Origin of Man, 1926].57 Bolk 
wrote this essay as a challenge to Ernst Haeckel’s then still widely sup-
ported theory of recapitulation. He argues that Haeckel’s theory of evolu-
tion can indeed explain the mechanisms that determine the ontogenetic 
development of animal species, but that it cannot provide an answer to 
the much more pressing riddle of human ontogentic development. Bolk 
departs from the often quoted but never quite satisfactorily explained ob-
servation that adult humans strongly resemble juvenile pongids, but that 
this phenotypic likeness gradually disappears during the pongid’s ontoge-
netic maturation. Moreover, in contrast to humans, in pongids there is a 
strong negative allometry of the brain and a strong positive allometry of 
the jaws. According to Bolk, these phenomena cannot be explained by 
the thesis that in ontogenetic development humans go through the differ-
ent stages that determined the phylogenetic evolution of their direct an-
cestors. His alternative theory holds that, in contrast to animals, humans 
evolved by retaining a number of juvenile and even fetal features of their 
direct ancestors throughout ontogenesis. Hence, whereas in the ontoge-
netic development of non-human primates bodily traits such as a flat face, 
a reduction of body hair, and high relative brain weight represent only 
temporary features, in humans they have evolved to become permanent 
features of their physical constitution.
There is no immediate evidence that Arendt ever engaged herself in 
a thorough study of Bolk’s theory of fetalization. Nonetheless, it is quite 
plausible that one implication in particular could have drawn her attention 
while reading Gehlen’s concise rendering of it. Bolk further specified that 
the retention of fetal characteristics in humans can be explained by the 
occurrence of a general retardation of human ontogenetic development, 
itself caused by an alteration of the endocrine system. In other words, it 
is because maturation is delayed in humans that fetal growth rates are 
56 Ibid., 178.
57 Arnold Gehlen, Man: His Nature and Place in the World, tr. C. McMillan and 
K.  Pillemen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 93-109.
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prolonged and fetal features stabilized. Retardation explains, for exam-
ple, why humans live much longer than other primates and mammals of 
comparable body size. A more interesting implication, however, is that 
if humans were to attain the same level of ontogenetic development as 
other primates at their time of birth, they would actually need a gesta-
tion period of twenty-one months instead of the nine months now. In a 
sense, the Swiss biologist Adolf Portmann noted, one could therefore say 
that humans spend their first year as “extrauterine embryos.”58 The main 
reason for this acceleration of time of birth is that even at this stage of 
ontogenetic development the human brain continues to grow at fetal rates. 
Humans achieve only twenty-three percent of their full brain capacity at 
term, whereas the brains of other mammals are at that time already fully 
formed. But if this growth of the brain would have to take place in the 
uterus, then it would be physically impossible for a woman to give birth.
Gehlen believed he had found in Bolk’s theory of fetalization hard 
scientific evidence for his conception of man as a “deficient being” 
[Mängelwesen] and it seems that Arendt’s reading of the former inspired 
her to develop her concept of natality on the basis of a similar anthropo-
logical theory. Unlike animals, Gehelen argues, humans are born without 
any well-developed instincts and without specialized organs and are thus 
singularly unfit for survival. He therefore rejects the standard interpreta-
tion of the evolutionary theory of the origin of man. Humans are not so 
much superior to other animal species, but are, on the contrary, vastly 
inferior to them: “One envisions man fictitiously as animal only to dis-
cover that he makes an imperfect and indeed impossible animal.”59 Thus, 
when Arendt states in the mentioned footnote to Gehlen that the scientific 
theories he discusses allow for the conclusion that action and speech are 
a “’biological necessity,’ that is, necessary for a biologically weak and 
ill-fitted organism such as man,”60 she clearly inscribes herself in a pecu-
liarly German tradition – initiated by Herder and brought into prominence 
by Nietzsche – that understands humans as ‘indeterminate’ or ‘deprived’ 
animals. Whereas newborn animals are almost immediately capable of 
generating appropriate reactions to the stimuli that emerge out of their 
environment, humans are extremely ill-adapted to the environment into 
which they are thrown. Born prematurely and thus deprived of any partic-
ular biological quality, no such spontaneous attunement between human 
organism and environment takes place. Because of their premature birth, 
58 Adolf Portmann (1941), ‘Die Tragzeiten der Primaten und die Dauer der Schwan-
gerschaft beim Menschen: ein Problem der vergleichen Biologie,’ Revue Suisse de 
Zoologie, Vol. 48, 511-518. Gehlen refers to this article in the first chapter of Man.
59 Gehlen, Man, 13.
60 Arendt, The Human Condition, 177.
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humans enter the world helpless and needy and thus in desperate need of 
protection and care by the social group. According to Portmann, one can 
even argue that the social group assumes the task of an “external uterus.” 
It is in this sense that the theory of fetalization allows us to understand 
more clearly why Arendt can argue that natality is an inextricable bio-
logical and politico-linguistic event, for as premature creatures humans 
are biologically conditioned to engage in politico-linguistic action. As 
Gehlen puts it, “a being with such a physical constitution is viable only as 
an acting being.”61 Thus, when Arendt writes that “a life without speech 
and without action […] has ceased to be a human life,”62 she clearly re-
mains within the confines of Gehlen’s anthropological theory.
This makes it understandable why Arendt can argue that the concept 
of natality articulates the idea that human freedom is conditioned by the 
biological fact of being born without necessarily contradicting herself. 
Natality not only articulates the fact that our politico-linguistic birth al-
ways arrives too late, in Anne O’Brien’s sense that our biological birth 
constitutes a past that was never present to us. The concept of natality also 
articulates the fact that our biological birth always arrives too early, name-
ly, in the sense that our premature birth releases us from the fate of being 
compelled to follow a biogenetically predetermined course of life. This is 
also probably one of the reasons why Arendt rejects the notion of human 
nature and opts to speak about human conditions instead.63 Natality, as a 
condition of human existence, does not determine human beings abso-
lutely because the biological traits they are born with never solidify into 
a set of fixed properties but remain in a deficient state. From a biological 
perspective, we were never ready to enter the world in the first place. But 
it is precisely this ‘unpreparedness’ or ‘prematurity’ that gives us to the 
possibility of initiating radically new beginnings. Natality, as we can see 
now, is not a purely biological concept, nor a purely politico-linguistic 
one. It names an event which breaks out of the eternal circle of nature, 
“where no beginning and no end exist,”64 but which nonetheless remains 
ineluctably tied to the biological condition from which it emerged.
The freedom of natal beings consists in an “persisting negotiation with 
the given,”65 to use Michael Sandel’s words, but the foregoing suggests 
61 Gehlen, Man, 16.
62 Arendt, The Human Condition, 176.
63 “[T]he human condition is not the same as human nature, and the sum total of human 
activities and capabilities which correspond to the human condition does not constitute 
anything like human nature” (ibid., 9-10).
64 Ibid., 96.
65 Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, 83.
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that actually very little has been given to them at birth. Deprived of an 
immutable ‘natural essence’ and not tailored to any particular environ-
ment, humans are biologically conditioned to actively create their own 
conditions of existence:
In addition to the conditions under which life is given to man on earth, and 
partly out of them, men constantly create their own self-made conditions, 
which, their human origin and their variability notwithstanding, possess the 
same conditioning power as natural things. Whatever touches or enters into a 
sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the character of 
a condition of human existence.66
Furthermore, Arendt makes it utterly clear that the condition of natal-
ity not only prompts them to engage in politico-linguistic action. Natality 
also prompts them to engage in technological innovation:
[I]f the human condition consists in man’s being a conditioned being for whom 
everything, given or man-made, immediately becomes a condition of his fur-
ther existence, then man “adjusted” himself to an environment of machines 
the moment he designed them. They certainly have become as inalienable a 
condition of our existence as tools and implements were in all previous ages.67
Contrary to what Habermas and Sandel believe, then, Arendt does not 
believe that biotechnological intervention will irrevocably infringe on the 
human capacity to act freely. In her view, technology is not an external 
force that threatens to violate a pure, natural origin, but constitutes an ir-
reducible condition of human existence. Technology could even be said 
to constitute natality’s necessary ‘other,’ namely, in the sense that it is 
the originary supplement of the human’s faulty biological constitution. If 
humans are born deprived of any fixed set of biological characteristics, 
if they are born ‘unfinished,’ as it were, then simply opposing oneself 
against genetic intervention becomes an impossible position to sustain. 
Of course, this does not mean that genetic intervention is entirely unprob-
lematic and thus exempted from critical examination. But it does seem to 
imply that it is impossible to determine in advance what is ‘natural’ and 
what is ‘unnatural’ to the existence of natal beings. Abiding in the gap 
between past and future, natal beings are destined to invent, to explore, 
and to go where nobody has ever went before, imbued as they are with the 
promise of always being capable to make a fresh start.






[A]t stake here will be the attempt to think, instead of the birth of the human 
qua entity related to its end, rather its invention or even its embryonic fabrica-
tion or conception, and to attempt this independently of all anthropologism, 
even if this would mean considering with the utmost seriousness this other 
question: “And if we already were no longer human?”2
The Forgetting of Epimetheus
Bernard Stiegler’s ongoing philosophical project Technics and Time3 
is one of the most original and promising efforts in contemporary conti-
nental philosophy to rethink the relationship between the human and tech-
nology.4 Drawing on the writings of Leroi-Gourhan, Husserl, Heidegger, 
Derrida, and Simondon, Stiegler seeks to argue that “anthropogenesis 
corresponds point by point to a technogenesis,”5 in the sense that human 
beings and technical artifacts have always been involved in a mutually 
constitutive relationship. In the first volume of Technics and Time, ‘The 
Fault of Epimetheus,’ Stiegler sets up his argument around the emblem-
atic figure of Epimetheus, Prometheus’ slow brother whose role in the 
infamous myth, just as that of technics, is usually forgotten by the philo-
sophical tradition.6 Since this story contains in broad outlines the central 
1 Parts of this chapter were published as Nathan Van Camp (2009), ‘Stiegler, Habermas, 
and the techno-logical condition of man,’ Journal for Cultural Research 13 (2), 125-
141 and Nathan Van Camp (2011), ‘Negotiating the Anthropological Limit: Derrida, 
Stiegler, and the Question of the Animal,’ Between the Species, 14 (1), 57-80.
2 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. R. Beardsworth 
and G. Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 135-136. 
3 The Fault of Epimetheus, the first volume of this series, appeared in 1994, followed 
by Disorientation in 1996, and Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise in 2001. 
Stiegler has planned to write two more volumes in the near future. 
4 While perhaps overstating it, Richard Beardsworth even goes as far as claiming that 
“it is a work the importance and effects of which can be compared, in the continental 
tradition at least, with Heidegger’s Being and Time and Derrida’s Of Grammatology.” 
See Ricard Beardsworth (1995), ‘From a genealogy of matter to a politics of memory: 
Stiegler’s thinking of technics,’ Tekhnema, 2, 2.
5 Stiegler, The Fault of Epimetheus, 45.
6 See ibid., 185-203.
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features of Stiegler’s theory, it is worthwhile to summarize it briefly. In 
Protagoras’ version of the story as narrated by Plato, Epimetheus con-
vinces his brother Prometheus to entrust him with the task of distributing 
the qualities or powers among the living creatures that was commended 
by Zeus. The Titan performs his task by allotting each creature one specif-
ic quality making sure that there is a just equilibrium between the species. 
But when it was time for the humans to receive their due, Epimetheus sud-
denly realizes that he had already handed out all available qualities. When 
Prometheus arrives at the scene to inspect his brother’s work, he notices 
that the humans are still naked and without means of defense. Because he 
is worried that their premature constitution could lead to the total destruc-
tion of mankind, Prometheus decides to make up for Epimetheus’ fault 
and goes out to steal the technical skills and fire from the gods to com-
pensate humans for their lack of qualities. What Stiegler wants to stress 
in his reading of this myth is the fundamental undefinability of the human 
or what he calls the human’s “default of origin.” Hence, technics is not 
proper to the human either, but merely an external prosthesis that is only 
adopted afterwards, by default, to compensate for an originary lack of ori-
gin. According to Stiegler, the figure of Prometheus, who is usually inter-
preted as the symbol of the technical hubris of man, can therefore only be 
understood in connection to that of his brother Epimetheus. The fact that 
the latter’s role is usually forgotten by the philosophical tradition is just 
as remarkable as it is understandable, given that Epimetheus is himself 
essentially a figure of forgetting. What this myth makes clear is that the 
human being is the forgetful one, the one who, in Stiegler’s terms, suffers 
from “retentional finitude” and who therefore needs technical prostheses 
to supplement his limited capacity for memorization.
The meaning of this mythical narrative can also be explained in bio-
anthropological terms. According to Stiegler, memory can be articulated 
on three different levels. First, there is genetic memory, which is common 
to all living beings and which remains strictly internal to the organism. 
Second, there is epigenetic memory, which consists of individually acquired 
experiences that are stored in the central nervous system of the organism. 
In contrast to genetic memory, epigenetic memory provides the organism 
with a certain degree of latitude, which explains why most species of ani-
mals can be conditioned to behave in certain ways. The main difference 
between genetic memory and epigenetic memory is that while the former 
is automatically transferred from one generation to the other, the latter is ir-
remediably lost for the species with its carrier’s death. Put differently, these 
two levels of memory don’t communicate with each other. Stiegler claims, 
however, that with the ‘birth’ of the human there emerged a third kind of 
memory – epiphylogenetic or technical memory –, which allows the human 
to overcome the evolutionary impossibility to transmit epigenetic memory 
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to the next generations. The reason for this is that, in contrast to the animal, 
the human being is capable of exteriorizing his epigenetic memory onto 
material supports (from flint tools and wax tablets to combustion engines 
and the TCP/IP protocol) that can be preserved over time.
What has so far not been sufficiently emphasized in the recent lit-
erature is that the starting point of Stiegler’s theory of technics was the 
problem of genetic intervention. The fact that this has previously gone un-
recognized is hardly surprising, given that Stiegler himself confined his 
remarks on this subject to a short essay dedicated to Derrida which only 
appeared in French and, moreover, predates the publication of the The 
Fault of Epimetheus. Nevertheless, it could be argued that not only can one 
not fully comprehend his theory of technics without acknowledging this 
initial starting point, but also, as we will argue further on, that his theory 
of technics has enormous consequences for the mode in which the debate 
on genetic intervention is currently conducted. In ‘Quand faire c’est dire’7 
[‘When to do is to say’], Stiegler notes that genetic intervention is “at the 
same time radically new and absolutely ancient.”8 In order to understand 
this claim, we have to recall that, in chapter one, we showed that with 
the emergence of genetic technologies the human species has entered an 
entirely new phase in evolution. Our point was that if it is possible to de-
liberately introduce changes in the human genome, then we are currently 
witnessing the suspension of the Central Dogma of Molecular Biology 
upon which the whole of Neo-Darwinism is constructed. Remember that 
this Dogma holds that the genetic program does not take lessons from 
experience, in the sense that whatever knowledge or skills an individual 
organism might acquire during its life, all this is forever lost for the spe-
cies when the individual organism dies. The radical novelty is, then, that 
insofar as genetic technologies allow to deliberately introduce changes in 
the human genome, it appears that the genetic program can receive les-
sons from experience after all. Yet, Stiegler argues, this is perhaps not as 
revolutionary as might seem at first sight, because it could very well turn 
out “that the ‘laws of evolution’ have already been suspended for quite 
some time now – at least since the invention of the human, that is, since 
the invention of technics.”9 This claim is far more radical than what has 
hitherto been assumed. What Stiegler means to say is not simply that the 
human is the only living being that is capable of preserving his memories 
over time by grafting them onto technical objects. He also intends to say 
7 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Quand faire, c’est dire. De la technique comme différance de toute 
frontière,’ in Le passage des frontières. Autour du travail de Jacques Derrida, ed. Col-
loque de Cérisy (Paris: Galilée, 1994), 271-283.
8 Ibid., 272; Translation mine. 
9 Ibid.; Translation mine. 
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that one particular species of living beings managed to free itself from the 
pressure of genetic selection and to become ‘human’ by entering into a 
mutually constitutive relationship with technics.
In this chapter we will attempt to clarify in more detail Stiegler’s claim 
that the human is co-constitutive with technics. In order to do this, we will 
start by examining Derrida’s work on the anthropological difference. The 
reason why it is necessary to devote part of our attention to the question 
of the human/animal distinction in Derrida is that, as we will show in 
much more detail below, Stiegler’s theory of technics is to a large extent 
the outcome of a productive dialogue with Derrida on precisely this ques-
tion. Moreover, it will be shown that much of this discussion centers on 
the interpretation of the work of the French paleontologist André Leroi-
Gourhan. It is on the basis of the latter’s work that Stiegler will argue 
that the human is invented by technics as much as technics by the human. 
Subsequently, we will use this insight to develop a critical reading of 
Habermas’s theory of technology. It will be shown that Habermas’s view 
that technology poses a threat to human nature is largely due to his mis-
taken belief that technology is and must remain simply a means to fulfill 
a human purpose. To conclude, we will suggest that Stiegler’s theory of 
originary technicity urges us to rearticulate the debate on genetic tech-
nologies in different terms.
Deconstructing the Anthropological Difference
In a collection of lectures published as The Animal That Therefore I 
Am,10 Jacques Derrida elaborates a critique of “the gesture [that] seems 
to constitute philosophy as such,”11 namely the positing of a single and 
indivisible dividing line separating the animal from the human. For 
Derrida, the question of the animal is therefore not one more pressing 
question among many others, but probably “the most important and de-
cisive question,”12 a question which he says to “have addressed a thou-
sand times, either directly or obliquely, by means of readings of all the 
philosophers I have taken an interest in […].”13 Hence, what for Derrida 
secretly unites such diverse thinkers as Descartes, Kant, Levinas, Lacan 
and Heidegger is that they simply oppose the Animal to the Human by 
denying all animals certain qualities they deem to be proper to man alone. 
To counter this tradition, Derrida will, however, not give back to the 







animal what man has always deprived it of – a gesture that risks introduc-
ing biological continuism and all the dangerous implications thereof –, 
but argue that all living beings, including the human being, suffer a radi-
cal powerlessness.
For many a reader of Derrida, his statement about the central impor-
tance of the question of the animal in his work will very likely come 
very unexpectedly. Indeed, at first sight this claim seems to be in fla-
grant contradiction with the simple fact that Derrida has not addressed 
this question as a specific subject of inquiry prior to the publication of 
The Animal That Therefore I Am. To be sure, there has never been a lack 
of animal figures in Derrida’s texts, but the strategic functions these ani-
mal figures fulfill are usually highly context-dependent and text-specific 
and certainly do not set the stage for a more profound investigation of 
the larger stakes of this issue. Yet, there nevertheless seems to be every 
reason to take this claim seriously. As if he wants to convince his readers 
that his is not merely using a hyperbole when making this claim, Derrida 
bluntly declares in this text that “logocentrism is first of all a thesis con-
cerning the animal.”14 Derrida’s versatility as a thinker renders it almost 
impossible to detect an overarching theme in his writings, but it would 
certainly not be inaccurate to state that his critique of logocentrism – the 
claim that there is a substantial self predating and enduring its interac-
tions with the world – motivates nearly all of his readings of texts of the 
Western philosophical tradition. Looking back at his early writings such 
as Of Grammatology (1974) and Writing and Difference (1978) from this 
perspective, one could indeed argue that the “quasi-transcendental” con-
cepts he elaborated in these works, such as the trace, the grammē and 
archi-writing, can also be read as potentially holding a strong critique of 
the rigid human/animal distinction bequeathed by the tradition. But even 
if we grant him the benefit of the doubt and assume that he did not merely 
retrospectively project a more recent sensitivity onto his early work, this 
issue was surely not at the center of Derrida’s attention at that time. It 
was therefore generally assumed, and even more so following the so-
called ethical turn of deconstruction marked by the growing influence of 
Levinas’s work on Derrida, that his critique of logocentrism was mainly 
intended to call attention to the many forms of human alterity that come 
to disturb the self-certain subject. If we follow Derrida’s lead, however, 
we should try to understand that this critique was above all meant to be a 





One of the first times Derrida explicitly addressed this issue was in 
an interview with Elisabeth Roudinesco. In this interview, Derrida argues 
that the relations between humans and animals must change drastically 
and adds that this is not merely an “ontological necessity,” but also, and 
especially today, an “ethical duty.”15 In contrast to his brief and rather 
purely theoretical reflections on this issue in earlier texts, on this occa-
sion and in The Animal That Therefore I Am he even goes as far as stat-
ing that “a war has been declared on so many animals,”16 and that the 
violence inflicted upon them could even be compared “to the worst cases 
of genocide.”17 Many consider this comparison between the slaughtering 
of animals and the systematic liquidation of human beings totally unac-
ceptable because it illegitimately equates the worst cases of human suf-
fering and the treatment of animals in big industry. We would, however, 
completely misunderstand Derrida’s intention if we take it to mean that he 
is blind to the fundamental differences between these two kinds of suffer-
ing, or even worse, that he abuses the suffering of those who were mur-
dered in genocides to call attention to the suffering of animals. His point 
is not that we put too much weight on human suffering in comparison to 
animal suffering, but that we do not pay enough attention to the singular-
ity of animal suffering. As Matthew Callarco has argued,
The very difficult task for thought here is to bear the burden of thinking 
through both kinds of suffering in their respective singularity and to notice 
relevant similarities and parallel logics at work where they exist. To do so 
requires abandoning […] the hierarchical humanist metaphysics that we have 
inherited from the ontotheological tradition […].18
The common view that human life is intrinsically more valuable than 
animal life is deeply embedded in Western tradition and culture and it 
will therefore take more than rational argumentation and political com-
mitment to bring about a radical reorientation of our value system. So 
although Derrida declares to have much sympathy for initiatives such as 
those of the animal rights movement,19 he is far from convinced that the 
violence against animals could be stopped or lessened by simply grant-
ing them legally sanctioned rights. For not only is it exactly the Cartesian 
model of subjectivity upon which the modern concept of rights is founded 
15 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For what tomorrow… A dialogue, trans. 
Jeff Fort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 64.
16 Ibid., 67.
17 Derrida, The Animal, 26.
18 Matthew Callarco, Zoographies. The question of the animal from Heidegger to  Derrida 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 112.
19 Derrida and Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow, 74.
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that he considers to be responsible for justifying anthropocentric violence 
in the first place, but he also clearly states that he has “never believed 
in some homogenous continuity between what calls itself man and what 
he calls the animal.”20 This latter statement is clearly directed at animal 
rights theorists such as Peter Singer who argue that one should grant ‘hu-
man’ rights to those animals that are endowed with sufficiently developed 
cognitive capacities. Since Derrida takes this to imply that certain species 
of animals are to be considered superior to, for example, mentally-ill per-
sons, he calls such strategies that deny any qualitative difference between 
humans and animals nothing less than “ridiculous and heinous.”21
It should be clear, then, that Derrida takes issue with both dominant 
positions in the discussion of the human/animal relation. It is no surprise 
though that the largest part of his writings on this problem deal with the 
anthropocentric bias of the continental philosophical tradition. His main 
critique of this tradition is that it has always given humans a privileged 
position among the living creatures by endowing them with qualities, es-
sences, or ‘propers’ such as language, consciousness, reason, or moral 
awareness which animals apparently do not possess. At the same time, 
however, he seems to be equally critical of those who strive to undo the 
metaphysical separation of humans and animals by giving back to the 
animal the qualities which the human has always denied it. According to 
Derrida, such a view does not take sufficiently into account the singular-
ity of all living beings. In other words, Derrida aims to undo the radical 
human/animal binary, but at the same time he also wants to avoid put-
ting man on the same ontological level as the animal. The question is, of 
course, whether it is actually possible to steer clear from both of these 
positions.
It seems as if the full import of this problem only started to dawn on 
him in the wake of his critical confrontation with Heidegger’s thought. 
It is well-known that Heidegger was an ardent critic of the many forms 
of “ontotheological humanism” that populate the philosophical universe 
and it would therefore have seemed reasonable for Derrida to assume that 
Heidegger’s writings contain a thinking that does not take for granted the 
radical human/animal divide. It is probably with this expectation in mind 
that in Of Spirit (1989) Derrida ventured a critical reading of Heidegger’s 
only text that explicitly broaches the problem of the being of the ani-
mal, namely The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1995). As men-
tioned in chapter three, the guiding threat of Heidegger’s argument in this 
lecture course is constituted by three theses: the stone is wordless, the 
20 Derrida, The Animal, 30.
21 Derrida and Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow, 67.
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animal is poor in world and man is world-forming. Derrida calls particu-
lar attention to the obscurity of the second thesis: what does being poor 
in world mean? Heidegger is quick to argue that this thesis certainly does 
not imply that there is a difference in degree between the human and the 
animal in the sense that the animal has only limited access to the enti-
ties in the world to which the human would have full access. Given that 
Heidegger clearly states that “every animal and every species of animal 
as such is just as perfect and complete as any other,”22 it is certainly not 
the case that these characterizations should be taken as an evaluative 
ranking of some sort. Yet, the animal must certainly ‘have’ some world, 
otherwise it could not be distinguished from the stone of which he said 
that it has no world at all. The animal, Heidegger will conclude, has ac-
cess to entities, but it does not have access to entities as such. Derrida 
comments as follows:
This analysis, certainly, has the interest of breaking with difference of degree. 
It respects a difference of structure while avoiding anthropocentrism. But it 
remains bound to reintroduce the measure of man by the very route it claimed 
to be withdrawing that measure – this meaning of lack and privation.23
A lizard lying on a rock, to use one of Heidegger’s famous examples, 
certainly relates to that rock in some way, but it certainly does not relate to 
the rock as such. The animal, Heidegger argues, is completely captivated 
[benommen] or absorbed by the entities which constitute its environment 
and therefore cannot have a free relationship to them. It always has a rela-
tion of utility with the entities it encounters and therefore cannot let the 
rock be what it is. Since the animal is captivated by its environment the 
possibility to apprehend something as something is structurally withhold 
from the animal.24 This phenomenological possibility to reveal an entity 
in its being is reserved for Dasein only. Derrida concludes:
I do not mean to criticize this humanist teleology. It is no doubt more urgent 
to recall that, in spite of all the denegations or all the avoidances one would 
wish, it has remained up till now […] the price to be paid in the ethico-politi-
cal denunciation of biologism, racism, naturalism, etc.25
The question is, then, whether Derrida himself found a way to avoid 
the twin pitfall of metaphysical humanism and biological reductionism. 
At the time of the writing of Of Spirit Derrida still seemed to be very 
22 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 194.
23 Jacques Derrida, Of spirit. Heidegger and the question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington & 
Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 49. 
24 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 247.
25 Derrida, Of Spirit, 56.
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skeptical about the prospects to actually achieve this goal. Heidegger’s 
case is exemplary in this respect. Although he consistently rejected the re-
duction of Dasein to a biological entity as well as the metaphysical deter-
mination of the human as a rational animal, Derrida points out that in his 
notorious rectoral speech, ‘The Self-assertion of the German university’ 
(1993), Heidegger capitalizes on both evils at the same time by spiritualiz-
ing the forces of “earth-and-blood.” He consequently ends up combining 
“the sanctioning of Nazism and the gesture that is still metaphysical.”26 
Having become aware that it is simply impossible to twist oneself com-
pletely free from both humanism and biologism, the question for Derrida 
then becomes that of knowing which is the least grave form of complicity 
with these two ‘evils.’ In Of Spirit he does not yet elaborate such a nego-
tiation with the anthropological limit, but he does give an indication of 
how one would probably have to proceed:
[…] [C]an one not say just as legitimately that the having-a-world also has for 
man the signification of some unheimliche privation of world, and that these 
two values are not opposed?27
This is indeed the strategy that Derrida will pursue in Aporias (1993). 
In the second essay of this little book, ‘Awaiting (at) the Arrival,’ Derrida 
remind us that Heidegger opened Being and Time by arguing that human 
Dasein in the only entity in the world that has the ability to question its 
own being and that an analysis of its existentials provides a privileged 
starting point to reopen the question of being as such. In the second part of 
his magnum opus, Heidegger shows that Dasein’s exceptionality resides 
in the fact that it is the only entity that has an experience of death. Only 
human Dasein can die, animals simply perish. Death, in other words, is 
Dasein’s most proper possibility. But, Derrida objects, isn’t death an ex-
perience that will never present itself to Dasein and thus actually its most 
improper possibility? No one will be able to experience his own death, 
no one will be able to ‘live’ this experience. From this perspective, the 
relationship between Dasein and the animal suddenly appears in a very 
different light:
But if the impossibility of the “as such” is indeed the impossibility of the “as 
such,” it is also what cannot appear as such. Indeed, this relation to the disap-
pearing as such of the “as such” – the “as such” that Heidegger makes the 
distinctive mark and the specific ability of Dasein – is also the characteristic 





of Dasein, common to all experiences of death and also, outside of Dasein, 
common to all living beings in general.28
Heidegger’s metaphysical humanism is here defeated on its own ter-
rain; Not by granting animals access to death ‘as such,’ but by showing 
that human Dasein does not have access to the ‘as such’ of death either.
Human finitude, Derrida recapitulates in The Animal That Therefore I 
Am, does not reside in man’s ability to run ahead towards death, but in its 
not-being-able to experience death, in a lack of power, in a not-having of 
the ‘as such.’ This brings the human in close proximity to the animal. The 
most important question, Derrida argues, is therefore not whether animals 
do or do not have access to logos, speech, spirit, tekhnē, death, and the 
like, but to know whether animals can suffer. Being able to suffer is pre-
cisely this possibility without power, this radical finitude that the human 
shares with the animal.  
At the time of the writing of The Animal That Therefore I Am, how-
ever, Derrida seems to have become aware of the fact that this line of 
thinking could also clear the way for a more subtle version of anthropo-
centric thought. This strand of anthropocentrism would not oppose the 
lack of the animal to the plenitude of the human, but claims that man’s 
superiority over the animal derives precisely from his deficient nature or 
his originary default:
[We will] see appear in every discourse concerning the animal, and notably in 
Western philosophical discourse, the same dominant, the same recurrence of 
a schema that is in truth invariable […]: what is proper to man, his subjugat-
ing superiority over the animal […] would derive from his originary fault, 
indeed from this default in propriety.29
The qualities that make the human superior to the animal, such as 
logos, mind, language, etc., are not simply gratuitous gifts from God or 
Nature, but emerge from the human’s exceptional position as a deprived 
being. This would be the fundamental logic underpinning all metaphysi-
cal discourses concerning the human/animal divide. Unlike the animal, 
the human does not have a fixed nature and that would paradoxically 
explain why he is able to gain access to these various defining traits. 
Leonard Lawlor has argued that this schema can be found in nearly all 
traditions of Western thought, but that it is most clearly present in those 
traditions that assume the fallen nature of the human such as Platonism 
and Christianity:
28 Derrida, Aporias, 75.
29 Derrida, The Animal, 45.
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Because of a fault, man conceives animals as being absolutely innocent, prior 
to good and evil, “without fault or defect.” The animals therefore do not seem 
to suffer a fall […]. In contrast, man is not perfect; he has fallen and has a 
fault, which allows him to question. The ability to question brings us to the 
axiom: it is precisely “a fault or defect” in man, in us, that allows us to be 
masters over the animals.30
The human would have suffered a fatal fall as a result of which he 
paradoxically attains a privileged position among the living beings, 
“[t]his would be the law of an imperturbable logic, both Promethean 
and Adamic, both Greek and Abrahamic (Judaic, Christian, Islamic).”31 
Whence this sudden change of discourse? It almost seems as if Derrida’s 
argument that the human also suffers from a deficient constitution, that 
man is also “poor in world,” had somehow started to boomerang back on 
him so that he deemed it necessary to ward off the suspicion that his own 
writings would be open to such an interpretation.
Epiphylogenetic Life
There is little doubt Derrida was mainly targeting Stiegler’s theory of 
technics with his critique of those who hold that what is proper to the hu-
man derives from an “originary fault.” Since Stiegler wrote his first vol-
ume of Technics and Time as a doctoral student of Derrida, the two were 
very familiar with each other’s work and it would therefore certainly not 
be impossible that they disagreed on certain issues. There is not only bio-
graphical evidence that there was a dispute going on between these two 
deconstructive thinkers though. In the already mentioned essay ‘Quand 
faire c’est dire,’ Stiegler explicitly explained that his theory should be 
understood as an attempt to resolve the question of the human/animal 
distinction which he thought Derrida had not adequately addressed. In 
this article, Stiegler returns to Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in Of Spirit 
which we discussed earlier. If the human is also “poor in world” and 
the human’s relation to the world is equally “guided by a narrow sphere 
of drives, of desires”32 and the like, Stiegler argues, then there still re-
mains to be determined what constitutes the human mode of being poor 
in world. In other words, if the human is also a programmed being, if he 
does not have unmediated access to the world either, then the specific-
ity of the human program still remains to be thought. Indeed, Derrida’s 
argument only seems to beg the question, for if the human and the animal 
30 Leonard Lawlor, This is Not Sufficient. An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in 
Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 67.




share a radical powerlessness, does he not end up endorsing some kind of 
continuism after all? Derrida seems to have anticipated such objections 
and counters them as follows:
[…] I am not advocating the blurring of differences. On the contrary, I am 
trying to explain how drawing an oppositional limit itself blurs the differ-
ences, the différance and the differences, not only between man and animal, 
but among animal societies – there are an infinite number of animal societies, 
and, within the animal societies and within human society itself, so many 
differences.33
But even if it is indeed so that the philosophical tradition has always 
treated ‘the animal’ as one homogenous category and so neglected the 
singularity of animal life, then we still bear the burden to determine what 
constitutes the singularity of the human animal. In order to steer clear 
from the traditional metaphysical prejudices, Stiegler will answer this 
question by showing that the transition from the animal to the human is 
not the transition from a fully programmed living being to a being guided 
by no program whatsoever, but the transition from a genetic program to a 
techno-logical or what he calls epiphylogenetic program.
In the beginning of the third chapter of The Fault of Epimetheus 
Stiegler writes that what is at stake is this book is “to think the birth of the 
human […] and to attempt this independently of all anthropologism.”34 
Stiegler finds a suitable point of departure for this project in the work 
of the French paleontologist André Leroi-Gourhan. What is particularly 
interesting for Stiegler is that Leroi-Gourhan describes anthropogenesis 
as a process of “exteriorization” in the course of which the brain and the 
tool develop at equal pace. As this non-anthropocentric concept defies 
the classical image of the human as an animal to which miraculously the 
capacity for reflection is added, it seriously calls into question the radi-
cal opposition between the human and the animal. A crucial event for the 
development of Leroi-Gourhan’s theory was the discovery of the remains 
of the Australopithecus together with its flint tools in 1959. According 
to Leroi-Gourhan, this was the first bipedal humanoid to have benefit-
ed from exteriorization. What is so important about this paleontological 
finding is that the small size of the Australopithecus’ brain pan urges the 
conclusion that what was decisive in anthropogenesis was not cerebral 
development, but the erect posture and the new functional organization of 
the body that ensued from this novelty in the history of life:
33 Jacques Derrida (1987), ‘On reading Heidegger: an outline of remarks to the Essex 
colloquium,’ Research in Phenomenology 17: 183.
34 Stiegler, The Fault of Epimetheus, 135.
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The “freeing” of the hand during locomotion is also that of the face from its 
grasping functions. The hand will necessarily call for tools, movable organs; 
the tools of the hand will necessarily call for the language of the face. The 
brain obviously plays a role, but it is no longer directive: it is but a partial ele-
ment of a total apparatus, even if the evolution of the apparatus tends towards 
the deployment of the cerebral cortex.35
The erect posture brought about a gradual suspension of genetic con-
straints and, consequently, an increasing indetermination of body func-
tions. The immediate result was the appearance of tools and language to 
fill in for this lack of genetic programmability. Moreover, Stiegler writes, 
between the Australopithecus and the Neanderthalian tools evolved so 
slow “that one hardly can imagine the human as its operator, rather, one 
much more readily imagine the human as what is invented.”36 This will 
be Stiegler’s thesis: the birth of the human is the appearance of technics 
in the sense that the human and technics “invent each other respectively, 
as if there were a technological maieutic of what is called ‘humanity,’”37 
the cortex being informed by the tool as much as the tool by the cortex.
Leroi-Gourhan, however, will maintain that from the Australopithecus 
up to the Neanderthalian, “tools were still, to a large extent, a direct ema-
nation of species behavior,”38 which means that he thinks that in this ar-
chaic period of thousands of years technical evolution was still mainly 
determined by the rhythm of cortical development, itself propelled by 
genetic selection, and thus essentially of zoological origin. According to 
the paleontologist it is only with the emergence of the Neanderthalian 
that technical evolution frees itself completely from genetic constraints. 
So although Leroi-Gourhan argues that the fact that the Australopithecus 
could already handle tools implies that this humanoid must have had a 
“technical consciousness,” he thinks he was still not yet endowed with 
a full-fledged “symbolic consciousness,” which will only emerge with 
the Neanderthalian when an extraordinary increase in anticipatory capaci-
ties was accompanied with the stabilization of the evolution of the hu-
man’s neuro-equipment. What is at issue here is the latitude that became 
available with exteriorization and the origins thereof. Stiegler argues that 
Leroi-Gourhan’s distinction between two types of ‘consciousness’ con-
tradicts the simple fact that the Australopithecus must already have had 




38 André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and speech, trans. Anna B. Berger (Cambridge Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1993), 97.
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gesture requires, as Leroi-Gourhan himself explains, “a good deal of fore-
sight on the part of the individual performing the sequence of technical 
operations.”39 So although Leroi-Gourhan came close to recognizing that 
the birth of the human coincides with the birth of technics, in the end 
he gives a determining role to cortical development, implying that the 
Australopithecus was still an animal and that the real origin of the hu-
man is the acquisition of a faculty for symbolization. This is a conclusion 
which Stiegler cannot accept:
There is no such [second] origin because technical differentiation presup-
poses full-fledged anticipation, at once operative and dynamic, from the 
Australanthropian onwards, and such anticipation can only be a relation to 
death, which means that symbolic intellectuality must equally be already 
there. Reflective intellectuality is not added to technical intelligence. It was 
already its ground.40
The difficulty Leroi-Gourhan found himself confronted with, Stiegler 
argues, is the ambiguity of the term “exterior-ization.” It gives the im-
pression that what is exteriorized should be preceded by some kind of 
(mental) interiority, something that would function as the origin of this 
movement. But given the fact that Leroi-Gourhan himself had asserted 
that the brain was only a beneficiary of the rupture of exteriorization, 
there cannot be anything of that kind, whether it be in the guise of a 
neurological impetus or a premature consciousness. What has therefore 
remained unthought-of is the possibility that the “interior and exterior are 
[…] constituted in a movement that invents both one and the other,”41 so 
that “neither one precedes the other, neither is the origin of the other, the 
origin being the coming into adequacy [con-venance] or the simultaneous 
arrival of the two.”42 The challenge is to think what Stiegler calls a “mir-
ror proto-stage” or an “instrumental maieutics,” the structural coupling of 
the human and technics that makes the constitution of the one impossible 
and unthinkable without the other.
It is at this stage of his argument that Stiegler calls upon Derridean dif-
férance which in this context he understands as the history of life in which 
are articulated different stages of the grammē. Significantly, Derrida also 
based his concept of the grammē on what Leroi-Gourhan calls the lib-
eration or exteriorization of programs. More specifically, Derrida finds 
in Leroi-Gourhan’s notion of “program” a “non-anthropocentric concept 
39 Ibid., 97.





that does not take for granted the usual divides between animality and 
humanity.”43 Since Derrida’s interpretation of Leroi-Gourhan was crucial 
for Stiegler, I quote him at length:
Leroi-Gourhan no longer describes the unity of man and the human adventure 
thus by the simple possibility of the graphie in general; rather as a stage or an 
articulation in the history of life – of what I called différance – as the history 
of the grammē. […] This movement goes far beyond the possibilities of the 
‘intentional consciousness.’ It is an emergence that makes the grammē appear 
as such. […]. If the expression ventured by Leroi-Gourhan is accepted, one 
could speak of a ‘liberation of memory,’ of an exteriorization always already 
begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning from the elementary 
programs of so-called ‘instinctive’ behavior up to the constitution of electron-
ic card-indexes and reading machines enlarges différance and the possibility 
of putting in reserve.44
Since the grammē does not only concern genetic inscription, but also 
“electronic card indexes” and “reading machines,” that is, means of tech-
nical inscription, it seems that the program is operative on both sides of 
the human/animal divide. But, Stiegler argues, it is nonetheless true that 
this transition from a genetic to a non-genetic program coincides with the 
appearance of the human and an account of the specificity of this passage 
is still missing in Derrida’s writings.
The emergence of the human, Stiegler will conclude, coincides with 
the appearance of a third type of memory or program in the evolution of 
the living. If animal life already knows genetic memory and epigenetic 
memory, with the birth of the human, there emerged a third kind of mem-
ory which Stiegler calls epiphylogenetic memory – memory embodied in 
technical objects. Since the human is capable of exteriorizing its epige-
netic memory onto material supports – from flint tools to digital storing 
devices – it can preserve and transmit this memory across generations. It 
is this suspension of the law of life that Stiegler situates the singularity of 
the human animal.
Critics such as Ben Roberts (2005) and Geoffrey Bennington (1996) 
have argued, however, that it is not so much Derrida’s interpretation of 
Leroi-Gourhan that is lacking in clarity, but Stiegler’s appropriation of it. 
While Derrida’s quasi-concepts such as the grammē and the trace precise-
ly challenge the opposition between the human and the animal, Stiegler’s 
distinction between epigenesis and epiphylogenesis would simply repro-
duce this opposition in terms of an originary technicity. By insisting on 
43 Ibid., 137.
44 Jacques Derrida, Of grammatology, trans. Gayatri C. Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1974), 84.
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the fact that the human is the only living being that is able to conserve its 
memory in technical objects, Stiegler would merely have invented a more 
subtle form of anthropocentrism. As we have seen, this also seems to be 
Derrida’s own critique of Stiegler’s theory of anthropogenesis.
We would, however, do injustice to Stiegler’s theory if we read it as 
simply implying that technics is the defining property of man since his 
argument is precisely that there is nothing proper to the human. If the 
danger of anthropocentrism is most critical when it straightforwardly op-
poses the animal to the human, then no worse could be done than to install 
a insurmountable gap between them on the basis of some transcendental 
property. In this respect Stiegler’s refutation of what he calls the “mira-
cle thesis,” that is, the positing of some form of ‘spirituality’ without a 
rational understanding of its provenance, is rather an attempt to diminish 
anthropocentric violence than its continuation by other means. Moreover, 
the suppression of both overt and latent anthropocentrism could just as 
much lead to its opposite, namely the effacing of all differences between 
the animal and the human. As Stiegler puts it, “the contestation of opposi-
tions must not eliminate the genesis of differences.”45
When asked in an interview what he thinks about the fact that certain primates 
also use tools and transmit this knowledge to the next generation, Stiegler 
responds as follows:
If you would object to me that certain large apes also have cultures, then I 
would say that I am willing to accept them as members of the world which 
starts with the human – in other words, as embryonic fabricators of this third 
type of memory. I would most certainly allow them to enter human history. As 
a matter of fact, that is the reason why they are so close to us.46
Arthur Bradley has argued that this way of responding to the above 
objection can only confirm the impression that Stiegler seeks to violently 
“absorbs every apparent exception into the narrative of hominization.”47 
We would argue, however, that such an interpretation can only arise be-
cause it is almost impossible to use the name of the “human” without 
inheriting the metaphysical assumptions pertaining to this term. That is 
the reason why Heidegger uses the term Dasein to designate human being 
and that is also why Stiegler prefers to call this entity simply the “who.” 
In other words, Stiegler is not primarily interested in the entity we unre-
flectively call the ‘human,’ but in the structure of experience that opens 
45 Stiegler, The Fault of Epimetheus, 163.
46 Stiegler, Philosopher par Accident, 49; Translation mine.
47 Arthur Bradley, ‘Originary technicity? Technology & Anthropology,’ in Technicity, ed. 
A. Bradley and L. Armand (Prague: Litteraria Pragensia, 2006), 98.
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up when a living being enters into a mutual constitutive relation with 
technical objects:
I’m not interested in what we call “man” but in temporality, temporality that, 
as a form of life, has to decide what it is to become (and it so happens that 
this form of life is still called man today). Even when man is finished, when 
he belongs to the past, this form of life may well continue on, becoming ever 
more complex―and perhaps man is already finished.48
Thinking anthropogenesis as mutually constitutive with technogen-
esis implies that the human is not a spiritual miracle that is added to an 
animal body, but that hominization is “the pursuit of the evolution of the 
living by other means than life.”49 Hominization is not a break with life, 
but a break in life and, moreover, through technology.
Technology and Communicative Reason
As its title clearly suggests, Stiegler’s project to forge a new concep-
tion of the human/technology relationship results not only from a critical 
dialogue with Derrida on the question of the anthropological difference, 
but also with the work of Heidegger on the constitution of human tem-
porality. Stiegler’s attempt to think technics as constitutive of temporal-
ity will lead him to articulate a fierce critique of the latter’s existential 
thinking of Technik. Since Heidegger opposes the primordial temporal-
ity disclosed in Sorge [care] to the technical constitution of temporality 
disclosed in besorgen [concern], Stiegler’s believes Heidegger’s work is 
still caught in the classic metaphysical tradition that sees technology as 
external to human nature. In Being and Time, the temporality of concern 
marks the mode of existence of das Man [the One] whose inauthentic 
understanding of Being ensues from the uprooting consequences brought 
about by modern industrial society. Stiegler, on the other hand, argues that 
technics is precisely the very condition of the experience of time since 
technical objects provide the conditions for Dasein to experience a past 
that one has not lived and to anticipate the future in the light of this in-
herited past. According to Stiegler, Heidegger was very close to grasping 
this fundamental relationship between technics and time when he argued 
that worldhood is primarily disclosed in the handling of equipment [das 
Zeug] that is ready-to-hand [Zuhandensein], but, as Richard Beardsworth 
has argued recapitulating Stiegler’s critique, Heidegger refrained from 
48 Bernard Stiegler (2003), ‘Technics of decision,’ Angelaki 8 (2), 158.
49 Stiegler, The Fault of Epimetheus, 135.
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drawing this radical conclusion in his desire to “understand the factuality 
of the world in terms of Dasein’s self-affection.”50
Yet, notwithstanding the predominance of references to Heidegger’s 
work throughout his writings, there are strong indications that in The 
Fault of Epimetheus Stiegler also envisages a critical assessment of 
Habermas’s theory of technology. However, a comprehensive elabora-
tion of such a critique is noticeably missing. Habermas’s seminal essay 
‘Technology and Science as “Ideology”’ is briefly mentioned and criti-
cized by Stiegler in the introduction of the book, but his attention is soon 
drawn to Heidegger’s work.51 This is all the more curious, since Stiegler 
explicitly states that “the major themes from the existential analytic will 
be interpreted and submitted to a critique that I sketched out as much in 
response to Habermas as to Heidegger.”52 Although Stiegler does indeed 
indicate that Habermas and Heidegger share a similar pessimistic diagno-
sis of modern technology by saying that “Habermas and Heidegger appear 
to agree in considering the technicization of language as a perversion,”53 it 
is clear that his critique of Heidegger cannot be transposed to Habermas’s 
work: arguably, existential ontology and critical theory are not kindred 
spirits. We will, therefore, aim at developing a Stieglerian reading of 
Habermas’s writings on technology and argue that the opposition the lat-
ter draws between technics and language, and which appears under such 
different terms as work/interaction and purposive-rational action/commu-
nicative action, stems from his failure to fully confront what Stiegler calls 
the “techno-logical condition of man.”54
Habermas’s ‘Technology and Science as “Ideology”’ was written in 
direct response to Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964). In 
earlier works, like Eros and Civilization (1955), Marcuse had tempered 
the pessimism of his Frankfurter School colleagues about a society domi-
nated by instrumental reason by pointing out that the increasing automa-
tion of the labor-process could also create a realm of freedom in which 
life-enhancing activities would thrive. In One-Dimensional Man, how-
ever, this initial optimism concerning technological development makes 
way for radical critique and blatant utopian hope. Marucse frames tech-
nology and science as the media through which the dominant political 
ideology exercises and strengthens its power. Marcuse no longer believes 
that the technology can be seen as a neutral means, as classic Marxism 
50 Beardsworth, From a genealogy of matter, 152.






had always maintained, because its drive to dominate nature and human-
ity is reproduced on the political level where its rationality serves to jus-
tify stringent forms of social control. That is, although the technological 
system is structurally repressive, humanity does not experience this as 
such because the system is legitimized by the comforts of life it yields. 
Therefore, in Marcuse’s view, the modern technological system can no 
longer fulfill its role as the material basis of a liberated society, but needs 
itself to be liberated for such a society to be possible in the first place. 
Hence Marcuse’s curious call for a “New Technology” which would treat 
nature no longer as inert matter to be dominated at will, but as a subject 
in its own right, and a corresponding “New Science,” which “would ar-
rive at essentially different concepts of nature and establish essentially 
different facts.”55
In ‘Technology and Science as “Ideology”,’ Habermas takes up 
Marcuse’s thesis of the ideologization of science and technics, but he sug-
gests that a distinction must be made between the “institutional frame-
work” and the “subsystems of purposive-rational action.” Both structures 
are subject to waves of rationalization, but while the institutional frame-
work finds its source of legitimation in communicative processes – from 
mythological explanations to human rights claims –, progress in the sub-
systems of purposive-rational action is measured by the degree in which 
its practices prove to be successful or not. On the basis of this distinction, 
Habermas seeks to explain a phenomenon that Marcuse and the other 
members of the Frankfurter Schüle described either as the dialectic of 
enlightenment, the eclipse of reason or one-dimensionality, while deny-
ing that pessimism or a utopian call for a “New Technology” are the only 
responses left. Habermas’s strategy consists of showing that there is noth-
ing wrong with the increasing rationalization of the subsystems of purpo-
sive-rational action as such, but that in modern society its logic has also 
penetrated the institutional framework. The result is that issues that ought 
to be decided upon by citizens following communicatively guided norms 
are being increasingly treated as mere technical ones. Hence, the problem 
for Habermas is not modern science and technology per se, but the fact 
that “the reified models of the sciences migrate into the sociocultural life-
world and gain objective power over the latter’s self-understanding.”56 
Therefore, the solution must rather be sought in “removing the restric-
tions on communication.”57 It is in this sense that we ought to understand 
55 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 166-177.




Habermas’s claim that the aim of Marcuse’s “New Technology” – the 
liberation of nature – is utopian:
[…] [T]he achievements of technology, which are indispensable as such, 
could surely not be substituted for by an awakened nature. The alternative to 
existing technology, the project of nature as an opposing partner instead of 
object, refers to an alternative structure of action: to symbolic interaction in 
distinction to purposive-rational action.58
Put differently, Habermas criticizes the modern tendency to apply the 
logic of instrumental-technical action to the symbolic driven sphere of 
culture, as well as Marcuse’s suggestion to do the exact opposite, namely 
to apply concepts that only make sense in the realm of intersubjectiv-
ity (domination, liberation, opposing partner, etc.) to the realm of nature 
where they make no sense at all.
After a brief exposition of the discussion between Marcuse and 
Habermas, Stiegler remarks that since Habermas considers the technici-
zation of the sphere of communication as a denaturalization, “as it were a 
question of one instance ‘proper to humanity’ perverting another instance 
‘proper to humanity’,”59 his analyses are still haunted by the founding 
positions of metaphysics. According to Stiegler, the technicization of lan-
guage was already at issue in the conflict between Plato and the sophists. 
In the Phaedrus and many other dialogues, Plato criticizes the sophists’ 
use of the technique of writing as a memory aid (hypomnēsis). According 
to Plato, the sophists were only able to become excellent public speak-
ers because they wrote down their speeches in advance, which allowed 
them to learn everything by heart. Plato thinks this a dangerous practice 
because, in his view, writing is a pharmakos, a poison that ruins the truth 
seeking capacity of living memory (anamnēsis). The technique of writing 
distorts truth because it replaces the rule of the logos by that of death let-
ters and in this way renders a critical discussion of the propositions under 
discussion well-nigh impossible. For Plato, true epistēme is only possi-
ble through a spoken dialogue that fixes attention on the ideal content of 
propositions. In this sense, Stiegler argues, we encounter here at the heart 
of critical theory a reintroduction of Plato’s lament that the technicization 
of language does harm to individuation:
The new ideology consequently violates an interest grounded in one of the 
two fundamental conditions of our cultural existence: in language, or more 
58 Ibid., 88.
59 Stiegler, The Fault of Epimetheus, 13.
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precisely, in the form of socialization and individuation determined by com-
munication in ordinary language.60
According to Stiegler, it is no coincidence that this age-old discussion 
should rise up again today. Habermas’s essay was written in a period in 
which one was still trying to come to terms with a new crisis concern-
ing the structure of memory that appeared in the wake of the Industrial 
Revolution, and thus when the technical system “suddenly outgrows the 
sphere of language – which is also to say the logos – and takes over that 
of material bodies.”61 According to Stiegler, the Industrial Revolution 
can be described as a new stage in a process of exteriorization in which 
the memory of living bodies is inscribed in machines, in the sense that 
the “the memory of the proletarian has been absorbed by a machine re-
producing gestures that he no longer needs to know how to make, and 
which he must now simply serve, because he has reverted to the status 
of a serf.”62 In the industrial stage of exteriorization, new powers are 
bestowed upon the human, but also new threats. Habermas implicitly 
mentions this process in his attempt to counter Marcuse’s argument for a 
New Technology. While Marcuse argues that the contemporary technical 
system is historically contingent, Habermas argues that this is not the 
case, given that technological development is a ‘project’ of the human 
species as a whole:
In any case technological development lends itself to being interpreted as 
though the human species had taken the elementary components of the be-
havioral system of purposive-rational action, which is primarily rooted in the 
human organism, and projected them one after another onto the plane of tech-
nical instruments, thereby unburdening itself of the corresponding functions. 
At first the functions of the motor apparatus (hands and legs) were augmented 
and replaced, followed by energy production (of the human body), the func-
tions of the sensory apparatus (eyes, ears, and skin), and finally by the func-
tions of the governing center (the brain).63
Habermas describes technical evolution as a process of exterioriza-
tion, but not in Stiegler’s sense of a mutually constitutive relationship 
between the human and technics whereby the one requires the other to 
be itself in the first place, but as a structural ‘emptying-out’ of the hu-
man behavior system, the functions of which are progressively projected 
60 Habermas, Technology and science as “ideology”, 113.
61 Bernard Stiegler, ‘Anamnēsis and Hypomnēsis: The Memories of Desire,’ in Technic-
ity, eds. A. Bradley & L. Armand (Prague: Litteraria Pragensia, 2006), 20.
62 Ibid., 21.
63 Habermas, Technology and science as “ideology”, 87. See also Jürgen Habermas, 
Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J. J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1972), 48.
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into technical objects. Hence, Habermas defines technical objects as mere 
material extensions of biological functions that increase the human’s 
power over its external environment. It is this instrumental conception 
of technics that motivates Habermas to criticize the technicization of the 
institutional framework in modern society: instead of fulfilling its proper 
function as a means at the disposal of man, man himself has now reverted 
to the status of raw material for the technical system:
For the first time man can not only, as homo faber, completely objectify him-
self and confront the achievements that have taken on independent life in his 
products; he can in addition, as homo fabricatus, be integrated into his techni-
cal apparatus if the structure of purposive-rational action can be successfully 
reproduced on the level of social systems.64
Given that, in Habermas’s view, “individuation is achieved through 
the socializing medium of thick linguistic communication,”65 the tech-
nicization of society corrupts this essential human property. The crucial 
question for Stiegler, however, is “whether such an evaluative distribution 
– according to which technics remains only on one side (of an opposition), 
itself not constitutive of individuation – in fact remains ‘metaphysical’.”66 
Insofar Stiegler thinks that technics constitutes the condition of possibil-
ity for the capacity for memorization and anticipation, the becoming of 
the “who,” is as much conditioned by technics as it is by language.
In order to get to the root of this issue, we have to turn to Habermas’s 
book Knowledge and Human Interests (1972) in which the theoretical 
basis for his critique of Marcuse was formulated. In this early work, 
Habermas distinguishes between two fundamental modes of human ac-
tion, ‘work’ and ‘interaction.’ This distinction corresponds to the division 
between the subsystems of purposive-rational action and the institutional 
framework.67 These modes of action are, in turn, linked to a particular hu-
man interest that serves as the basis of a specific form of knowledge. On 
the one hand, work – or instrumental action – is linked to the technical 
interest in the mastery of nature. This interest is necessary for the re-
production of the species and, moreover, lies at the basis of the em-
pirical-analytical knowledge of the natural sciences. Interaction – or 
symbolic action –, on the other hand, is linked to the fundamental interest 
64 Habermas, Technology and science as “ideology”, 106.
65 Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 54.
66 Stiegler, The Fault of Epimetheus, 14.
67 Habermas also recognizes an emancipatory interest in knowledge. But since this third 
interest is not grounded in deep-rooted anthropological structures, he thinks it has a 
derivative status. See for example Jürgen Habermas, ‘A postscript to Knowledge and 
Human Interests,’ Philosophy of Social Science 3, 176.
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in maintaining distortion-free communication. This interest is necessary 
for the reproduction of cultural existence and lies at the basis of the histor-
ical-hermeneutic knowledge of the cultural sciences. On the basis of this 
theory of “equiprimordial” knowledge-constitutive interests, Habermas 
can retain important elements from Marcuse’s critique of instrumental 
reason, while criticizing its most problematic claims. That is, while he 
agrees with Marcuse that instrumental action is not a neutral practice in 
that it serves a particular human interest, he rejects the possibility of a 
New Science and Technology by specifying that this interest is not bound 
to a particular social group but is shared by the human species as a whole. 
Since this fundamental mode of action is built into the very biological 
structure of the human species itself, the human can only perceive nature 
as a possible object of technical control. In other words,
[t]hey have a transcendental function but arise from actual structures of hu-
man life: from structures of a species that reproduces its life both through 
learning processes of socially organized labor and processes of mutual un-
derstanding in interactions mediated in ordinary language. These basic 
conditions of life have an interest structure. The meaning of the validity of 
statements derivable within the quasi-transcendental systems of reference of 
processes of inquiry in the natural and cultural sciences is determined in rela-
tion to this structure.68
This passage contains a curious mixture of naturalistic and transcen-
dental arguments. Before taking a closer look at how these relate to each 
other, we will first briefly examine them separately. Since Habermas 
wants to avoid the relativism of Marcuse’s position, he first seeks to ar-
gue that the human interests are grounded in deep-seated anthropological 
structures. For this purpose, he finds an ally in Marx who, in opposition 
to Hegel, holds that “nature […] not only seems external to a conscious-
ness that finds itself within nature but refers instead to the immediacy of 
a substratum on which the mind contingently depends.69 Whereas Hegel 
considers nature as a self-created presupposition of Geist, Marx argues 
that nature must be seen as an autonomous entity that gradually gave rise 
to both the human species and his external environment. Habermas simi-
larly argues that the fundamental modes of human action and their cor-
responding knowledge-constitutive interests have emerged through basic 
evolutionary processes and assigns a pivotal role in to a rupture in bodily 
organization. Significantly, he suggests that the invention of the tool was 
an immediate consequence of this rupture:




Without the particular physical equipment of the hominids, the ‘process of 
material exchange’ could never have assumed the form of labor at the human 
level. Men ‘begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they be-
gin to produce their means of subsistence, a step that is conditioned by their 
bodily organization.’ […] The absolute ego of social production is founded 
in a history of nature that brings about the tool-making animal as its result.70
As in Leroi-Gourhan, hominization is described as a process inherent-
ly linked to the evolution of tools. This leads Habermas to the conclusion 
that it is impossible to determine the origin of man in either biological or 
transcendental terms:
In contrast to the fleeting aspects of individual performances, productions, 
and gratifications, labor processes give rise to something general that accu-
mulates in the productive forces. In their turn these enduring productions, or 
stored up forces of production, transform the world within which subjects 
relate to their objects. Therefore the species can have no fixed essence, either 
as a transcendental form of life or in the empirical form of a biologically con-
ditioned basic pattern of culture.71
Technology, or the “productive forces,” as Habermas calls it in a 
Marxist parlance, contains the accumulated materialized experiences of 
previous generations. What is transmitted through time is an ensemble of 
technical objects, which gives man access to an each time different, but 
always already meaningful world.
This seems to bring Habermas close to the idea that technology is a 
fundamental condition of human culture. However, there is yet another 
theoretical issue he wants to address and which leads him in a different di-
rection. The reason why Habermas understands the activity of “work” also 
as a transcendental structure is that in Knowledge and Human Interests 
he is mainly concerned to counter the scientism of those positivists who 
hold the objectivist illusion that science investigates reality as such. By 
arguing that the reality that science takes as its object of inquiry is not an 
ontologically independent realm of facts, but that part of reality that is 
transcendentally constituted by our fundamental interest to master nature, 
Habermas is able to show that while science has an interest structure, and 
is therefore not value-neutral, it is nevertheless valid when applied within 
its own realm.
Ingenious as this theoretical construction may be, in the sense that 
it allows him both to dispel the positivistic account of science and dis-
credit Marcuse’s longing for a New Technology, the combination of both 
70 Ibid., 41.
71 Ibid., 30-31, Emphasis added.
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naturalistic and transcendental arguments leads to some serious contra-
dictions. This is so because Habermas seeks to explain the genesis of 
human interests, while also retaining their transcendental character. Our 
knowledge of the phenomenal world is the necessary product of our tran-
scendental interest in the mastery of nature. However, because Habermas 
also maintains that this interest is the product of contingent evolutionary 
processes, he has to assume the existence of a problematic pre-human 
nature in itself that, as it logically precedes the transcendentally consti-
tuted nature for us, functions as an absolute origin in his theory:
While epistemologically we must presuppose nature as existing in itself, we 
ourselves have access to nature only within the historical dimension disclosed 
by labor processes. Here nature in human form mediates itself with objective 
nature, the ground and environment of the human world. “Nature in itself” is 
therefore an abstraction, which is a requisite of our thought.72
Clearly, there is a striking circularity at work here, for how is knowl-
edge of a “nature in itself” possible given that he also holds that knowl-
edge is always constituted through the fundamental interests?73 As 
Thomas McCarthy puts it:
In Habermas’s terms, the categories and methods of empirical-analytical sci-
ence would both be explained (transcendentally) by reference to structures of 
human action and be employed to explain (empirically?) these structures […]. 
It seems to follow that nature is the ground of subjectivity. And this is, on the 
face of it, flatly incompatible with its status as a constituted objectivity.74
According to Habermas, there is clear evidence that our interest struc-
tures have a purely transcendental character: we can only perceive the world 
as an object of possible technical control. Yet, there is also a fundamental 
intuition that nature is something that predates us as a species and some-
how retains its independence. By accepting both views at the same time, 
however, Habermas appears to be saying that the knowledge-constitutive 
interests are both constitutive of and constituted by nature. This problem 
has of course haunted philosophy ever since Kant’s Copernican revolution, 
but whereas Kant keeps the phenomenal and the noumenal realms rigidly 
separated, Habermas presumes that he can solve this problem by combining 
Kant’s theory of passive synthesis with Marx’s view that human understand-
ing also has an active element, which, in the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx 
72 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 34. Emphasis added.
73 For a similar critique, see for example Joel Whitebook (1979), ‘The Problem of Nature 
in Habermas,’ Telos 40, 41-69 and Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen 
Habermas (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 110-125.
74 McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 111-112.
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calls “human sensuous activity.” According to Habermas, nature in itself is 
positively knowable, but only as an object of possible technical control for 
a species that is compelled to reproduce its life through purposive-rational 
action. Therefore, the ultimate touchstone of this scheme is the obstinacy of 
material reality to which our behavior and our beliefs have to adapt:
We do reckon with the existence of a reality that is independent of men who 
can act instrumentally and arrive at a consensus about statements. But what 
the predication of properties catches “of” this reality is a matter of fact that is 
constituted only in the perspective of possible technical control.75
Habermas argues here that nature in itself is an independent reality that 
somehow functions as the unchanging material ground of our experienc-
es. However, the problem is, as we mentioned above, that he also wants 
to maintain that technology always “transform the world within which 
subjects relate to their objects”76 First, does this initial view not imply that 
there is not one way of relating to the world – as a possible object of tech-
nical control – but that there are many such ways depending on the stage 
that technical evolution might have reached? This is also Heidegger’s po-
sition. What Habermas considers as a transcendental way of relating to 
the world appears in Heidegger’s later writings as something specific to 
modern society in which everything, including the humans themselves, is 
disclosed as a standing reserve [Bestand] that can be stockpiled and used 
to serve the will to power. Second, does his initial view not also imply 
that there is not one unchanging ‘reality,’ but that every time a new stage 
in technical evolution is reached, also a ‘new’ world is created? A hypo-
thetical visitor from the 17th century would surely no longer recognize our 
world, with all its technical objects, as his world. This seems to be self-
evident, but it is not for Habermas who, in the context of the discussion 
that arose in the wake of the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions, maintains that “it is always the experience of 
identical objects of our world which is being interpreted differently ac-
cording to the state of scientific progress we happen to have reached.”77
Steven Vogel has suggested that this problem of a nature in itself in 
Habermas’s theory of knowledge constitutive interests is the outcome of 
an act of “bad faith” on Habermas’s part. Vogel argues that Habermas de-
fined the human interests as species-related and not socially constructed 
because he wanted to avoid at any costs any “Lysenkoist” implications to 
75 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 130.
76 Habermas, Technology and science as “ideology”, 29.
77 Habermas, A postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests, 171.
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follow from his views.78 This is an interesting hypothesis, but we want to 
suggest that it also follows from his disavowal of the techno-logical con-
stitution of the human. By arguing that the technical interest of mastering 
nature is ‘natural,’ in the sense that it is vital for the reproduction of the 
species, Habermas may be able to avoid the danger of relativism that is 
present in Marcuse’s writings, but the result is that he ends up maintain-
ing that technics merely serves the instinct for survival. Habermas would 
probably deny that his theory includes the idea that instrumental action 
is propelled by a purely zoological drive because he explicitly argued 
that “the human interests that have emerged in man’s natural history […] 
derive both from nature and from the cultural break with nature,”79 but 
this argument is not open to him because he almost immediately adds 
that “what raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can 
know: language.”80 We meet once again with Leroi-Gourhan’s concern 
to avoid the conclusion that what is specifically human is technicity. But 
whereas the paleontologist ends up installing an enigmatic gap between 
a technical pre-humanity and a symbolic humanity, in Habermas this gap 
reappears on the societal level due to his concern to safeguard the sphere 
of symbolic interaction from pervasive technology.
Inevitable Enhancement
It can be argued that Habermas’s criticism of the colonization of the 
communicatively structured ‘life-world’ by systems of instrumental ra-
tionality is also at the basis of his rejection of any genetic intervention in 
the human. Because if we were to reduce Habermas’s argument against 
genetic intervention to its most basic principle, then we would say that it 
holds that it is wrong because it threatens to destroy the whole meaning 
of what is to be human. That is to say, it assumes that the human has an 
immutable ‘nature’ and that any attempt to improve upon it through tech-
nology could be seen as a potential moral pitfall:
Bodies stuffed with prostheses to boost performance, or the intelligence of an-
gels available on hard drives, are fantastic images. They dissolve boundaries 
and break connections that in our everyday actions have up to now seemed 
to be of almost transcendental necessity. There is fusion or the organically 
grown with the technologically made, on the one hand, and separation of the 
productivity of the human mind from live subjectivity, on the other hand. 
Whether these speculations are manifestations of a feverish imagination or 
78 Steven Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1996), 122.




serious predictions, an expression of displaced eschatological needs or a 
new variety of science-fiction science, I refer to them only as examples of 
an instrumentalization of human nature initiating a change in the ethical self-
understanding of the species – a self-understanding no longer consistent with 
the normative self-understanding of persons who live in the mode of self-
determination and responsible action.81
Much of this argument depends on the distinction between the natural 
and the artificial, the “grown” and the “made,” which Habermas sees as 
a “transcendental necessity.” While inanimate nature is mute and passive 
and hence open to forms of instrumental manipulation, organic life-forms 
possess an inner dynamic of spontaneous growth that ought to put cat-
egorical restrictions on the kinds of actions we are allowed to perform 
on them. To be more precise, since human beings come into being by 
nature, they are entitled to “respect” or “dignity,” and this should act as a 
check upon our practical dealings with them. However, as we have seen, 
Habermas denies that dignity is a property one possesses simply by virtue 
of being human, and instead claims that it is the distinctive mode of be-
ing of a “communicatively structured form of life.”82 Importantly, on this 
view, prenatal forms of life don’t yet possess dignity because they are still 
incapable of engaging in reciprocal and symmetrical relations of mutual 
recognition with other human beings:
As a member of a species, as a specimen of a community of procreation, the 
genetically individuated child in utero is by no means a fully-fledged person 
“from the very beginning.” It takes entrance in the public sphere of a linguis-
tic community for a natural creature to develop into both an individual and a 
person endowed with reason.83
The advantage of this strategy is that it allows Habermas to disconnect 
the debate on genetic intervention from the much too delicate ideologi-
cal discussion of the moral status of human embryos. If he sees genetic 
intervention as a threat to human dignity, this is not because it tampers 
with prenatal forms of life but because it creates a radically asymmetric 
power balance between the generations, in the sense that the members of 
one generation would be treating those of the next as a means and not as 
ends, as objects and not as potential co-subjects. Hence, when Habermas 
argues that the danger of genetic technologies is that they have the power 
to change human nature, then he means that they will undermine the very 
foundations of the moral community of equals.





Human beings possess dignity only insofar as they “belong to the 
universe of members who address intersubjectively accepted rules and 
orders to each other.”84 In other words, according to Habermas, notions 
such as ‘dignity’ and ‘inviolability’ “have a significance only in inter-
personal relations of mutual respect, in the egalitarian dealings among 
persons.”85 As already said, this implies that the human in its presub-
jective state (embryo, fetus, newborn) cannot be given “the absolute 
protection of life enjoyed by persons who are subjects possessing basic 
rights.”86 Although these presubjective stages of development are a nec-
essary precondition for the formation of one’s own sense of personal 
identity, the human achieves moral agency and freedom precisely in its 
separation from this biological layer. Habermas also explains this dis-
tinction in terms of the difference between “being-a-body” and “having-
a-body.” The primary mode of self-experience is that of being a body. 
That is to say, in their initial stages of ontogenic development, human 
beings still fully coincide with their body, almost in the very same way 
as animals coincide with their environment. Having-a-body, on the other 
hand, “is the result of assuming an objectivating attitude toward the prior 
fact of being a body, a capacity we do not acquire until youth.”87 While 
initially we are one with our body, gradually we come to realize that this 
mode of experience does not fully exhaust our being and that we are also 
always more than just our body. Such an experience arises, for example, 
when we try to acquire a new skill and we are faced with the fact that 
our body just doesn’t seem to want to cooperate with ‘us.’ Yet, a person 
“’has’ or “possesses’ her body only trough being this body in proceeding 
with her life.”88 It is only because we are our bodies that we are able to 
“differentiate between actions we ascribe to ourselves and actions we 
ascribe to others,”89 and thus to understand ourselves as autonomous and 
unique persons. Moreover, Habermas adds, in order to feel one with our 
body, “it seems that that this body has to be experienced as something 
natural – as a continuation of the organic, self-regenerative life from 
which the person was born.”90 With genetic intervention, however, rather 
than being-a-body and having-a-body being distinct modes of experi-










The realization that our hereditary factors were, in a past before our past, sub-
jected to programming, confronts us on an existential level, so to speak, with 
the expectation that we subordinate our being a body to our having a body.91
If a person realizes that her body has not been given her by nature, 
but that it has been genetically programmed by somebody else, then that 
person will experience the body that she ‘is’ permanently as the body 
that she ‘has,’ as thus as not quite her own. And insofar as this situation 
“may give rise to a novel, curiously asymmetrical type of relationship 
between person,“92 it will prevent genetically modified humans and 
non-genetically modified humans from ever recognizing one another as 
moral equals.
At the end of the first chapter, we have argued that this line of ar-
gument also has a profoundly unsettling corollary. We argued that by 
giving substantive content to the notion of ‘human nature,’ Habermas’s 
argument risks withholding the status of human being to any genetically 
enhanced being that may be brought into existence in the future. In his 
view, ‘normal’ human beings will not be able to enter into “symmetri-
cal relationships” with these kinds of beings because they constitute “a 
foreign body in the legally institutionalized relations of recognition in 
modern societies.”93 Following Agamben and Esposito, we could say that 
by constructing his argument in this way, Habermas ends up establishing 
a biological caesura within humanity between genetically enhanced and 
non-genetically enhanced human beings. That is, by making member-
ship of the moral community contingent upon the possession of a ‘natural 
body,’ Habermas risks isolating a “bare life” or an “existence without 
life” within the community.
It should be clear, then, that the problems and questions associ-
ated with the emerging possibility to radically redesign life through 
genetic technologies cannot be properly addressed within a human na-
ture framework. Rather, what is urgently needed today is an equally 
radical politico-philosophical redefinition of life. Above all, this new 
conception of life should be conceived such that it no longer allow for 
a separation between pure biological life and political life, between 
zoē and bios. In chapter four we argued that Arendt’s concept of natal-
ity provides us with the basic outlines of such a “form-of-life.” If the 
potentiality of human beings to act freely is predicated on the condition 
that they are born biologically ‘unfinished,’ then this implies that the 






co-implicated from the very beginning. Moreover, we also suggested 
that this notion of natal life has strong implications for how we should 
approach the question of genetic intervention, for if it is true that the 
biological traits human beings are born with never solidify into a set 
of fixed properties and dispositions, then there is no reason to fear that 
genetic intervention will interfere with the human capacity to act. After 
all, even genetically enhanced human beings will still have to come 
into the world through birth.
Stiegler’s theory of anthropogenesis provides two additional insights 
to this rearticulation of the concept of life. First, it allows us to see that 
human existence is not only natal on an ontogenetic level, but on an a 
phylogenetic level as well. We argued that the concept of natality ex-
presses the idea that human freedom is conditioned by the biological fact 
that individual human beings are always born too early. By this we meant 
that our premature birth releases us from the fate of being compelled to 
follow a biogenetically predetermined course of life. Stiegler’s theory ar-
gues that this is also true for the human species as a whole. To see this, 
we need only to briefly revisit his reading of the myth of Epimetheus 
and Prometheus. Remember that this myth states that the human only 
came into existence after Epimetheus had already handed out all avail-
able qualities to the other living beings and thus that the human was from 
the very beginning left unprovided for – “naked, unshod, unbedded, and 
unarmed.”94 So, in a sense, this myth also tells us that the human is ‘born’ 
both too early and too late. Too early because the human was brought into 
existence before it was endowed with a particular, defining quality; Too 
late because, at the time the human came into existence, all qualities had 
already been distributed to the other living beings. Yet, contrary to the 
standard interpretations of this myth95 – and this is the second point we 
wish to make –, Stiegler doesn’t take Prometheus’s intervention to mean 
that the human is compensated for his originary lack of essence by the gift 
of technology. The human is born neither before technology (it is not an 
instrument), nor, for that matter, after technology but through technology. 
This is, at least, the conclusion that one may draw from Stiegler’s reading 
of Leroi-Gourhan. As we explained, Stiegler argues that there is ample 
paleontological evidence to conclude that the process of hominization 
was the result of the fact that one particular living being managed to free 
itself from the pressure of genetic constraints by entering into a mutually 
constitutive relationship with technical artifacts. The birth of the human 
94 Quoted in Stiegler, The Fault of Epimetheus, 187.
95 See for example Heinrich Popitz, Der Aufbruch zur Artifiziellen Gesellschaft ( Tübingen: 
J. C. B. Mohr, 1995), 44-47. 
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is the transition from a genetic program to an epiphylogenetic program; 
or, what amounts to the same, from a process of genetic selection to a 
process of artificial selection. In a way, then, the human is always al-
ready technologically ‘enhanced.’ Clearly, this view has important conse-
quences for how the contemporary debate on human genetic intervention 
is framed. Because if it is true that artificial selection has made the pro-
cess of humanization possible in the first place, then it no longer makes 
any sense to be either ‘for’ or ‘against’ human genetic modification. As 
we’ve already indicated, seeing technology as an intrinsic condition of 
humanity doesn’t in the least imply that genetic intervention is entirely 
unproblematic. But it does mean that it cannot be decided in advance 
what it essentially means to be human. Perhaps, then, the very possibility 
to genetically modify human beings retroactively reveals the fact that “we 
already were no longer human.”96
96 Stiegler, The Fault of Epimetheus, 136.
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